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Abstract
One of the most significant urban phenomena in Serbia over the past thirty years has 
been the rapid and widespread growth of illegal housing building. It is widely 
believed that the socialist housing policy of the 1970s and 1980s is the main rationale 
behind illegal building in Belgrade in the 1990s. Although the policy resulted in a 
housing shortage and consequently initiated illegal building, the author will argue 
that changing socio-economic and political conditions during the transitional period 
in Serbia created a new set of reasons for illegal building.
The thesis explores how the new political elite used an opportunity for profit making 
by manipulating the housing shortage and exercising control of state owned land 
through their informal and formal links. The case study of Dedinje, the most 
privileged area in Belgrade, illustrates how the political elite, including former 
president Slobodan Milosevic and individuals close to his regime, were breaking the 
rules and building illegal villas and office buildings. The second case study focuses 
on the Zemun council, run by another political party, and analyses how the law was 
ignored, and illegal building allowed as means for collecting political favours. 
Finally, a brief analysis of kiosk building across the other municipalities, run by the 
other political parties proves the same relationship between corruption and informal 
linkages.
This discussion is advanced through a framework of new institutionalism; 
specifically the thesis is built around an argument for the importance of informal 
institutions, especially in a corrupt society.
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1 Chapter: Introduction
1.1 Research Question
Post-socialist Belgrade faces many socio-economic problems as a consequence of its 
communist past and post-communist changes. However, one of the major problems 
Belgrade with its 1.7 million citizens faces (Census, 2002), is prolific illegal building. 
When a law on legalisation of illegally constructed buildings and objects was passed 
in 2003, the Minister for Building and Urbanism sent an appeal to citizens through 
TV adverts to legalise their houses. The advert informed them that there were almost 
1 million illegally built objects in Serbia. In 2001 the estimations for the total number 
of illegal objects in Belgrade varied between 100,000 and 200,000 (Secretariat for 
Property Affairs and Legal Rights, Belgrade, 2001).
The main research question of this thesis is why the majority of the buildings 
constructed in the 1990s in Belgrade were illegally built. More specifically: what 
were the major drivers that allowed illegal building on such a scale and what were 
the roles of political parties, politicians and institutions in illegal building?
In order to answer these questions, it is of crucial importance to explain how the 
urban realm was both dependent on and constrained by its communist past as well as 
by the economic and social context in the 1990s. Furthermore, it is necessary to 
establish who the relevant powerful actors were, what their interests were and what 
the relations were between them, in addition to uncovering the mechanisms and rules 
they set and used to achieve their goals. It is also essential to see what factors 
directed the construction of a dominant political coalition within a given set of 
structural constraints and opportunities and to explain how different political parties 
were creating new rules as well as informal coalitions around illegal building. In 
addition, an explanation is required for the failure of institutions to block illegal 
building.
9
The hypothesis is that social change and the socio-economic and political contexts do 
not explain enough, and that a focus on institutions in terms of rules, routines and 
interactions is key to getting to the core of the problem. Those rules and routines 
were created initially by the elite and subelites, made up of politicians from ruling 
and opposition parties, with the ultimate goals of gaining benefits and at the same 
time buying social peace which enabled them to win elections. This elite and 
subelites used the inherited institutional system, preventing its full transformation 
into a democratic transparent one, for their own benefits and fused some of its power 
into their own hands. New rules spread from the top down and so local authorities, 
no matter from which party, used them for both financial and political gain. The 
overall result was the rise of corruption and the creation of informal links around 
illegal economic and political activites at all levels of society. Corruption became a 
very strong ‘informal institution’, in some cases more powerful than many formal 
ones.
What additionally persuaded me to analyse the extensive illegality in building was 
the arrival of the police with local council inspectors at my parents’ house in 1999 in 
order to demolish the 2.5 sq m shed which they had had in their backyard since 1987. 
That was the first case of an attempt to demolish an illegal object that I had ever 
witnessed. What particularly interested me was how a great number of illegal villas, 
houses and kiosks, built everywhere and mostly in public spaces, were not 
demolished. What criteria had local councillors and inspectors used when they 
decided to demolish my parents’ shed? Why was it a priority to demolish a shed and 
not some other object that was located in a park, for example? My parents applied to 
legalise the shed, but after a few years they have still not received any response from 
the local council on whether legalisation was approved or not.
1.2 Definitions
Illegal building is a process defined as construction carried out without previously 
acquired building permits (Petovar, 2003). It is related to the construction of new 
houses, the adaptation and change of purpose of existing houses and construction of
10
auxiliary and concomitant objects such as garages and storage units. The socialist 
government suppressed the problem and kept it off the political agenda due to its 
inability to subsidise houses for so many newcomers. Many immigrants from rural 
areas built weekend cottages in the Belgrade suburbs, where they produced fruit and 
vegetables during weekends. Following this the number of illegally built houses rose 
spontaneously through the 1970s and 1980s. According to Saveljic (1988), 98.1% of 
illegal builders in Belgrade until 1988 were immigrants from rural areas and between 
70-90 % of these belonged to the working class.
There is another type of illegal building defined as usurpation. This type of illegal 
building is not necessarily in suburbs but on publicly-owned land and in public 
spaces. In the 1990s, public spaces like parks, and public objects and parcels of 
private ownership have been ‘attacked’ by developers and investors building onto 
them, leading to these public spaces being legalised as private properties. The most 
common examples of this are kiosks, built in parks, on riverbanks, in the backyards 
of public buildings and on pavements, disabling safe passage for pedestrians. The 
number of kiosks is still unknown, but they are all around the city and have become a 
primary feature of Belgrade’s identity, which has recently been dubbed the ‘Balkan 
Sao Paolo’ (Petovar, 2003) due to the extent of illegal building. The main actors in 
these cases, besides the builders themselves, are politicians at high levels within the 
city and republic, as well as investors, developers, local authorities and planners 
(Petovar, 2003). Although usurpation is associated with the period when Slobodan 
Milosevic’s party was ruling the city, it escalated during the period when opposition 
parties won local elections in 1997. Between then and 2000, the number of illegally 
built objects increased to 200,000, a 15.95 % increase over a three-year period 
(Andjelkovic, 2001).
Illegal building is a phenomenon that has legal, urbanistic and social dimensions. 
Legally it is an expression of a violation of law by the person who builds without a 
legal permit. For urban planning, illegal building is an obstacle for the 
implementation of urban plans and it violates infrastructure, efficiency and the 
aesthetics of the city. Sociologically, illegal building is a self-initiative of the second- 
class citizens who build in order to meet their housing need due to the lack of any
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other housing solution. They were not able to get anything from society despite 
contributing (through various taxes) to the building of houses for the upper class 
(Zivkovic, 1981). Apart from these aspects, illegal building in Serbia the 1990s also 
had political and economic dimensions that emerged from the changed political, 
economic and, consequently, institutional context.
1.3 Political and Economic Context
Economic crisis, civil wars and international sanctions marked Serbia in the 1990s.1 
Moreover, a command economy was replaced by state intervention in the economy 
by the post-communist elite, resulting in a failure to develop a completely free 
market. The same occurred in the property markets, where the final prices of 
properties were not the result of free competition. State distribution of benefits, used 
as a mechanism for governing, has not been undertaken transparently. This, in 
addition to the inherited public administration, created an optimal environment for 
the development of corruption. Since the state had power over the economy, it has 
been extremely attractive to politicians prone to corruption (Begovic and Mijatovic, 
2001). Therefore, certain groups that saw the chance to benefit were stimulated to 
adapt the regulations and inherited institutional framework to their own interests. 
This could have been done in two ways: by gaining an exemption from the formal 
rules, or by adapting the mles to particular interests. The previous communist 
institutional system and rules, instead of being replaced by new ones with democratic 
rules, were replaced with a system whose rules were based on corruption and 
informal links. Corruption increased and consequently demand for corrupt behaviour 
increased rapidly. Growing demand for corrupt behaviour was followed by a 
growing supply of corrupt services. However, at the beginning of the 1990s, the elite 
had the intention of applying changes to mles only for the cases where their interests 
were involved. The late 1990s had witnessed unintended consequences when the new 
mles spread out to inform the conduct of the rest of society.
1 For the period before 1990 and disintegration, the country will be referred to as the former 
Yugoslavia (Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia), for the post 1990 period the thesis will refer to 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as Serbia until 2002. Thereafter the current name, the 
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, will be used in order to make it more clear.
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The change of rules started at the very top of the political hierarchy. The best 
example of it was the first indictment made against ex-Yugoslav president Slobodan 
Milosevic in 2000 for illegal building in Tolstojeva 33 Street. Accusations of war 
crimes, genocide and fraud, being more complex and difficult, followed a year later. 
The rest of society, affected by the housing shortage and influenced by such 
examples, subsequently adopted the same pattern of behaviour but with much 
smaller profits and gains.
This thesis starts from a focus on the elite, the subelites and those individuals close to 
them who were building illegally and gaining profits from this, since they set up an 
institutional context that encouraged the rest of society to take over the same pattern 
of behaviour regarding building. The poorest layers of society which built illegally in 
order to have somewhere to live are discussed and explained but not in as much 
detail. This is because only 18% of illegal buildings are settled by people who live in 
poverty (Petovar, 2003), which suggests that the majority of illegally built structures 
belong to either the middle or higher classes. One of the major characteristics of the 
new institutional context was the existence of specific kinds of informal networks 
that were operating behind the scenes. The term that was first used by ex mayor 
Nebojsa Covic in 1995 to define those informal networks involved in illegal building 
in Serbia in the 1990s is the ‘urbanistic mafia’. This has never been fully defined and 
there are different interpretations. The first one relates to informal networks made 
around building, including all the institutions concerned with the issuance of building 
permits, as well as professionals like architects and planners, and politicians and 
investors, as a result of the new institutional system (Zdravkovic, 2001; Saveski, 
2001). The second definition includes only investors and politicians, and treats them 
as organised criminals (Petovar, 2001; Ilic, 2001; Prodanovic; 2000). The existence 
of two models results from the difficulty of identifying exactly who the carriers of 
illegality were. This thesis rejects the theory of illegal building being organised crime. 
It rather focuses on the exercise of power by the elite and subelites, informal 
networks and the failure of institutions to block illegality since the elite and subelites 
had altered them in an irregular way.
1.4 Elite, Informal Links and Corruption
Due to the complex problems related to the development of illegal building during 
the 1990s, it is difficult to apply a single theory from political studies or urban 
studies to it. Therefore, insights from several different theories will be drawn upon 
and should be viewed as complementary rather than competitive theoretical elements.
Classic urban political theories, such as the elitist and pluralist approaches, offer 
useful entry points for explaining the realities in Belgrade. Elitist theory provides 
help in defining the elite and an explanation of the functioning of the creators of the 
institutional setting for illegal building in Belgrade in the 1990s. In addition, 
pluralism is an alternative approach that might provide some useful insight for an 
analysis of relationships among different parties and the significance of elections as 
well as help explain the relationship between the elite and the rest of society. 
However, it has limitations in the present context because it has been mostly shaped 
and used in a democratic context, and does not have a strong institutional focus. 
Furthermore, neo-elitism is introduced as a theory that attempts to analyse the actual 
exercise of power. It is based on analysis of the hidden face of power and includes 
compulsion, influence, authority, force, and manipulation. It also analyses the 
mobilisation of political bias and latent conflicts.
Nevertheless, given that classical political studies and neo-elitism do not take 
corruption and other abnormal political patterns into consideration and do not focus 
on interaction between individuals and institutions, there is a need to add a new 
approach, and some elements of new institutionalism may be helpful in establishing a 
theoretical explanation for the questions raised. As a symptom of institutional 
weaknesses, corruption needs to be viewed within a broader institutional framework. 
The newly emerged institutional framework of the post-communist era was based on 
newly created rules and old rules constrained by the elite and subelites. As a 
consequence of increasing corruption the established institutions were unable to 
control the bureaucracy inherited from the communist period, to protect property and
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contractual rights or to provide necessary support to the rule of law. Some 
institutional functions were taken over by powerful members of the elite and 
subelites, who were organising the remaining institutions in accordance with their 
political needs.
In addition, inherited institutions were also affected by a series of economic and 
social shocks (civil wars, international sanctions, unemployment) and consequently 
produced sets of new rules. This is consistent with institutionalism, both old and new, 
which argues that causation goes in both directions and that institutions shape social 
and economic life but also that society and the economy shape political life and 
institutions. This study will be orientated towards an examination of the formal and 
informal institutions and the creation of new mles that have determined decision­
making and decision implementation. In order to find the answers, the research uses 
elements of new institutionalism to assist theoretical explanation. New 
institutionalism analyses institutions as sets of mles and the routines which they 
produce. Moreover, it uses the concept of dynamic rather than static institutions 
characterised by ongoing interaction with individuals. Additionally it analyses the 
relationship between institutions and the wider socio-economic context in which they 
operate. In particular, the significance of informal networks and institutions will be 
employed to help explain the development of illegal building through the 1990s in 
Belgrade.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is organised in three parts. The first part is focused on potential theoretical 
explanations for informal and illegal developments in Belgrade. It considers various 
political theories such as elitism, pluralism and neo-elitism as well as the concepts 
used in new institutionalism. Additionally, it analyses the problem of corruption from 
a theoretical point of view. It also includes the methodological justifications for the 
approach applied to the empirical research in the field. These comprise Chapters 2 
and 3.
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The next part is focused on the origins of illegal building during the communist 
period. It analyses various political, economic and institutional reasons behind illegal 
building, but it focuses in particular on the political determination of the communists 
to emphasise collective housing over individual housing. Additionally it considers 
the consequences of unbalanced regional economic growth and development, and the 
resulting migration to Belgrade, for the housing conditions in the city. Chapter 4 also 
deals with land nationalisation and its consequences for the housing sector. An 
additional factor that is analysed in this chapter is the very unfavourable financial 
policy for individual building. Mostly as a result of these reasons, people had started 
building illegally, predominantly in the suburbs and on agricultural land. Analysis of 
the communist period is very important since some of the problems related to illegal 
building were inherited from that era.
Chapter 5 analyses the political and economic situation in the 1990s. The SFRY 
disintegrated and the period of civil wars and economic and social destruction started. 
From the most developed Eastern European country, Yugoslavia became one of the 
poorest countries in the whole of Europe. In order to survive, many people turned to 
the black economy, corruption and bribery. The aim of this chapter is to explain the 
relation between the political and economic context and a new institutional 
framework created by the elite and subelites, and their impact on the housing sector 
under those new circumstances. Additionally, it analyses the second face of illegal 
building developed in this period - usurpation. Contrary to the citizens who were 
building in order to provide housing during communism, a new class of speculators 
and profit makers emerged. They were building in central municipalities, on land 
usually got by usurpation, and earned huge profits from selling flats. These builders 
were people from, or very close to, the ruling elite or subelites.
Chapter 6 addresses these issues at the city level, through the analysis of city 
institutions and local politics. This chapter analyses the changes in the definition of 
the public interest as well as of urban planning. It also analyses the direction in 
which city institutions shifted and which routines and rules they formed in the post-
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communist period. It introduces empirical research on the elite, subelites, city 
institutions and their mutual interaction.
The third part of the thesis presents the findings of my own empirical research 
carried out in Belgrade in the form of two case studies. The purpose of Chapter 7 is 
to analyse the elite who changed rules and institutions and adapted them to their own 
interests and the mechanisms they used in the Dedinje area to gain personal benefits. 
Dedinje has traditionally been the area settled by the elite. There are many illegal 
builders, but the most interesting cases, like Slobodan Milosevic’s house, the Karic 
Family and the Pink Television building will be analysed, and the pattern of illegal 
building among rich people will be established. Additionally this chapter analyses 
how the institutional framework (rules and routines) was changed to work to the 
advantage of the most powerful.
The focus of chapter 8 is the local council of Zemun since it is the settlement with 
the largest number (17,970) of illegally built objects. It has been suspected that there 
are even more, which are not registered (Gavrilovic and Curuvija, 2001). The aim of 
this chapter is to show how illegal building spread to the rest of the city. Informal 
links and corruption were the most important factors in illegal building, no matter 
which political party was involved, and the principles and mechanisms, as well as the 
purpose of, allowing illegal building, were the same as in Dedinje.
Finally, the thesis concludes with an analysis of the two case studies. The 
conclusions about unofficial rules, the elite and subelites, and on the strength of 
informal networks are presented in this part. Furthermore, the mechanisms they used 
as well as the interests that led them are evaluated. The final impact on the 
institutions and the rest of the society is considered. Furthermore, the situation after 
the removal of Milosevic’s regime is analysed and illegal builders are assessed in 
light of the new political context.
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1.6 Illegality as a global problem
Illegal building is not a phenomenon unique to Belgrade. Informal settlements, often 
referred to as squatter settlements or shantytowns, are dense settlements comprising 
households and communities housed in self-constructed shelters under conditions of 
informal or traditional land tenure. They are a common characteristic of developing 
countries and are typically the result of an urgent need for shelter by the urban poor. 
They are characterised by a dense proliferation of small, improvised shelters built 
from diverse materials, degradation of the local environment and by severe social 
problems. The illegal settlements exist globally: in Brazil, so called favelas, in 
Venezuela -  barrios, the informal settlements in Mexico, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Kenya, South Africa, as well as settlements in Turkey - gecekondu, India, 
Philippines, Pakistan and Malaysia, are some of the examples across the world. 
Recent research shows that 30 to 60 per cent of the population of cities in developing 
countries live in informal settlements (Durand and Clerc, 1996). It is estimated that 
between 40 to 60 per cent of residents of cities in the developing world operate 
outside of the law (Rasnah, 1999). In cities in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the 
urban poor often have to break the law in order to gain access to housing. The 
reasons behind the illegal developments are diverse, including housing shortage, 
different cultures and tradition, resistance to modernisation or centralised 
government as well as social conflict around law, property and urban space 
(Fernandes and Varley, 1998). In cities in developing countries, illegality is mostly 
associated with the urban poor.
In most of the illegal cities worldwide, the major reason for their development is 
housing shortage and inadequate housing supply. Furthermore, the lack of, or 
inappropriate, governmental response was the cause of their increase. For example, 
similarly to Serbia in the 1990s, in Karachi, Pakistan, the governmental involvement 
in illegal building was very evident (Nientied and van der Linden, 1990). “The 
government through the Karachi Development Agency is actively promoting illegal 
subdivision by systematically failing to provide an alternative. Furthermore, many 
highly and lowly placed persons in the government apparatus are crucial actors 
allowing and facilitating the system and profiting from substantially by it. In the third
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place, the legal and bureaucratic systems are instrumental to illegal subdivision of 
government land” (Nientied and van der Linden, 1990:230). In addition to the similar 
pattern, in Serbia illegality was widespread, including all levels of government, not 
only that of the city. Another reason that can be found behind illegal building both in 
Serbia and in developing countries is the inadequate response of urban planning, and 
the laws behind the issuance of building permits. For example, in India and Pakistan, 
urban planning has been inflexible and the process of issuing building permits is too 
long (McAuslan, 1998). In many African countries local governments have little or 
no say in planning decisions which are purely controlled by the central government. 
Additionally there is no public participation in the making of plans. Most of the 
planning laws have a purely elitist nature in Nigeria and Zambia for example 
(McAuslan, 1998), while this was not purely the case in Serbia.
In addition to some similarity in the causes of illegality, there have been some 
similarities between attempts to resolve illegal housing problems in Serbia and other 
countries. For example, illegal settlements in Turkey were very often legalised. 
Furthermore, legalisation did not necessarily mean an increase in investment in 
housing and payments of services by settlers (Yonder, 1998). A clientelist nature 
characterised Turkish political parties at national and local levels. This consequently 
fuelled both the speculative building boom and informal settlement formation 
(Yonder, 1998). During national elections, all parties promised title deeds and 
delivery of infrastructure services to illegal settlements in addition to legalising 
illegal buildings in the existing middle income districts. However, due to the lack of 
financial and technical resources, municipal governments failed to deliver the 
services and building regulation, which resulted in selective enforcement and 
relaxation of regulations or “the most expedient way of the dispensing patronage” in 
return for votes in both the formal and informal districts of the city (Yonder, 
1998:59). Similarly, political parties in Serbia promised legalisation of illegal 
buildings for electoral purposes, buying votes by not intervening in the illegality.
Although Belgrade was dubbed the ‘Balkan Sao Paolo’ (Petovar, 2003) the illegality 
in the cities in developing countries has distinct features compared to that found in
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Serbia. For example, in many developing countries such as Malaysia, the illegality 
was the result of existing colonial policies and legal restrictions introduced while 
they were colonies. Those policies did not take into consideration Malayan lifestyle 
and so they resulted in the segregation of low income groups in slums (McAuslan, 
1998). McAuslan additionally explains the roots of illegality in the South Pacific and 
Africa by the relationship between customary land tenure and urban development 
(1998). Customary land tenure is unwritten law which governs the relationship 
between a particular group (tribe) of people and the land on which they customarily 
reside or farm (McAuslan, 1998). Unofficial customary tenure still exists in towns 
and cities in Africa. Additionally, the illegality also occurs when the customary land 
is taken away from the people who use it (1998). The example of a clash between the 
customary land tenure and colonial land tenure legislation can be found in Bamako, 
Mali. The conflict between two systems escalated after Mali gained independence 
and the city started expanding into mral areas (van Westen, 1990). A similar dualist 
urban tenure system is a feature of all Sub-Saharan African cities (McAuslan, 1998).
Another pattern that can be found in developing countries but not in Serbia is a land 
invasion. Although it has been argued that the rapid increase in the number of kiosks 
in Belgrade is a kind of invasion, land invasions in Asia, Africa and Latin America 
resulted in the creation of squatter settlements on public land. The income and wealth 
structure of typical squatter settlements elsewhere are also different from those of 
illegal builders in Serbia. While in developing countries illegal settlers were mostly 
poor trying to provide shelter for themselves, in Serbia the majority of illegal 
builders were middle and upper class while only 18% of illegal builders were in 
poverty (Petovar, 2003).
However, illegal forms of production of urban housing and land are becoming more 
and more associated with the privileged parts of third world cities. They involve, for 
example, closed developments in which gates that make private enclosures may 
prevent the public from gaining access to the road system or public spaces such as 
beaches and environmentally protected areas (Fernandes and Varley, 1998). Still, the 
quantitative importance and social implications of illegality in low income areas has
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more impact on the cities and on the qualities of life in them than the development of 
gated communities.
Gated communities are planned as a whole by project developers and are 
characterised by sophisticated security measures. They can be located in inner cities 
as well as on the outskirts of the cities. They represent ‘new extraterritorial spaces’ in 
the cities as a response to the social conflict and violence in everyday life in the Latin 
American cities (Coy and Pohler, 2001). Those gated communities are often illegal 
because they may prevent the public from gaining access to the road system or to 
other public spaces. Gated communities have a high level of fortification and often 
include schools, shopping centres and sporting facilities. Dedinje, an elite part of 
Belgrade, which is a focus in this study, also has a high level of security but that is 
due to the large number of politicians and foreign diplomats who live there, which is 
the result of the standard security procedure in most of the countries. Some of them 
build higher fences than allowed by regulations as Karic did (Chapter 7), but still 
Dedinje cannot be classified as a gated community due to the social and wealth 
structure of the area, allowed access to the general public, and the lack of 
fortification.
In summary, although this thesis does not have a comparative character, it has to be 
outlined that illegal building and informal settlements exist globally and especially in 
developing countries. However, the illegal settlements in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America were developed as a result of huge poverty and urban immigrants trying to 
resolve their housing problems. In Serbia illegal housing developed in a different 
context -  economic, political and institutional. Contrary to small improvised shelters 
made by diverse materials, illegal houses in Serbia were solid, middle class houses, 
huge building apartments as well as luxury villas. Furthermore, in contrast to land 
invasions and building of informal settlements led by poor people in developing 
countries, illegal building in Serbia in the post-communist period was led by the 
elite, subelites and the existing middle class which makes the Serbian case more 
peculiar and different from the other existing cases.
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2 Chapter : Theoretical Review
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to give a critical review of relevant theories that could help 
provide an explanation for the illegal developments in Belgrade in the 1990s. The 
theories that appear the most relevant and explanatory are theories of power in urban 
politics, new institutionalism and specific theories of corruption. Specific theories 
about housing under socialism are also relevant because they analyse the root of the 
housing shortage and consequently illegal building. These are addressed in Chapter 4.
Power models analyse decision-making within a framework of the structures of 
power. Three power models are related approaches that are relevant to this research: 
elitism and pluralism (part of the so-called community power debate) and neo-elitism. 
These models are relevant because they can help provide insights into how power 
was distributed and exercised as well as into the diversity of interests which were 
competing for scarce resources in post-communist Serbia. Several concepts from 
these three models will be used for understanding of Belgrade’s political context.
The first approach towards studying urban political power used in this research was 
made by the elitists who constructed a picture of an urban ‘elite’ from 
interconnections between individuals in positions of economic and political power. 
On the contrary, pluralists analysed the complexity of interest coalitions around 
actual policy decisions and disputes. For pluralists, power is distributed among 
different groups and thus no one group has enough power and resources to control 
the urban political process. As a result of such a distribution, a multiplicity of groups 
defines the (urban) power structure. In order to make a decision, private interests and 
political leaders have to make coalitions. Those coalitions vary from issue to issue 
and they tend to be short lived. Neo-elitism represents a theoretical analysis of the 
actual exercise of power through the mobilisation of bias. The exercise of power is
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examined through the ability of politicians to decide which issues are to be on the 
agenda in the process of policy making, and which are to be excluded.
The aim of this section is to see what the major concepts in these theories are and to 
see to what extent they can help answer, in principle, the research questions set out in 
the previous chapter. That theoretical framework needs to help to explain why the 
post-communist institutional framework did not block the increase of illegal building. 
Therefore, new institutionalism is also assessed as it might help provide a theoretical 
explanation for this question. Furthermore, since corruption is a symptom of essential 
economic, political and institutional weaknesses, and is not only the result of the will 
or actions of elites, it also needs to be viewed in that context. Thus, several theories 
of corruption are considered for explanation of the problems of corruption in post­
communist Serbia.
2.2 Power Models
The major purpose of this section is to give a critical review of the relevant urban 
political theories, particularly elitism and its alternative - pluralism, and present their 
strengths and weaknesses concerning illegal developments in Belgrade, in order to 
come up with an operational understanding of the elite and its influence upon the 
political system. Additionally it considers the explanatory potential of neo-elitist 
theory with its focused attention on the exercise of power.
2.2.1 The Elitist model
In the elitist model, power is unequally distributed in society and it is concentrated in 
the hands of a group of economically and politically powerful individuals. Elite 
theorists suggest that in the real world there are those at the top with the power and 
the masses are without power. The group of individuals who have power, and whose 
decisions play a crucial part in shaping the lives, choices and futures of the mass of
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the people are the elite. On the other hand, the masses have the combination of 
apathy, insufficient time, lack of expertise and the need to be guided. Additionally, 
the elites’ natural greed for power results in decision-making being the process 
which works to the advantage of those elites. Whether we live in democratic or 
authoritarian societies, with market or command economies, “control over crucial 
resources like property, money, the legitimate use of violence, political influence, 
scientific knowledge and so on is concentrated in the hands of a few” (Harding, 
1995:35).
Two Italian theorists, Mosca and Pareto, are the originators of this model in the 
modem social sciences. Pareto provided a dual definition of the elite, and argued that 
“there are two strata in society: first, lower stratum, the non-elite; and higher stratum, 
the elite, which is divided into two: a governing elite and a non-goveming elite” 
(Pareto, 1935: 1424). The elite consists of those keeping social and economic power, 
with some also holding political power (Pareto, 1935). Mosca concentrated more on 
the analysis of the relationship between the elite and the non-elite which he found 
“controlling, more or less legal, and more or less arbitrary and violent” (Mosca 
quoted in Parsons, 1995:249). However, their approach is considered individualistic 
since their definition of the elite was based on achievements essentially in areas of 
intelligence, character or skill. Although this approach first warned of the link that 
might exist between powerful individuals and institutions, it never gave a full 
explanation of those relationships.
However, the more relevant theoretical approaches for this thesis are those that 
address elites in accordance with their position in institutions, using this institutional 
location as a criterion that separates them from the mass. Some authors like Max 
Weber argued that an elite is necessary for the government of complex modem 
societies. He argued that rationalization in capitalist society leads to the formation of 
a bureaucracy which would replace other forms of organisation and consequently 
pose a threat to democratic decision-making by elected politicians (Weber, 1947). 
However, he was positive that the liberal democratic system could manage 
bureaucratic power by elected politicians who, with their authority, will maintain 
social control over bureaucratic power (Harding, 1995). However, according to
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C.Wright Mills (1965), with the growing bureaucratisation of American society, 
power became concentrated within big business corporations, the central government 
and the military establishment. These organisations had control over the nation’s vast 
physical, financial, political and information resources and thus the leaders of those 
key power centres were making all national decisions. Liberal democratic institutions 
gave sovereignty to the mainly non-elected ‘power elite’ (Mills, 1965). Mills also 
first addressed the issues of the masses and their non-participation arguing that the 
masses are not incompetent, apathetic or untrustworthy, but are rather manipulated 
and exploited and kept in a state of ignorance, and thus powerless, by elites who rule 
in their own interest (1965).
Domhoff (1983) developed a class hegemony framework combining elite theory and 
class theory, reconceptualising the power elite in class terms. He argued that in 
America there is a corporate upper class that owns major business assets and controls 
the bulk of wealth, including major banks, corporations, mass media, elite 
universities, foundations, important advisory groups and organisations, the executive 
branch of government, the cabinet, the judiciary, the military and the regulatory 
agencies. This class, by virtue of its economic power, also controls and influences 
important departments and agencies of the state and in this way becomes a governing 
class -  the American business aristocracy (Domhoff, 1983).
Classes appear when the production relations result in a division of labour allowing 
the accumulated extra production to be taken and used in the form of the extra value, 
by a minority which exploits the majority (Marx quoted in Dahrendorf, 1959:174). In 
Marx’s analysis, the existence of classes and interests implies the existence of a 
conflict resulting from the historical struggle between the unpropertied working 
class, the proletariat, and the property-owning capitalist class. Power flows from 
economic relations and is translated into political power and thus the dominant 
economic class is the ruling political class. Since classes are political groups, 
political conflict is class conflict (Marx quoted in Dahrendorf, 1959:176).
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However, this thesis uses the concept of elite, and not class, accepting Etzioni- 
Halevy’s (1993) argument that elite is a narrower concept than class. The elite are the 
individuals who, even among the dominant class they belong to, participate more in 
the active control over the organisational and administrative resources of power 
control (Etzioni-Halvey, 1983). However, the members of the elite do not necessary 
belong to the class. For example, a member of the cultural or political elite of the 
working class movement is not necessarily a member of the working class (Lazic, 
2000).
Additionally, in communist societies, class had control over merged economic, 
political and cultural resources, while in the capitalist societies that control was over 
economic resources or capital. The so-called ‘collective’ class monopolised power 
over the resources and subsystems of the society and it was the only socially and 
politically active subject which implied the overlapping of the class and elite in the 
given context (Djilas, 1963). Additionally, the representatives of the intelligentsia 
represented subclass of the ruling class. Other classes like the working class or 
peasants did not have the possibility to organise politically or economically into 
collective action (Lazic, 2000). However, with the break-up of the communist 
systems, which also meant the break-up of the collective class, this fusion of the 
economic, political and cultural control was continued by the emerging elite that was 
rising from the members of the previous class/elite that capitalised their monopolies 
over resources. However, this thesis does not argue that with the break-up of the 
previous systems, classes have disappeared but rather that it takes time for its 
reorganisation and the formation of the new ones. Therefore the elite is a more 
appropriate operational concept for this research.
2.2.2 The Urban Elite
At the urban scale, Floyd Hunter carried out an influential study about the 
distribution of power. In his book Community Power Structure (1953) he analysed 
power structures in a “Regional City”, but everyone knew the city in question was 
Atlanta. He found that to analyse power in Atlanta it was “necessary to identify some
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of the men who wield power, as well as to describe the physical settings in which 
they operate” (Hunter, 1953:10). In order to define the powerful, Hunter introduced a 
reputational methodology in his research, where he asked informants from Atlanta to 
select forty men of power who held important positions in government, the business 
community, and social and civic affairs. However, his approach was faced with many 
problems. First, Hunter had to make a clear cut distinction between the ‘exercising of 
power’ and ‘reputations of power’. Second, there was the problem of making a 
distinction between people who have the potential power and those who are actually 
exercising power. The third problem was related to the ‘judgement sampling’ method 
which does not guarantee that the experts, in this case judges, will not introduce 
serious biases into the results, for example personal policy preferences or personal 
contacts with powerful individuals. An additional problem with the methodology 
Hunter used was that he limited the number of persons who held power to forty, 
which was also subjective and made his methodology weak.
However, from the interviews he did with selected persons Hunter concluded there 
was no single power hierarchy or power pyramid in Atlanta. Rather, there were 
overlapping groups within the business community. Furthermore, different people 
took the lead on different policy issues depending on the nature of the initiative. 
Hunter drew conclusions on the power structure of policy making in Atlanta such 
that “there are several pyramids of power in that community which look more 
important than a pyramid” (Hunter, 1953:79). He found that there were five small 
groups of people who affected decision-making and that businessmen control the 
decision-making process in civic affairs. He suggested that formal governmental 
organisations are not policy originators. They may be the locus of decision-making 
and of implementing and legitimising the same, but they do not invent new policies. 
Hunter concluded that there are no formal connections between the government and 
the business community but the structure of the policy-determining committees and 
their ties with other powerful institutions make government subservient to the 
interests of those groups (Hunter, 1953).
Hunter's study, which brought the term “power structure” into social science 
discourse for the first time, was recognised as a controversial contribution as soon as
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it was published in 1953. Besides the methodological weaknesses, his study was also 
criticised for failure to include the analysis of different actors’ ranges of power as 
well as changing political relations and political power groups (D’Antonio and Form, 
1965). The lack of analysis of those problems, and the unreliability of his 
‘reputational’ methodology, led to the question: has Hunter studied power or its 
reputation? Furthermore, Enrlich suggested that the reputational method might find 
out very little about the power structure and decision-making since it does not make 
it obvious whether the people who have a power actually use it. The relationship 
between power as a potential for control and power as control itself is not very easily 
demonstrated (1961).
Despite some theoretical and methodological weaknesses, Hunter emphasised that 
the elite is a rather complex concept assuming the existence of several pyramids of 
power in a city which take the lead on different policy issues depending on the nature 
of the initiative, implying that the formal political structures are not necessarily the 
policy originators. Thus, Hunter inferred the existence of informal links between 
government and business structures, and the significance of the former in policy 
creation.
2.2.3 Pluralist theories
The classical pluralist studies like Dahl’s Who Governs (1961) and Polsby's 
Community Power and Political Theory (1963) developed a new theoretical and 
methodological approach to power analysis in the cities based on a critique of the 
elitist model. Their critique was focused on three major elitists’ concepts. First, 
pluralists criticised elitists for their basic presumption that there is an ordered system 
of power in every institution because “nothing categorical can be assumed about 
power in any community” (Polsby, 1960: 475). The second critique was related to 
elitists’ hypothesis that the power structure tends to be stable over time. Pluralists 
assume that power could be tied to certain issues which provoke coalitions among 
different interest groups, which does not mean that those coalitions are timelessly 
stable. “Power might be tied to issues and that issues, even if they are temporary or
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persistent, provoke the creating of coalitions between different groups but Hunter can 
not presume that the set of coalitions is timelessly stable and the part of social 
structure” (Polsby, 1961). A third criticism of the elitist model is that it wrongly 
equates reputed power with actual power (Polsby, 1960).
The concept of power upon which analysis is developed in the pluralist model is an 
asymmetric individualist conception, regarding power as based on compromise and 
exchange. Power, as a political concept, is based on the concepts of liberal free 
market theory. It is defined as a resource to be used in the market place, in free 
competition with other actors, in order to maximise personal utility. According to 
Dahl power is the potential of A to make B do something which B would otherwise 
not choose to do or, in the other words, power is actually the control of behaviour 
(Dahl, 1961).
Pluralists focused on the actual exercise of power, and instead of deducing power 
relations from interconnections between the economic and political elite, they 
analysed complex interest arrangements around political decisions and 
argumentation. They rejected the notion that local politics was determined by the 
local economy, and argued that politics has autonomous authority and commands 
important resources including economic ones. Consequently, social notables do not 
control the state in any instrumental sense (Dahl, 1961). Power was seen as widely 
distributed and the political system so organised that the policy process was driven 
by public demands and opinions (Dahl, 1961). As a result, every legitimate group 
commanded sufficient resources to exercise power and no one particular group 
commanded sufficient resources to control the others. Consequently the urban power 
structure was defined by the bargaining between all these groups (Mollenkopf, 1992). 
Politicians and private interests built coalitions around different questions concerned 
with urban development, social service issues and public policy. Therefore, coalition 
building and participation in decision-making was central to the definition of urban 
power.
Furthermore, the pluralist approach attempts to study specific outcomes of conflicts 
in order to define who really prevails in the process of decision-making in local
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communities. The emphasis in this model is put on the analysis of the concrete, 
visible behaviour that is lacking in Hunter's study. Identification of the individual or 
group who prevails in the decision-making process is the best way to identify the 
most influential group in social life, because direct conflict between actors shows the 
situation that is closest to the experimental test of their abilities to influence the 
outcomes (Polsby, 1963). According to Polsby, decisions are the direct and visible 
outcome of competition among interested actors.
The main critique of the pluralist approach was focused on its definition of interests 
as “actors’ subjective policy preferences” (Dunleavy, 1980:30). Pluralists argued that 
to deduce interests other than those clearly pursued by actors was unscientific and 
could “only involve a substitution of the analyst's own prejudices about actors’ 
‘objective’ interest” (Dahl and Polsby quoted in Dunleavy, 1980:30). However, 
pluralists did not explain how to distinguish ‘subjective policy preferences’ from the 
other offered subjective options. Pluralist analysis ultimately defined interests as 
‘realistic’ policy preferences within the status quo, and thus incorporated references 
to the existing distribution of power in assessing who gained and who lost in political 
conflicts (Balbus quoted in Dunleavy, 1980:30). Consequently, since pluralists 
analyse only conflict situations, their definition of interests leads to the conclusion 
that conflict of interests is identical with the conflicts that are already recognized by 
the political system as issues (Dunleavy, 1980).
Bachrach and Baratz (1970) criticised Dahl and his study of New Haven, for the 
focus of the individuals and decision they made. The only influence on decision­
making which was analysed in the study was about local governance, with the effects 
from the broader region or from the national level excluded from the analysis, which 
made pluralist theory incapable of understanding the social reality that underlies and 
explains its behaviouralist analysis.
Although pluralism offers interesting ideas about politicians and private interests 
building coalitions around different questions concerned with urban development, 
social service issues and public policy, the shortcomings in pluralist methodology
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resulted in unrevealed complex networks of power in the examined locality. The lack 
of analysis of a number of actors from different backgrounds and positions in society 
which were influencing the decision-making process resulted in the rejection of their 
method in urban political analysis and pluralist analysis has become considered as 
disembodied from socio-economic life. However, the new group of theorists who 
criticised pluralists for failing to understand how the relationship between the state 
and the underlying socioeconomic system shapes the political agenda, and restored 
the elite's role after the pluralist critique of it, are neo-elitists. Their approach 
presents a third methodological take on how to look for and/or test evidence of the 
exercise of elites’ power.
2.2.4 Neo-Elitism,
The most radical critique of pluralists came from Bachrach and Baratz in their works 
The Two Faces of Power (1963) and Power and Poverty (1970). In The Two Faces 
of Power they criticised pluralists for their failure to analyse all aspects of power. 
The first face is the one that was considered in the pluralist model, visible in the 
direct conflicts. The other one, which pluralists missed in their analysis, is hidden 
and includes compulsion, influence, authority, force, and manipulation.
Bachrach and Baratz (1963) based their hypothesis on Schattschneider’s theory of 
the mobilisation of bias. “All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of 
the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because 
organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while 
others are organised out” (Schattschneider quoted in Bachrach and Baratz, 1970:8). 
The core of Schattschneider’s theory is that interest groups, which are the foundation 
of the political system, are socially biased to the middle and upper strata and 
therefore the argument that the pressure system automatically represents the whole 
community is not true. “Pressure politics is a selective process ill designed to serve 
diffuse interests” (Schattschneider, 1960: 35). Therefore central to politics is the 
classification of issues into those that are significant and those that are not. The 
‘mobilisation of bias’ could reduce the success of the raised questions that challenge
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dominant principles and values with little or even no visible effect on the dominant 
interests.
Bachrach and Baratz argued that politics is not only concerned with making 
decisions about specific issues, but also constraining which issues are to be on the 
agenda in the process of policy making. Power is not only the control of observable 
behaviour and decisions but it is also contained in the non-observable realm of ‘non­
decisions’. Non-decision-making will involve restraint in decision-making, so as to 
be focused only on safe issues by manipulating the dominant community values, 
myths and political institutions and procedures (1963). Pluralists had failed to 
conceive the extent to which those with power can actually exclude problems and 
issues from the policy-making process. According to Bachrach and Baratz, non- 
decision-making is a mean by which demands for change in the existing allocation of 
benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even 
voiced; or kept covert; or killed to gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; 
or failing all these things, damaged or destroyed in the decision-implementation 
stage of the policy process (1970). Furthermore, “the second face of power is 
revealed when actors create or reinforce social and political values and institutional 
practices which limit the scope of the political process to issues innocuous to 
themselves” (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970: 7).
Matthew Crenson (1971) had applied Baratch and Baratz’s model of two- 
dimensional power empirically, analysing why some American cities had been active 
in addressing the issue of air pollution, whilst others had not. Crenson brought 
together several important areas of analysis: the study of issue formation, decision 
and non-decision-making and the organisational context of policy making. He found 
that although decision-making may be pluralistic and fragmented, non-decision­
making presented a high degree of unity (1971: 179). Crenson’s findings were that 
besides the ability of political power to bias the resolution of local political issues, 
there is also the ability to prevent some topics from even becoming issues and to 
obstruct the growth of emergent issues. “The power reputations of people and groups 
within the community may deter action over certain sensitive and politically 
unprofitable issues. Activity in one issue area may tend to foreclose action in certain
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other issue areas...this power needs not to be exercised in order to be effective” 
(Crenson, 1971:177).
Pluralists responded to the critique from neo-elitists arguing that a non-decision is a 
certain type of decision because it is an observable act, thus “the second face of 
power in practice merges with the first face and it becomes identical” (Polsby, 1980: 
212), and criticised Bachrach and Baratz’s empirical basis for studying non-events 
(Polsby, 1963). Furthermore, pluralists argued that non-decision-making is partly an 
unconscious process and it happens in cases when actors do not participate due to 
expected negative sanctions or due to their non-awareness about consequences 
caused by non-participation in the political process. Therefore, it is very difficult to 
identify non-decisions “which seems generally to come back to determining peoples’ 
real interests” (Wolfinger, 1971: 1077).
Steven Lukes also finds Bachrach and Baratz’s critique of pluralism based on 
behaviouralism limited, arguing that the process of non-decision-making is actually 
the process of decision-making and introduces a third dimension in power analysis 
(1974). Lukes criticised Bachrach and Baratz for three basic shortcomings. First, 
their focus on the individual’s behaviour, in spite of whether it is covert or overt, 
produces many issues excluded from the analysis because “the bias of the system is 
not maintained simply by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, more 
importantly, by the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of the 
groups, and practices of institutions, which may be manifested by individuals 
inaction” (Lukes, 1974: 21). In other words, there are structural constraints imposed 
by the economy and state which by their very nature exclude certain issues from the 
policy agenda (Judge, 1995). This represented a radical move from behaviouralism 
towards structuralism. Second, contrary to Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes suggests 
including the analysis of latent conflicts because the most effective use of power is to 
prevent latent conflict from arising (1974: 23).2 Latent conflicts arise from a 
discrepancy between the interests of those who use power and the real interests of 
others, which they exclude (Lukes, 1974). His third critique was based on Bachrach
2 Luke’s latent conflicts should not be equated with Ralph Dahrendorf s latent interests which are 
“antagonistic interests conditioned by, even inherent in, social positions, in imperatively coordinated 
associations, which are independent of the [individual’s] conscious contains” (Lukes, 1974: 25).
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and Baratz’s argument that if there are no grievances, there is a genuine consensus on 
the prevailing value allocation (1970) which for Lukes represents the exclusion of 
the possibility of “false or manipulated consciousness by definitional fiat” (1974: 
24).
In summary, Lukes focuses on an analysis of the assumed consensus of power 
holders centring on the control of the political agenda, and introduces the analysis of 
not only potential conflicts (covert and overt) but also latent conflicts, as well as an 
analysis of the subjective and real interests. In other words, Lukes added new 
dimensions to the second face of power. First, he argued that “A may exercise power 
over B not only by altering his behavior, but also by influencing or determining his 
wants” (1974: 23). Second, power exercising may occur in the absence of the 
observable conflict, which may have been avoided but exists as latent conflict, as a 
contradiction over real interests. Finally, “political exclusion occurs not only through 
individuals’ decisions, but also through operation of social forces and institutional 
practices” (1974:26).
Furthermore Lukes recommends an analysis of how power is exercised since it may 
be exercised not only by individuals but also by institutions and collectivities. Still, 
the most difficult question for Lukes is where to draw the line between structural 
determinations on one side and the exercise of power on the other. He states that 
power exists where the possibility for the actor to act differently exists. If the actor 
does not have choice then it is structural determination (Lukes, 1974). However, the 
main problem Lukes faced is to define this power-structure relationship.
An attempt to overcome this duality between problem has been made by Gaventa, 
who tried to define the circumstances and mechanisms, in which the third dimension 
of power operates. He started with the delineation between direct processes that take 
in information control, and indirect processes that are “processes where conceptions 
and actions are affected through ‘no direct cues’ of the power-holders” (1979: 19), 
but represent the power relationships themselves.
However, when Gaventa tried to test this theory empirically in his case study about
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the power of miners in Appalachian Mountains, he concluded that hidden aspects of 
power and domination are by far the least understood dimension of politics as it 
“involves specifying of means through which power influences, shapes or determines 
conceptions of the necessities, possibilities, and strategies of challenge in situations 
of latent conflict. This may include the study of the social myths, language and 
symbols, and how are they shaped and manipulated in power process. It can also 
locate the power processes behind the social construction of meanings and patterns 
that serve to get A to act and believe in a manner in which B otherwise might not, to 
A’s benefit to B’s detriment” (Gaventa, 1979: 15-16).
Lukes’ and Gaventa’s analysis was a radical shift in power analysis, but they failed 
to make the complete move from behavioural towards structural, because they retain 
a conception of power concerned mainly with the observation of individuals. Despite 
this problem, an analysis of the ‘third dimension of power’ advances the debate 
about power, and asks many questions that have not been initiated by pluralists and 
elitists.
In summary, neo-elitism starts to address questions about how the elite can exercise 
power, particularly through their role in structuring organisations, (the biases of) 
organisational behaviour and people's expectations of what is normal and/or 
reasonable, which are closely related to what in this thesis are defined as institutions. 
Still they have not fully explained the interaction of the politics, economy and 
institutions. On the basis of these criticisms of political science at the time March and 
Olsen (1984) argued for the creation of new institutionalism, with a focus on 
collective action for the understanding of political life. Furthermore, the relationship 
between political individuals, collectivities and their socio-economic environment 
should be reciprocal in order to explain complex political life.
2.3 Old Institutionalism, Behaviourists and Rational Choice theorists
Old institutionalists developed an important body of literature that was the 
foundation for the development of new institutionalism as well as for the other
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schools of thought that emerged in parallel. Although it has been much criticised for 
its descriptive richness and methodology that was mainly based on observations and 
descriptions (Peters, 1999), old institutionalism gave a good impetus for the further 
research of political institutions and political life. The main concern of the early 
institutionalists was to analyse the nature of governing institutions that were capable 
of structuring the behaviour of individuals towards better ends and collective 
purposes (Peters, 1999).3 Thus the older institutionalists tended to have a strong 
normative component in their analysis. They often affiliated their descriptive 
statements about politics with a concern for ‘good government’ (Peters, 1999), which 
was consequently criticised by some as “not scientific” (Storing, 1962).
Contrary to old institutionalism, which concentrates on the formal institutions of 
government and the constitutions which produce those structures, the behavioural 
revolution in political science concentrates completely on the reverse process and 
analyses the inputs from society into the political system (Easton, 1953). Although 
institutionalism excluded many interesting and important features of political mass 
behaviour, the behavioural revolution went to the other extreme and denied the 
importance of formal institutions in determining the outputs of government. “It was 
the behaviour, not the performance of government that was the principal concern” 
(Peters, 1999: 14). Furthermore, only the economy and society were considered to 
influence politics and political institutions. Institutionalism, both old and new, argues 
that causation goes in both directions and that institutions shape social and economic 
life.
Rational choice theory does admit that institutions possess some influence over 
participants because institutional rules establish the parameters for individual 
behaviour (Peters, 1999) but still denies their significance in shaping the preferences 
of the participants (Peters, 1999). Goodin argues that the perfect generality of 
rational choice theory applicability has been greatly exaggerated and that the
3
The most famous school of institutionalists was the Progressive Movement in the United States, 
which considered political science as the study of the State in formal-legal terms, and that constituted 
the basis o f political science research for much of the late nineteenth century and the first half of the 
twentieth century (Peters, 1999: 22).
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behaviourists’ focus serves to fix attention upon individuals and their behaviour, but 
those individuals are shaped by, and in their collective enterprises act, through 
structures and organisations and institutions. “What people want to do, and what they 
can do, depends importantly upon what organisational technology is available or can 
be made readily available to them for giving effect to their individual and collective 
volitions” (Goodin, 1996:13).
The initial advocates of the new institutionalism, James March and Johan Olsen, who 
named the movement in 1984, reasserted some of the features of the old 
institutionalism, and criticised behavioural and rational choice analyses for giving the 
central role to the state, rather than society upon which political science depends 
(March and Olsen, 1984). In addition, they criticised behavioural and rational choice 
analyses for reducing collective behaviour to individual behaviour as well as the 
level of significance the behavioural and rational choice approaches had given to 
history. Finally, March and Olsen argued that contemporary political science was 
characterised by the domination of outcomes over process, identity, and other 
important socio-political values (1984). In other words, they criticised contemporary 
theorists in that they analysed political life as simply something done through the 
public sector rather than as a complex interaction of symbols, values, and even the 
emotive aspects of the political process.
2.4 New Institutionalist Approach
The new institutionalism which emerged in the 1980s was a reaction to the 
dominance of theories with under analysed social, economic and political behaviour. 
Both behaviourists and rational choice theorists had regarded institutions as 
epiphenomenal or as the aggregation of individual actions (Lowndes, 2001:1950). In 
the first case, institutions were regarded as a result of individual roles, and in the 
second as an accumulation of individual choices based upon utility maximising 
preferences (Shepsle, 1989). In political science, March and Olsen argued that ‘the 
organisation of political life makes a difference’ and asserted a more autonomous 
role for institutions in shaping political behaviour (1984). Contrary to the descriptive
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style of the earlier institutional theories, new institutionalism developed a more 
sophisticated definition of its subject matter, operating through more explicit 
theoretical frameworks. The new institutionalists analyse informal conventions as 
well as formal rules and structures, paying attention to the way in which institutions 
embody values and power relationships, and they study not just the impact of 
institutions upon behaviour, but also the interaction between individuals and 
institutions. Lowndes summarised the main differences between new and old 
institutionalism in terms of movement across several analytical points. First, there is 
movement from a focus on organisations to a focus on rules. The second movement 
in focus is made from an formal to an informal conception of institutions. Moreover, 
institutions are no longer considered a static but a dynamic concept (2001).
Political institutions are not equated with political organisations in new 
institutionalism but rather, they are the sets of rules that guide and constrain actors’ 
behaviour. Institutions provide the rules of the game, while organisations and 
individuals are players within that game. As Goodin states, institutions are 
differentiated in the sense that they embody, preserve, and impart differential power 
resources with respect to different individuals and groups (1996). That means that 
institutions embody power relations by privileging certain courses of actions over 
others and by including certain actors and excluding others. “Institutional rules may 
produce variation and deviation as well as conformity and standardisation. They 
evolve in unpredictable ways as actors seek to make sense of new or ambiguous 
situations, ignore or even contravene existing rules, or try to adapt them to favour 
their own interests” (Lowndes, 2001:1960).
Peters attempted to define a common core that binds institutional approaches 
together. The most important element of institutionalism, according to Peters, is that 
institutions are a structural feature of a society and/or polity. That structure may be 
formal like a legislature, an agency in the public bureaucracy, or a legal framework, 
or may be informal like the set of shared norms or a network of interacting 
organisations. A second feature is the existence of stability over time. A third feature 
is that it must affect individual behaviour or in some way constrain the behaviour of 
its members. There should be some sense of shared values and meanings among the
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members of institutions. Those constraints may be formal or informal but they must 
be constraints if there is to be an institution in place (Peters, 1998).
As Peters states, the word ‘institution’ is loosely used in political science to mean 
everything from a formal structure like a parliament to very amorphous entities like 
social class, with other components of the socio-political universe, such as law and 
markets, also being defined as being institutions. In sociology, it is often used 
interchangeably with the term ‘organisation’ (Peters, 1999). According to March and 
Olsen (1984) institutions should rather be understood as a collection of norms, rules 
and understandings, and perhaps most importantly routines. They define institutions 
as “collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions in 
terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves determining of 
what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled, and what obligation of that role in 
that situation is” (March and Olsen, 1989: 21). Furthermore, they define institutions 
also in terms of the characteristics that they and their members represent as well as 
by their capability to influence the behaviour of individuals for generations (March 
and Olsen, 1994: 99).
The most important feature of the March and Olsen’s conceptualisation is that 
institutions tend to have a ‘logic of appropriateness’ that influences behaviour more 
than a ‘logic of consequentiality’ that also might shape individual action. That is, if 
an institution is effective in influencing the behaviour of its members, those members 
will think more about whether an action conforms to the norms of the organisation 
than about what the consequences will be for the member themselves (Peters, 1999). 
The extreme example he gives is of firemen who willingly enter blazing buildings 
because that is the role they have accepted as a function of their job. In less extreme 
situation, the logic of appropriateness may be manifested through activities in public 
institutions, like serving clients as well as possible and not engaging in corruption on 
the job (Heidenheimer, 1989). In this normative conception of institutions, it is the 
routine that appears most important. However, March and Olsen assume that 
institutions are not so well developed that there are chances for the development of 
anomalous situations and consequently there is a need for the creation of 
enforcement mechanisms to deal with deviant cases. Still for most of the decisions
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routines will be sufficient to generate appropriate performance (March and Olsen, 
1994).
Offe (1996) also argues that institutions play two major roles, the perceptive and the 
functional roles. The perceptive role means that “good citizens make good 
institutions, and good institutions are ‘good’ to the extent that they generate and 
cultivate good citizens or the ‘better selves’ of citizens, who at least get ‘used to’ and 
‘feel at home’ in those institutions, develop a sense of loyalty, and come to adopt the 
cognitive expectations and moral intuitions from which the institutions themselves 
derive” (1996: 200). The functional role of institutions is called ‘congruent 
socialisation’ and assumes that institutions will function properly. In other words, it 
means that institutions need to accomplish the task that is set for them, or to be 
compatible with the supply of resources they depend upon and must therefore extract 
from their environment. If institutions are established properly and widely supported, 
they ‘fly by themselves due to the invisible operation of an autopilot’ (Offe, 
1996:200). Furthermore, Offe argues that both those functions are necessary as 
criteria for the existence and viability of institutions, internal socialisation and 
external effectiveness, or the consolidation of beliefs, on the one hand, and purposive 
rational or strategic action on the other (1996). March and Olsen relate to the same 
dualism (1989:23), and define institutionalised actions as backward looking which is 
obligatory, and forward looking or anticipatory motivational forces. The perceptive 
role of institutions is a ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the functional role is a ‘logic of 
consequentiality’ in March and Olsen’s work (1989; 1994).
The major weakness of March and Olsen’s work is related to making a clear 
distinction between rules and routines. March and Olsen defined routines as a stable 
patterns of behaviour, without the sense of them being unchangeable or 
dysfunctional. Routines are assumed to make the behaviour of an organisation more 
predictable and more rational, although it is difficult to determine when predictability 
ends and inertia begins (Peters, 1999). Although not considering rules to be central to 
their research, March and Olsen do address rules as part of the control of behaviour 
within institutions and organisations. They consider rules as constitutive and to some 
extent as the formalisation of the logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen, 1994).
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Rules serve as guides for newcomers to an organisation for example. Institutions 
derive a good deal of their structure of meaning and their logic of appropriateness 
from the society in which they are formed (March and Olsen, 1984). Routines appear 
to arise naturally once people begin to interact in an institutional setting (Peters, 
1999). Another question that March and Olsen have not answered, according to 
Peters, is that of the difference between an institution and an organisation. He adds 
that it is easier to make the distinction if the adjective ‘formal’ is added in front of 
‘organisation’ thus applying a very strict definition of organisations, and a loose, 
more culturally based, definition of institutions (Peters, 1999).
The institutional dimension of urban politics is conceptualised in a similar way to the 
new institutionalism developed by March and Olsen. Institutions refer to systems of 
values, traditions, norms, and practices that shape or constrain political behaviour 
(Pierre, 1999). However, the institutional dimension in urban politics remains unclear 
and ambiguous due to the much greater constraint of institutions in urban governance 
by organisational factors such as constitutional arrangements and other types of legal 
definitions of the responsibilities of public organisations, than is the case at the 
national level (Pierre, 1999). However, at national level organisational arrangements 
shape urban politics and therefore it is necessary to examine the extent and the 
relationship between institutions and organisations in urban politics.
This argument can be summarised in four points. First, governance refers to the 
process through which local authorities, together with private interests, seek to 
enhance collective goals. It is a process shaped by those systems of political, 
economic and social values from which urban governance derives its legitimacy 
(Pierre, 1999). Second, an understanding of local government organisations is 
fundamental for an understanding of urban governance. The key question should be 
centred on the role of local government in urban governance. To address this it is 
necessary to bring urban politics into mainstream political science and institutional 
analysis. Third, different institutional models of urban governance represent different 
systems of values, norms, beliefs, and practices. These systems produce different 
urban policy choices and outcomes. Just as new institutionalists (March and Olsen, 
1984; 1989) see institutional systems as a result of values and norms, urban
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governance reflects values and interests typical to local communities. Therefore, 
urban governance is embedded in a myriad of economic, social, political and 
historical factors pertaining to the exchanges between local state and local 
community. Finally, Pierre acknowledges the significance of the national context 
within which urban governance is embedded. “National politics and state traditions 
remain the most powerful factors in explaining various aspects of urban politics, 
including urban political economy, urban political conflict, and strategies of local 
resource mobilisation” (Gurr and King, 1987).
March and Olsen (1984) introduced new concepts into institutional analysis and 
defined institutions as collections of interrelated rules and routines that define 
appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and situations. They also 
outlined the importance of informal institutions. Lowndes (2001) recognised that 
institutional rules might produce variation and deviation as well as conformity and 
standardisation since they evolve in unpredictable ways as actors seek to make sense 
of new or ambiguous situations, ignore or even contravene existing rules, or try to 
adapt them to favour their own interests. Thus corruption, as one of the possible 
deviations of institutions, is addressed in the next section.
2.5 Institutions and Corruption
The creation of institutions or the building of new and better social, political and 
economic institutions is generally considered to be the central problem that all 
transitional societies have faced. Institutions establish standards, both normative and 
cognitive, as to what is held normal, what must be expected, which rights and duties 
are attached to which positions, and what makes sense in the community or social 
domain to which the institution is answerable.
The stability of institutions comes at the cost of rigidity (Offe, 1996). Democracy as 
a preference aggregating machinery can only work under a framework of rights that 
is protected by independent courts and at least relatively immune from democratic
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contingencies. One key problem to the Central and Eastern European transition from 
communism is the lack of the necessary rigidity for the stability of institutions (Offe, 
1996). Communist regimes that could have enforced such rigidity had broken down, 
and there exists too little scope for reasoned choice, as all actors have a strong reason 
to believe that they cannot rely upon institutional parameters since they are the 
subjects of sudden change. However, the success of newly built institutions is likely 
to depend more on people’s trust, compliance, and patience in enduring the transition 
costs involved than in the quality of those institutions themselves (Offe, 1996).
Furthermore, besides the fact that state communist institutions have failed to generate 
all socialist preferences, they have, as a rule, generated a state of mind, a set of 
assumptions and expectations that now often turn out to be inimical to the growth of 
democratic capitalist and democratic institutions. This state of mind, regardless of 
whether it has been cultivated by the last fifty years of experience of state socialist 
institutions or the cultural or political inheritance of the last five hundred years of 
precarious and often failed modernisation processes, has been described by many 
authors as “a combination of apathy, depletion of communal bonds, passivity, 
unwillingness to accept responsibility, atomisation, lack of respect for formal rules, 
‘short terminism’ and pervasive ‘grab and run attitude’ towards economic gain” 
(Moravski, Schdpflin, Sztompka, quoted in Offe, 1996). Additionally, economic 
attitudes are shaped by zero-sum-assumptions as well as the expectation that success 
must be, as a rule, due to patronage, corruption, and cooperation, not effort.
Corruption in Central and Eastern European countries is seen to be on a par with 
Africa, Latin America and the Middle East, and the level is considerably higher than 
for the OECD countries (Kaufmann, 2000). Transition, understood as a time of 
systemic change, is a period which greatly supports corruption. With the collapse of 
a previous system, rapid political and economic changes are followed by processes of 
social disintegration, which means the implosion of institutions and crises of the 
system of values developed in the previous system, of the ruling moral norms and 
standards and the collapse of their significance. The state, its values and property are 
left with no protection. The state becomes a free for all and many see a chance to 
gain profit for themselves. Bribery becomes public and old value symbols are
43
ridiculed. Comparative studies conducted in countries of East and South East 
Europe4 in the post-communist period demonstrate that they all share a state of 
significant prevailing anomie, both on the level of social consciousness and on the 
individual level. Since the new value system has not yet been fully established, the 
transition from the old into the new political and economic order, in reality, is 
characterized by a harsh conflict of values resulting in a state of social anomie and 
moral deregulation (Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001). According to Transparency 
International, an organisation that focuses on the fight against corruption, and their 
Global Corruption Report 1999, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was ranked as 
the second most corrupt country in the world immediately after Nigeria (Appendix 1).
2.5.1 Definition of Corruption
“Corruption, or the practice of bribery, is as old as the state” (Begovic and Mijatovic, 
2001:9). The term corruption was used by Machiavelli and referred to ‘a quality of 
spoiling of power’ (Machiavelli quoted in Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001:9). Today 
the definition of corruption means an illegal use of social position and power to 
incorporate personal profit or gain. Another definition is that of Vito Tanzi, used by 
Begovic and Mijatovic, according to which “corruption is the intentional non- 
compliance with the formal rules aimed at deriving some advantage and gains for 
oneself or for related individuals from this behaviour” (Tanzi quoted in Begovic and 
Mijatovic, 2001:9). According to Rose-Ackerman, corruption develops when 
individuals and firms who want favourable treatment may be willing to pay to obtain 
it. Furthermore, according to Rose-Ackerman corruption is a symptom that 
something has gone wrong in the management of the state. Institutions designed to 
govern the interrelationships between the citizen and the state are used instead for 
personal enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt (1999).
However there is a difference between the intentional failure of objectivity and the 
failure of objectivity due to imperfect information. The seizing of a benefit can be 
carried out simultaneously with the making of a biased decision, but those two acts
4 www.worldbank.org/goveraance/corruption
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can also be done at two different times. Biased decision-making by the corrupt 
person makes an informal but very solid obligation to return or repay the favour 
sooner or later. Still, the difficulty arises when the definition of bias in decision­
making is to be made. The easiest way to do it is to determine if formal rules are 
broken. However, in many cases formal rules do not exist and decision-making is 
within the discretionary authority of government officials. For example, if a 
government official is in charge of issuing import licences, and has a discretionary 
authority to choose to whom he will issue a licence having in his mind ‘the benefit of 
the whole national economy’ or ‘preservation of public interest’, it is very difficult to 
determine if rules are broken and, where so, if they are broken intentionally. 
Furthermore, temporal delimitation between the providing of services by a corrupt 
party and the counter service by the corrupter creates problems in the determination 
of the personal gain of the corrupt person. If the counter service is not precisely 
specified, it is very difficult to define the second necessary condition for corruption, 
which is the acquisition of personal gain. This makes the definition of personal gain 
even more difficult.
This thesis uses an operational definition from the World Bank, according to which 
corruption is a misuse of public authority for the acquisition of a private gain 
(Kaufmann, 1997). This approach focuses only on the public sector and excludes 
corruption in the private sector. It links corruption to the state and its activities, to 
authorities and their intervention in the market and assumes the existence of the 
public sector. Corruption in the public sector is a more important phenomenon than 
corruption in the private sector in terms of dimensions and consequences.
Depending on the mechanism of corruption, or its economic and political 
consequences, it is possible to identify two kinds of corruption. Firstly, corruption 
which makes possible the implementation of rules (laws). Secondly, corruption 
which makes possible circumnavigating or breaking of rules (laws). Those two types 
of corruption are part of so the called ‘administrative corruption’ or corruption that is 
based on biased decisions by state employees making impossible the full and 
impartial implementation of state rules.
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The first type is developed because the bureaucratic apparatus of public services 
prolongs the response to requests made. In order to speed up the procedure, and 
overcome the obstacle of bureaucratic apparatus, a citizen is ready to provide 
additional payment. “In Italy long bureaucratic delays are the rule” (della Porta and 
Vannucci, 1997: 525). Public servants explain these delays with an argument that 
‘something is possible to be done only if he (the public servant) ignores certain 
elements of procedure’. This type of corruption is most widely present because the 
risk of capture is lower (Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001).
The second type of corruption is related to the breaking of rules. A public servant 
tolerates a potential client who is breaking the rules or breaks the rules himself (in 
the issuing of different permits, fixing tenders, and so on). As there is no clear line 
between corruption and crime on either side, the risk is higher. The amount of risk, in 
addition to the value of the deal, increases the price for the ‘service’. According to 
Begovic and Mijatovic (2001), this type of corruption is the most common for 
acquiring customs documentation, foreign currency transactions, tax administration, 
financial police, sanitary and urban planning inspections, and mandatory registration 
of foreign trade deals.
The most common reason for the corrupt behaviour of state employees is the lack of 
incentive to work efficiently. Regardless of the speed or efficiency of their work, 
their salary remains the same, and therefore the optimizing behaviour of state 
employees is based on the minimisation of effort for a given income. Additionally, 
since they are aware that there are parties ready to pay a bribe for speeding up of 
processes, for example of issuing the permits, state employees are acting in such a 
way as to increase the probability of being offered a bribe for expediting the process. 
The more they stall with the issuing of licenses, the greater the probability that 
companies will offer a bribe.
In addition to administrative corruption, there is also political corruption, which leads 
to changes in, or the formulation of new, rules and laws. “Political corruption is the
46
abuse of the entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective 
of increasing the power or wealth. Political corruption does not necessarily involve 
money changing hands, but might take a form of ‘trading the influence’ or granting 
favours that poison politics and threaten democracy” (Transparency International, 
2004: 11). According to Transparency International, political corruption includes a 
wide range of crimes and illicit acts committed before, during and after leaving 
office, by political leaders or elected officials who have been vested with public 
authority and who bear the responsibility of representing the public interest. That can 
result in loss of faith in politicians and parties challenging democratic values. In 
transitional and developing countries, that has been especially the case (Transparency 
International, 2004).
Recent pay-off scandals affected elected politicians in Mexico, Italy, Korea, and 
Japan, and corruption at local level is common in Germany and France (Rose- 
Ackerman, 1999:113), which clearly implies that even democratic regimes do not 
always succeed in checking corruption and that the problem of corruption is not easy 
to identify and consequently tackle. The scale of the problem also depends on 
whether corruption is economically or politically driven, a distinction to be further 
discussed.
2.5.2 Economic and Political Causes of Corruption
There are variations in the nature and level of corruption, and these are dependent on 
context - objective political and economic conditions. One of the underlying reasons 
for corruption according to Begovic and Mijatovic (2001), is in rent seeking 
behaviour which has a purely economic basis. However, in a benevolent state, 
existence of corruption is explained by using principal-agent theory.
Begovic and Mijatovic assume the existence of an asymmetry of information 
between the principal (the state, or the legislative authority) who defines the rules of 
conduct, and the agent (state employees) who enforces those rules. The agents do not
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have the same goals as the benevolent state, which is to enhance the public interest 
and welfare, but rather their basic goal is to maximize their personal welfare. For the 
state to control the work of the agents, it has to be perfectly informed about their 
jobs, but in reality, there is a significant asymmetry of information. Agents know 
much more about their activities than the state, embodied in the legislative 
authorities. The core of the agency theory is that, under conditions of asymmetrical 
information, state employees act in such a way that personal goals to maximize 
personal well being are realised independently from the task given to them by the 
principal. Therefore, this theory is concerned with a benevolent state and wicked 
state employees. Or, as defined by Leninists, with the ‘scoundrels within our own 
ranks’ (Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001: 17). In other words, corruption is the 
consequence of asymmetric information between a benevolent state and corrupt state 
employees.
However, the question of the applicability of this theoretical approach arises, at least 
for Serbian society, from the assumption of the lack of a benevolent state in the 
1990s. Therefore, Begovic and Mijatovic offered an alternative theoretical approach, 
which starts from an assumption about a kleptocratic state. It is assumed that the only 
goal of the state is to maximize its income, while the only goal of the state leadership 
is to maximize its personal welfare. This case we are dealing with ‘a so-called 
predator state, or as it is called lately, a kleptocratic state’ (Begovic and Mijatovic, 
2001). Very often a kleptocratic state is identified with dictatorship, or an 
undemocratic regime, while the benevolent state is identified with democracy. 
Regardless of the fact that such an assumption is a simplification, a kleptocratic 
dictatorship represents an acceptable framework for the explanation of the 
mechanism of corruption in many countries (Table 1).
According to Begovic and Mijatovic, inside the given conceptual framework the 
dictator is only a robber, who uses the dictatorship as a means for maximizing his 
personal welfare. Corruption in this case represents only a mechanism for increasing 
the welfare of the dictator. The necessary condition for maximizing income is that 
the existing dictator remains a dictator for as long as possible, so that he can succeed 
in plundering as much as possible. This is rendered more complex by the existence of
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those who covet the dictator’s power and position. The dictator must carefully share 
the spoils among all members of the ruling elite, so as to curtail their incentive to 
realize their ambitions. In other words, there exists a division of spoils. In that 
context, “the corruption of state employees does not represent a random 
phenomenon, but only a well-elaborated role inside institutionalised plunder” 
(Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001: 18).
Moreover, there is a significant difference between centralised and decentralised 
types of corruption. Begovic and Mijatovic explained the difference using cartel 
theory, arguing that centralised corruption is based on the same principles and factors 
as cartels are, such as the implementation of credible punishment and the 
impossibility of breaking out. A good example of centralised corruption was found in 
communist Russia, where the basic institution for the implementation of centralised 
corruption was the KGB, which had the means for detecting the breaking of 
centralised corruption, and refined methods for punishing violators (Begovic and 
Mijatovic, 2001).
Table 1: Different types of corruption
Type of rule DEMOCRACY DICTATORSHIP
Character of the state Benevolent Kleptocracy
Source of corruption Agency problem Character of the state
Intensity of corruption Uncertain Great
Character of corruption Decentralised Centralised
Source: Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001
Rose-Ackerman agrees that one of the most dangerous forms of corruption for 
democracy is kleptocracy, and makes a distinction between two basic types. The first 
kleptocracy is the one where the corruption is organised at the top of government, 
and the second type includes other states where bribery is the province of a large 
number of low-level officials (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). Additionally, those who
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become rich from the ruler’s favour will not wish to expose all their assets to the risk 
of regime change.
Furthermore, kleptocrats might face additional problems of bureaucratic control. 
Corruption at the very top creates expectations among bureaucrats that they should 
share the wealth and reduces the moral and psychological constraints on lower-level 
officials. “Low-level malfeasance that can be kept under control by an honest ruler 
may become endemic with dishonest ruler” (Lundahl 1997:43).
At the moment when the state and its institutions begin to weaken and the power of 
an individual begins to ascend over these institutions, corruption starts growing. 
“Those who hold a certain state function are in a position to be the first to notice the 
weaknesses of state institutions, and to determine if there is a will and a way to 
resolve those shortcomings. If their assessment is that it cannot be done or that there 
is no will to do so, discipline breaks down, fear of consequences decreases or 
disappears, which causes character changes in the individual” (Begovic and 
Mijatovic, 2001:26). Moreover, state property is considered property without a real 
owner and is acted upon accordingly. It is believed that representatives of the state 
property can be persuaded to turn a blind eye to certain activities.5
2.6 Conclusion
Illegal building in Belgrade is a complex problem. Therefore, several theories and 
various angles from them are pulled together and assessed in an attempt to formulate 
a comprehensive explanation for the research question.
The elitist approach developed by Hunter, assumes power to be unequally distributed 
in society, where power is concentrated in the hands of group of politically and
5 Common practices in such persuasion are: ‘the state will not fail because of our small deal’; ‘it will 
be good for you, and good for m e’. Proverbs ‘money drills where no drill can’, ‘one hand will wash 
the other hand’; ‘crow will not poke another crow’s eyes out’ are popular illustrations of corruption.
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economically powerful people, and the rest are the masses without power. It might be 
applied to any form of society and its concepts can be broadly applied when 
analysing the stubborn persistence of centralised, minority rule within the one-party 
systems of communist states, as well as of the less centralised communist system in 
the former Yugoslavia and post-communist Serbia, where the elite ruled for fifty-five 
years. Although elitism is a circular theory, arguing that the powerful group 
constitutes those who have power, Hunter’s approach is beneficial to this research, 
due to his argument on the existence of several pyramids of power similarly to the 
hypothesis that elite and subelites were the drivers behind the illegal developments in 
Belgrade. These elite and subelites are addressed more in detail in the fifth chapter 
which analyses the specific shape of elite, their emergence and their actions in 
Belgrade in the post-communist period.
Additionally, the reputational model, although criticised for its bias, is useful as a 
starting point for the definition of elite and subelites, which are not easy to be 
empirically defined due to the lack of elite studies during the communist era. As 
Lazic suggested, “studies of elites in communist countries used to be ‘forbidden 
fruit’” (2000: 21). Even though Hunter’s model analyses reputation rather than the 
exercise of power, the intuition of the informants involved in the analysed issues 
should not be ignored. The expert informants are not necessarily the members of the 
elite, but they witnessed many actions of the elite and subelite, and they can provide 
useful insights into their mechanisms and functioning. Additionally, the analysis of 
reputation of power is easier nowadays due to the development of various media and 
especially electronic access to many information sources, as well as due to the 
greater involvement of the public in politics. Media today compete on delivering 
information on time, and they are especially interested in reporting on the members 
of the elite, particularly the political and economic elite.
However, although elite theory is indispensable in the case of the Serbia, since it 
helps address questions about the the drivers of illegal building, it does not address 
the masses or the other groups who benefit from the actions of the elite. Thus, 
pluralism is helpful in terms of explaining the elite’s and subelite’s relationship with 
the rest of the society with regard to illegal building, especially during election times
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when political bargaining among them was taking place. Pluralists’ assumption of a 
natural balance of power among various groups is preserved through bargaining and 
compromise, and thus equilibrium is reached in group struggle included an existence 
of shared acceptance of the basic political framework, i.e. consensus of values, 
democratic traditions, procedures and principles. However, the democratic political 
framework assumed in this concept did not really exist in Serbian post-communist 
society. Furthermore, the pluralists’ assumption that economic and governmental 
institutions are separate, not overlapping, power sources also is not applicable to the 
Serbian state.
On the other hand, although useful in defining who the powerful are, elitist theory 
does not give an answer as to how the powerful exercise their power, and how, as it 
sometimes suggested, they shape the political agenda, which neo-elitism made an 
attempt to answer. Their argument was based on a critique of pluralism, suggesting 
that power is not only the control of observable behaviour and decisions but it is also 
contained in the non-observable realm of non-decisions that involve contraint in 
decision-making, such as focusing only on safe issues by manipulating dominant 
community values and political institutions and procedures. Following 
Schattschineider’s line of thought that some issues are organised into politics while 
others are organised out, analysis of whether the analysed problem of illegal building 
was on the agenda or was suffocated even before being voiced by politicians in both 
communist and post-communist systems, is necessary. Furthermore, if the second 
face of power is revealed when actors create or reinforce social and political values 
and institutional practices which limit the scope of the political process to issues 
innocuous to themselves, then the institutional response to illegal building is crucial 
for testing of the hypothesis whether the elite was the driver of it. Moreover, 
following Lukes’ argument, the bias of the system is not maintained simply by a 
series of individually chosen acts, but also by the socially structured and culturally 
patterned behaviour of the groups, and the practices of institutions, which may be 
manifested by individuals’ inaction. Political exclusion occurs not only through 
individuals’ decisions, but also through the operation of social forces and 
institutional practices. In other words, power may be exercised not only by 
individuals but also by institutions and collectivities. Still, the most difficult question
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is where to draw the line between structural determinations on one side and exercise 
of power on the other. The approach taken is that power exists where the possibility 
for the actor to act differently exists. If the actor does not have choice then it is 
structural determination.
Nonetheless, the question raised in this thesis is how the elites exercised their power 
and managed to change the rules and routines in institutions in their favour, since it is 
the institutions that provide the rules of the game, while organisations and 
individuals are players within that game. The changed rules did not become the 
structural determination for the rest of the society, because they had the choice not to 
build. However, the majority followed the new rules and built illegally. Therefore, 
new institutionalism, which focuses on mutual interaction between institutions, 
individuals and economy and society, is the approach that was added to help theorise 
the institutional aspects of the problem. March and Olsen (1984), who developed 
new institutionalist theory, defined an institution as a collection of mles and routines. 
Institutions in new institutionalism are differentiated in the sense that they embody, 
preserve, and impart differential power resources with respect to different individuals 
and groups. However, institutional rules may produce variation and deviation as well 
as conformity and standardisation. They evolve in unpredictable ways as actors seek 
to make sense of new or ambiguous situations, ignore or even contravene existing 
rules, or try to adapt them to favour their own interests (Lowndes, 2001). However, 
what happens when corruption becomes an imposed ‘logic of appropriateness’ in 
most of the public institutions? Corruption consequently becomes informal 
institution itself and structures, such as legislature and legal framework, 
administration, and norms and values, start working more on an informal than a 
formal basis.
Additionally, communist institutions have as a rule generated a state of mind, a set of 
assumptions and expectations that now often turn out to be in opposition to the 
growth of capitalist and democratic institutions. As previously mentioned, this state 
of mind can be described as a combination of apathy, diminution of communal bonds, 
passivity, unwillingness to accept responsibility, atomization, lack of respect for 
formal mles, and a pervasive ‘grab and run attitude’ towards economic gain.
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Additionally, economic attitudes are shaped by the expectation that success is a result 
of patronage, corruption, and not effort. The final result was a corrupt state with the 
sole goal of maximising its income, while the only goal of the state leadership is to 
maximise its personal welfare. Furthermore, the rising corruption of state employees 
did not represent a random phenomenon, but only a well-elaborated role inside 
institutionalised plunder.
Many phenomena characteristic of the period of transition in Serbia, such as the grey 
economy, irregular economic and business transactions, smuggling, illegal money 
trading, and unauthorised premises development and bribery and corruption are not 
considered by many people as serious moral or legal offences. The practice of the 
breaking of moral and legal rules and routines was so widespread that this was 
accepted as customary and normal. The conditions that caused and reproduced 
corruption are unresolved issues of statehood and the constitution, internal political 
trouble and infighting, economic depression (made even worse by international 
economic sanctions), the experience of hyperinflation, drastic pauperisation and 
differentiation of the populace, a rising rate of unemployment, war psychoses and 
refugees.
In summary, using elements of elitism, neo-elitism and new institutionalism in post­
communist conditions, as a set of tools, rather than a theoretical framework, means 
focusing on several themes: the elite as drivers of illegality, illegal building as a 
visible exercise of power in space, new rules and routines in institutions, and formal 
and informal coalitions. The thesis will address the elite that had an important role in 
defining the institutional environment and the ways in which it produced deviation in 
society. The second focus is a shift from formal to informal institutions, which means 
a focus on the informal rules that shaped decision-making, rather than the formal 
structures. These themes combined form the theoretical framework for the thesis’ 
explanation of the defined problem of illegal building in Belgrade.
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3 Chapter: Methodological Approaches, Data Collection and Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to explain in detail the methodological approach 
adopted for the empirical study of illegal building in Belgrade in the 1990s. This 
approach emerged in response to the need to address the overarching aim of the 
research which was to identify the key drivers of illegal building. The 
methodological framework adopted is explained in detail here, including a theoretical 
justification of the specific research methods employed, and the methods from the 
elitist, pluralist and institutionalist approaches used. Special importance is placed 
upon the appropriateness of using the multiple-case study method.
The chapter also details the way research questions are designed to address the 
objectives of the research. A degree of flexibility was retained in definition of these 
questions, due to the absence of a single theoretical understanding of the concept of 
illegal building as it relates to the institutional context. The principal methods 
employed are open-ended interviews and documentary analysis. They are analysed in 
respect to the ways in which they were applied in the collection of data. Finally, 
careful analysis of the limits of the overall research methodology is given.
3.2 Reputational Method, Conflict Analysis and Institutional Description
The purpose of this section is to explain the methods of the theories used in the 
Theoretical Overview chapter in addition to the methodological approach that was 
chosen for the analysis of illegal building in Belgrade.
The elitist method is derived from Floyd Hunter’s controversial study about the 
distribution of power in Atlanta, based on the “necessary identification of some of 
the men who wield power, as well as description of the physical settings in which 
they operated” (Hunter, 1953:10). Hunter began by asking a panel of 14 people who
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were reputed to be knowledgeable about the city, essentially upper-middle-class 
professionals, to pick out the top ten leaders from lists of organisational leaders he 
had collected from the Chamber of Commerce (business leaders), the League of 
Women Voters (government officials), the Community Council (civic leaders) and 
newspaper reporters and civic leaders (“society” leaders). From these lists containing 
175 names, he picked those 40 people who gained the most votes, and then set out to 
interview as many of those people as he could. Hunter interviewed 27 of the 40, and 
they overwhelmingly agreed that most of the top leaders in Atlanta were on the list
However, this method faced many problems. First, there was no clear-cut distinction 
between the ‘exercising of power’ and ‘reputations of power ability’. Second, there 
was the problem of making a distinction between people who have the potential 
power and those who are actually exercising power. The third problem was related to 
the ‘judgement sampling’ method which does not guarantee that the experts, in this 
case judges, will not introduce serious biases into the results. The other problem with 
the methodology he used was that he limited the number of persons who held power 
to forty. Another critique was related to the non-inclusion of any analysis of the 
different actors’ ranges of power as well as changing political relations and political 
power groups into the research (Miller, 19586; D’Antonio and Form, 1965). The lack 
of analysis of these problems, and the unreliability of the ‘reputational’ methodology, 
posed the question: has Hunter studied power or its reputation? Another criticism of 
the method is that empirical studies were defined by geographical boundaries and 
they conflated geographical places with communities, and power of local 
governments with power per se. In so doing they gave an unrealistically high degree 
of local autonomy to the local governments (Harding, 1995).
Reputational analysis does not offer any convincing evidence about power but it still 
has considerable potential as a starting point for research, since researchers need to 
have a hypothesis of who is powerful and why. With the development of local media, 
business and political leaders and their activities become more visible to researchers 
and the community They are no longer behind the scenes, as was the case during
6 Compared the workings of power in governmental institutions in Bristol in the UK and in 
Washington in the US.
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Hunter’s research, which makes them more accessible to detailed analysis. 
Furthermore, in this research the reputational model was used in a wider political 
setting than simply the local, following the hypothesis that all levels of power were 
involved. In addition, analysis of the wider political context is necessary to provide 
the overall context of the problem.
Pluralists were mostly criticised for their methodological individualism in defining 
conflict interests and power actors. If power is an attribute of individuals’ relations 
then how can researchers analyse a situation where such a relation is not determined? 
If power is ascribed to anyone who is involved in the process of decision-making 
then it leads to the conclusion that power is widely dispersed in all layers of society 
and that makes analysis of power almost impossible for the researcher. Bachrach and 
Baratz criticised Dahl in his study of New Haven for the use of decisional 
individualism. Dahl (1961) delineated the city into administrative boundaries and 
‘localised’ the problems. Two of the three key criteria Dahl used, electoral 
nomination and public schools, were largely influenced by the people who lived out 
of those boundaries (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970). The only influence on decision­
making, which was analysed by the pluralists, was about local governance, but the 
effects from the broader region or from the national level have been excluded from 
the analysis.
All of these shortcomings in the pluralist methodology resulted in unrevealed 
complex networks of power in the examined locality. The lack of analysis of a 
number of actors, from different backgrounds and positions in society which were 
influencing the decision-making process, resulted in the rejection of their method in 
urban political analysis and pluralist analysis has become considered as disembodied 
from socio-economic life.
And finally the old institutionalist approach was heavily criticised for its descriptive 
nature and a methodology that was mainly based on observations and descriptions 
(Peters, 1999). However, there is a lack of a methodological approach in new 
institutionalism in urban politics and, a methodological approach has not yet been
57
offered which would lead research, especially in relation to the analysis of informal 
structures or networks in institutions.
Therefore, one approach that might be helpful is that recommended by Mollenkopf, 
who, in order to overcome the weaknesses of urban political theories and 
methodologies, suggested their synthesis. According to him, a satisfactory political 
approach must operate at three interdependent levels:
1. How the local state’s relationship to the economy and society conditions its 
capacity to act;
2. How the ‘rules of the game’ of local politics shape the competition among 
interests and actors to construct a dominant political coalition able to exercise 
that capacity to act;
3. How economic and social change and the organisation of political 
competition shape the mobilisation of these interests (Mollenkopf, 1992).
The focal points for starting on an analysis of the political urban arena in Belgrade 
were therefore the elite and subelites, and the relationship between the state, the 
economy and society and their mutual interaction and influence, as suggested by new 
institutionalists. The next relationship investigated was the one between the state, 
urban politics and newly created rules of the game. Finally, the way the institutional 
changes imposed by previously explained change in the relation between the elite 
and subelites and the state resulted in new mobilisation of interest and bias, and the 
creation of informal networks in particular around illegal building, are analysed The 
multiple-case study approach was used to compare and analyse the newly created 
rules of the game in the real life context (Yin, 1994).
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3.3 Justification of the methodological approach
Following the research goals, a multiple-case study approach was applied involving 
an empirical investigation within two of Belgrade’s local municipalities -  Dedinje 
and Zemun. Data for each case study was collected by using two main methods: semi 
structured, open-ended interviews with key planning actors, local authority officials 
from different political parties, city level officials, representatives of various local 
and city institutions, academics; and documentary analysis of key policy texts, laws, 
plans and decisions. The findings from the two case studies were compared and 
analysed in order to inform wider theoretical understanding of illegal building in post 
socialist Belgrade.
In designing the research, three key factors were taken into consideration. Firstly, 
that the study of illegal building is inseparable from the underlying political and 
economic institutional context which gives it meaning. The second factor was the 
need for flexibility to be taken throughout the study due to the limited amount of 
existing research on illegal building since it relates to illegal activities and 
corruption. Thirdly, given the sensitivity of information on illegal building, in 
addition to the interpretability and reliability of qualitative data which are frequently 
subject to uncertainty, there is a need to ensure the internal and external validity of 
the research that the observations accurately represented the issues that surrounded 
illegal building, and that specific conclusions could be extrapolated.
3.4 Case studies
The case study method was chosen due to its suitability for studying contemporary 
phenomena within a real life context (Robson, 1993; Yin, 1994). Petermann (1989) 
defined a case study as an “in-depth study with a single unit of observation, where 
the research question aims at the whole, irreducible behaviour of the whole; and 
observation is made with regard to some intervention in the system”. The case study
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is considered to be most useful when the contextual conditions are believed to be 
highly relevant to the phenomenon being explored and has proved a popular choice 
for conducting research within the fields of public administration, public policy, 
political science, city and regional planning research, and organisational and 
institutional studies, particularly in relation to current practice research (Robson, 
1993; Yin, 1994). In implementing a case-study approach, the research recognised 
that the context of the institutional organisation would be highly important to any 
observations made about illegal building. Robson (1993) suggests that by researching 
a phenomenon in its ‘natural setting,’ the internal validity or the extent to which the 
researcher is actually measuring what they think they are measuring, is significantly 
enhanced.
The case study method best addresses ‘what’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ types of research 
questions that constitute both exploratory investigation into a new phenomenon 
about which relatively little is understood or where explanation of the phenomenon is 
needed (Yin, 1981; Yin, 1994). “Case study attempts to examine a) a contemporary 
phenomenon in its real life context, especially when b) the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (Yin, 1981: 59).
Case studies are usually criticised for their lack of rigour and for being biased. They 
also tend to take too long to do and too long to read. However, contrary to the 
findings of a single case study that are usually considered as suggestive and 
descriptive, “...multiple case studies, or evidence from a variety of sources, is more 
likely to lead us to interesting generalisations about the phenomenon under 
investigation” (Remenyi and Williams, 1996:142). Data from multiple-case studies 
are often considered to be more convincing and the overall study considered stronger 
if it includes a case study (Yin, 1994).
3.4.1 Selection of case studies
Advocates of positivist research methods put emphasis on the selection of case 
studies based on the representativeness of a sample drawn ‘scientifically’ from a
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defined population (Travers, 2001). However, for this research representativeness as 
a criterion did not provide the basis for case study selection, as the main objective 
was to generalise from one case to another in order to match the underlying theory, 
rather than generate universal, indisputable truths about illegal building in a post­
communist context. In this respect, Yin has argued that when using multiple-case 
studies, each case must be carefully selected so that it “ ...either (a) produces similar 
results (literal replication) or (b) produces contrasting results but for predictable 
reasons (theoretical replication)” (1994:46).
Looking for literal replication (Yin, 1994) of findings from Dedinje through a second 
case study was not considered sufficient in terms of the contribution of the research 
to wider theoretical understanding. As Robson has argued, a second case “ .. .need not 
limit itself to confirmation of suggested relationships.. .it could throw further light on 
relationships, or even suggest alternative views of the phenomena” (1993:149). The 
second case study was therefore selected on the basis of its potential to contribute 
additional evidence to the research. However, due to political and institutional 
differences that characterise different local authorities, identical findings could not be 
expected, but a certain degree of similarities and complementarities were expected. 
Investigation within Dedinje guided by the theoretical framework, enabled 
refinement and re-focusing of the investigation towards issues observed to be 
relevant. This understanding was then carried forward and built upon within the 
second case study, Zemun.
The first case study is based in Dedinje, an area historically settled by the elite. The 
second case study is the local authority of Zemun, which had the highest increase in 
the number of illegally built objects in post-communist period. However, the 
boundaries of research are not identical with the boundaries of the local authorities. 
Those two case studies are chosen due to their distinction from each other in terms of 
social and economic structure, as well as being run by different political parties in the 
1990s. The local level boundaries are important because they help to constitute local 
power relations. “They are one element in the local narratives of power” (Cochrane, 
1998:2126). However, those localities were not analysed as isolated units, but rather, 
as Massey suggested “ ...localities have to be constructed through the set of social
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relations which bind them inextricably to wider arenas, and other places” (1991:279). 
Furthermore, the key points, according to Giddens (1984) are that places are defined 
through overlapping and crosscutting social relations not by boundaries which are the 
product of the social processes of interaction and representation, internally and 
externally. Those processes develop as the products of interaction between people, 
groups and institutions in places over time (Giddens, 1984). However, an 
understanding of the particular localities is necessary for an understanding of the 
broader social systems and interactions, and it enhances the theoretical frameworks.
3.5 Qualitative research
The purpose of the research is to draw together a range of perspectives on illegal 
building in order to develop a theoretical explanation for it. Therefore, it needs to 
include an array of methodological approaches in order to reach the set objectives.
Qualitative research incorporates the use of qualitative data, such as interviews, 
documents and participant observation to understand and explain social or political 
phenomena (Yin, 1994). Qualitative research emphasises meanings, experiences and 
descriptions (Yin, 1994) and it tries to understand individuals’ own perceptions of 
social or political phenomena (Flick, 2002). Contrary to quantitative research, which 
is built upon a positivist paradigm and emphasises objectivity, qualitative research is 
more based on the socially constructed nature of knowledge and the role the 
researcher plays in interpreting it (Mertens, 1998). Although the quantitative 
approach is used to bring us closer the scope of the problem, it does not provide an 
explanation for the motivations and institutional context that enabled the problem to 
be developed to that extent.
The use of multiple-case studies and qualitative research methods is considered the 
most useful approach because it allows emerging issues to be explored during the 
investigation, improving the accuracy and credibility of the research through 
refinement of concepts and theories (Rubin and Rubin, 1988). Interviews and 
documentary analysis also provide the opportunity to refine the focus of the research.
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“If you feel uncomfortable about what you are hearing, if the narratives do not ring 
true or ideas described are not consistent, or you learn new and unanticipated things, 
you redesign the questions and shift the setting and/or interviewees until you can 
figure out what is happening. You will gradually build a consistent portrait” (Rubin 
and Rubin, 1988: 92).
A common criticism of qualitative research is that it often fails to address issues of 
internal validity (did the observations accurately represent the issues that surrounded 
illegal building?) and external validity (can specific conclusions be extrapolated?). 
Such validity can be increased by means of ‘triangulation’. It is important to bring 
together different sources and different forms of evidence around the same 
phenomenon. This might involve a combination of what Sayer (1984) calls 
‘intensive’ and ‘extensive’ research, or the gathering of qualitative and quantitative 
data, of documentary evidence, interview evidence, and survey evidence (Foster, 
1996:91). Validity in this research was achieved by asking multiple interviewees 
within each case study to consider the same issues which enabled problems to be 
explored from different perspectives. Methodological triangulation was achieved by 
exploring these same issues using documentary analysis. An attempt at conducting a 
survey among the illegal builders was made as well. Although some of the illegal 
builders agreed to take part in the survey, when the questionnaires were sent to them 
they were not completed. An explanation could be the fear of legal consequences, 
and the illegal builders were not willing to document their illegal actions, even 
though anonymity was maintained since names and addresses were not required. Due 
to the zero response rate on the fifty questionnaires sent, after two months it was 
discontinued.
3.5.1 Semi structured, open-response interviews
By definition, illegal building is poorly documented and private, although still of 
public concern. Consequently, most of the research that is focused on the informal 
sector and activities highlights at some point the extreme difficulties of tracking its
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empirical dynamics due to the lack of the secondary and in particular quantitative 
data (see Fernandes, 1998; Klitgaard, 2000; Kaufmann, 2000).
The collection of data was predominantly by a semi-structured, open-response 
interview style in preference to a more rigid and structured approach. Semi­
structured, open response interviews consisted of a set of open-ended questions 
carefully worded and arranged in advance. The major strength of semi-structured 
interviews is that they enable the researcher to develop a positive rapport with the 
interviewee. King has suggested that the semi-structured, open-response interview is 
most useful where “factual information is to be collected, but there is uncertainty 
about what and how much information participants will be able to provide [and] 
where the nature and range of participants’ likely opinions about the research topic 
are not well known in advance, and cannot easily be quantified” (1994:17). Since 
corruption and illegality are very sensitive issues and difficult to quantify, most of 
their measurement is based on individuals’ perceptions and observations. 
Consequently, the indices like Transparency International’s CPI index and the World 
Bank’s governance index, created to measure the level of deviations and corruption 
in societies, are based on perceptions. Furthermore “the basic subject matter is no 
longer objective data to be quantified, but meaningful relations to be interpreted” 
(Kvale, 1996). In this sense, the interviews adopted a flexible and continuous 
approach to data gathering (Rubin and Rubin, 1995), contributing to the iterative and 
self-corrective nature of the research process.
Research questions were grouped into five major themes (Table 2)7. The first theme 
was the causes of illegal building development and its dimensions. The following 
theme was addressing the official policy responsiveness towards the problem. The 
next set of questions was focused on an investigation of the mechanisms used by 
illegal builders. The fourth theme was focused on the interviewees’ perception of 
corruption. The final theme was investigating the role of various institutions in illegal 
building.
7 See Appendix 2 for interview guidelines used in all interviews.
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Table 2: Research Themes
Research 
objectives/ themes Key research questions
Objective 1:
Causes of illegal 
building 
Objective 2:
Policy Response 
Objective 3: 
Mechanisms
Objective 4: 
Corruption levels
Objective 5: 
Institutional failure
What are the core perceptions and beliefs about the cause of the illegal 
building? What is the extent of illegal developments in Belgrade?
Have any official decisions or policies affected illegal building?
What were the mechanisms illegal builders had used to achieve their goals?
According to the interviewees’ perception, was there corruption involved in the 
illegal building process? If yes, what was the extent of the corruption in the 
process of illegal building?
What was the role of institutions in the whole problem? What was the role of 
political parties and politicians? What was the role of different professions like 
urban planers, architect, and lawyers? What was the role of informal links?
The interviews were recorded and transcribed and cross-referenced with notes taken 
during the interview to ensure clarity and understanding of both interview content 
and documentation. Respondents were informed of the purpose of the interviews 
(part of a doctoral thesis). All respondents agreed to be interviewed and to have their 
interview recorded, except Spasoje Krunic8, ex-head executive of Belgrade’s city 
executive board, who refused to be interviewed on illegal building stating that “(he 
does) not know anything about it, and (I) could have chosen some nicer topic, for 
example the architecture styles in Belgrade” (Interview 10, 2001). At the time of 
interview, permission was obtained from interviewees to contact them again if 
clarification of research data was required, or if further questions arose during 
analysis. Following the interviews, a number of interviewees continued to send 
material when, data became available. Permission was obtained from each 
interviewee to present evidence obtained from interviews in the final research report. 
However, to a certain number of informants, anonymity was assured and names are 
not used. This approach was adopted in order to protect participants from the 
reporting of any particularly sensitive comments made during the interviews.
8 It has to be mentioned that Krunic was head executive of the city government during the late 1990s, 
when illegal building was booming, and that in 2001 was indicted for abuse of the power at the time. 
The outcome of the trial is not known to the researcher.
65
3.5.2 Gaining access and sampling of interviewees
Interviews were carried out between 1st July 2001 and 30th September 2001. A total 
of 26 informants were interviewed, with interviews ranging from one to three hours 
in length. The following sections explore in more detail the rationale behind the 
research methods adopted and their application within the study.
Interviewees were selected from those who were the staff of city institutions, the 
local political and business elite, local community associations and illegal builders. 
Led by the principle of ‘triangulation’ in methods, the same was applied when 
choosing the respondents with expectations that different views and knowledge about 
phenomena would provide more detail and understanding. Although the same 
questions were asked to all informants, consideration was given to their particular 
relationship to illegal building, and questions that were more specific were asked in 
regard to their position. The issue of power runs throughout the thesis, both from an 
academic interest in the elite’s responsibility for the problem and in regard to how to 
access and interview the local elite.
Although Hunter’s reputational method has been criticised as being biased and 
examining reputation more than real power, it still has the advantage of being 
straightforward to operationalise, and it might also be possible to focus on 
reputations among selected groups (Cochrane, 1998). Following this method, the 
main emphasis in this thesis has been on local and city politicians and officials. The 
groups selected to be examined were related to actual political parties that were 
running either the city or local authorities. Moreover, businesspeople and developers 
were also included in the research.
In all city institutions, the Town Planning Institute, the Secretariat for Property 
Affairs and the Agency for City Building Land and Development of Belgrade, 
respondents were interviewed as having key responsibilities in relation to planning, 
building land and housing.
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Initial contact was established in each of the case study authorities. Within Dedinje 
three contacts had already been established during the process of documentary 
analysis and through university contacts. In the case of Zemun, initial contact was 
established with an elected member identified by the contacts from Dedinje. These 
initial contacts were used, along with a review of the documentation, to gain a 
general, preliminary and contextual view of the structure and functioning of the 
authority. In both cases, initial contacts were used as informants who, after the 
interview, were asked to identify other individuals, who were in turn used to continue 
to identify further relevant interviewees - method known as snowballing.
3.5.3 Documentary analysis
This method can be used to clarify research questions, thus improving the focus of 
interviews and reducing the need for explanations of basic issues and concepts raised 
during their course (Robson, 1993). It must also be recognised however, that 
documentation may be inaccurate, fragmented and subjective and may not represent 
correct records of issues and processes (Forster, 1994). In this sense, it has been 
argued that the most important use of documentary analysis within case study 
research is to support and enhance evidence from other sources -  reinforcing the 
robustness and rigour of the research through a process of triangulation (Cochrane, 
1998; Yin, 1994). During the course of the two case studies, council plans and 
strategies, policy documents, internal reports and statistical material were analysed. 
A number of relevant documents and laws and their impact on the current situation 
was examined. It has to be acknowledged that the detailed analysis of plans, although 
central to planning, has remained a neglected area of planning studies in Yugoslavia. 
Even in the ‘post-modem’ era when it is expected that plans would be an ‘area of 
intensive investigation and deconstruction’, nobody has investigated their power and 
influence on illegal building9.
9 There is a similar situation in the Western countries. Healey argued that the status of plans has 
become somewhat diminished since there is a shift towards communicative planning. Plans used to 
be, according to her, regarded as directive statements in which planning authorities used scientific 
knowledge to exercise control over urban development. Now, these plans were replaced with post­
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In addition, some information was gathered from newspapers and magazines. 
However, although the development of various media made research on the elite 
easier, in Serbia the volume of writings on illegal building, especially on the elite’s 
activities, was small due to a lack of freedom of speech and fear of journalists and 
reporters. However, several small independent media such as the radio station B92 
and the magazine Vreme investigated elite and illegal building, and their reports 
provided valuable references for this thesis.
As a part of the preparation for interviews, documents were reviewed in order to 
provide a context for the case studies. Information on activities relating to the 
research objectives were gathered, as well as policies and statistics relating to illegal 
building. Documentary evidence was also used later on to supplement detail and to 
expand upon and support or challenge points raised during interviews, and was also 
utilised to generate additional questions or themes for investigation, thereby 
contributing to the iterative and continuous nature of the research process.
3.6 Reporting the findings
Interpretation of the data collected was undertaken via their ongoing review during 
the course of the case studies, in order to both determine their contribution to 
informing the research objectives, and to refine further data collection. Data gathered 
were used to produce detailed case study reports which clarified the key drivers of 
illegal building in the context of each individual case. Yin (1994) suggests that while 
the objective of the multiple-case study may be more analytical than descriptive, a 
descriptive approach to each individual case study may help to identify the 
appropriate causal links to be analysed through cross-analysis. Evidence was drawn
modernist or post-positivist plans which are developed from the relationship between planning 
authorities and developers, local communities and many other interest groups concerned with an urban 
development. “Plan is now seen to play an interactive rather than directive role, it should no longer be 
assessed as an authoritative document, reflecting planners’ power to intervene effectively in the world, 
it is rather an arena of struggle with different interests competing to determine its content” (Healey, 
1993:84).
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together at the end of each case study analysis in order to reflect upon the key issues 
arising from each case study.
Finally, evidence was explored across the two case studies in order to inform the 
research objectives and to build theory by examining, challenging, finding support, 
or conflicting evidence for, the initial theoretical framework. Individual case study 
assessments for Dedinje and Zemun are presented in chapters seven and eight 
respectively, with cross-analysis of evidence from the two case studies presented in 
chapter nine.
3.7 Limits of the research
The nature of the research required an intensive and in-depth case study approach, 
rather than the more ‘broad-brush’ approaches offered by such research methods as 
surveys or questionnaires which in any case did not produce a response when 
attempted. The reason behind it is the fact that illegal building is, obviously, illegal, 
and that the carriers of it do not want to talk about it because they are aware of the 
consequences they might have to face. Therefore, they would rather choose silence. 
The same happened when the 2001 Census was carried out and many illegal 
developers refused to take part in it. Additionally, due to the neglect of the problem 
by the state, the issue has not been statistically covered. Most of the statistics used 
come from the internal statistics of various local and city institutions. Additionally, 
there were several legalisations of illegal objects which the statistics had not 
incorporated properly. Time and resource restrictions placed upon the research 
prevented the inclusion of more than two case studies.
An additional disadvantage of the research was the lack of transparency in the source 
and legality of the money used for buying properties, especially among the elite. The 
wage levels during the communist period, and especially during the 1990s, were kept 
low by constant hyperinflation and a generally poor economic situation. However, if 
the sources of the large amounts of money among the elite is analysed, it can be
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assumed that much evidence for corruption and fraud would be found (Zdravkovic, 
2001; Ilic, 2001).
Additionally, as analysed in the theoretical chapter, there is no universal approach to 
defining the elite. It is even more difficult to define the elite in communist countries 
due to the scarcity of elite analysis, which was not ‘allowed’ during the communist 
era (Lazic, 2000). Furthermore, the definition is most difficult in the post-communist 
period as the elite is transforming and going through, as Lazic called, ‘adaptive 
reconstruction’ that often involves illegality (2000). Illegality, as stated before, is a 
phenomenon which is complicated and not easy to investigate nor to prove. 
Researchers can be easily misled or find themselves faced with walls of silence that 
cannot be passed. Moreover, power relations and social and economic relations are a 
complex problem, difficult to conceptualise and therefore to research.
Concerning the interviews, several problems occurred while they were conducted. 
First, there was a problem in the responses of the potential informants to take part in 
the research. Although most of them accepted the invitation to take part in an 
interview for academic purposes, when informed on the topic, many of them refused 
to take part. There was a noticeable avoidance of talking about the subject. Parallel 
with the limit in the resources, there was a problem of limits on truth. There was 
visible subjectivity in the responses, and the majority of those interviewed were 
trying to hide the institutions they work with, and to ‘pass the buck’ to the other 
institutions. Therefore it was very important for me to retain a form of continued 
scepticism and not to believe the stories interviewed told about themselves and their 
role in illegal building and corruption. However, these stories need to be taken 
seriously in their own right as well as in providing evidence of how illegal building 
was institutionally driven. In that sense, as Cochrane suggests, it is necessary to 
allow the interviewees to speak for themselves (1998) and to give their insight into 
problems that they have witnessed. Although they know only a fraction of the whole 
story, due to the lack of data and research on illegality in Serbia, the views of expert 
informants constitute very valuable information.
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Equally, while triangulation of data and research methods seeks to increase the 
reliability of findings and thus the validity and utility of the research, the role of the 
qualitative researcher in the interpretation of data must be addressed. The search for 
objectivity within research is perhaps the most debatable point of departure between 
the traditions of quantitative and qualitative research. While quantitative researchers 
seek replication of conclusions as a means of limiting researcher bias, the intuitive 
component of qualitative analysis makes replication more difficult and rare within 
social science research. Bryman (1988) argues that in seeking robustness and 
reliability within qualitative research, it is not replication but replicability that is 
important. Through a clear and detailed account of the methodology employed, it 
should be possible for a researcher to pursue a repeat of the study.
3.8 Summary of methodological approach
This chapter has detailed the research methodology used in order to identify the key 
drivers of illegal building in Belgrade in the 1990s. In addressing this aim, five core 
themes were identified from the theoretical framework contained in chapter two and 
which thereafter informed the research objectives. In order to address these 
objectives, a multiple-case study approach was adopted which sought to compare 
illegal building practices within two local authorities: Dedinje and Zemun. Data were 
collected from 26 interviews conducted with a range of politicians, businessman, 
planners, architects, local community associations and finally illegal builders. In 
addition, a range of documents was analysed. Triangulation of data and methods was 
pursued in order to increase the reliability and usability of findings. Cross-analysis 
was applied by comparing and contrasting findings from each of the case studies in 
order to inform existing theory and to develop an understanding of the particular 
institutional drivers of illegal building.
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4 Chapter : Belgrade as a ‘Socialist city’
4.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to examine various features of the now defunct socialist 
system in the former Yugoslavia which have lived on, shaping the more recent 
patterns of behaviour and illegality without being able by themselves to account for 
these patterns. One of the reasons behind illegal building in Belgrade was the 
weakness of the institutional setting developed during the communist period. As 
Smith argues, transition is not a one way process of changing a system, but rather a 
complex reworking of old social relations in an attempt at constructing capitalism on 
and with the ruins of communism (Smith and Pickles, 1998:5). Political and 
economic transition is path dependent because it is based upon existing 
institutionalised forms of both learning and struggles over pathways that emerge out 
of the intersection of old and new (Smith and Pickles, 1998:13). Inheritance from 
communist ideology and institutions created a route for future institutional 
inefficiency and corruption. Therefore, careful consideration is given to legacies 
from the socialist period as being of crucial importance in explaining the roots of 
illegality in post socialist Belgrade.
Illegal building is defined as construction carried out without previously acquired 
building permits (IAUS, 2001; Petovar, 2003). It is related to the construction of new 
houses, adaptation, a change of purpose of existing houses and the construction of 
auxiliary and concomitant objects such as garages and storages.
Illegal developments in Belgrade in fact started at the very beginning of the 20th 
century. However, most of the authors who have analysed housing in Serbia in the 
communist and post-communist period have not taken into consideration the 
condition of the pre-Second World War period. According to a historical study of 
Belgrade (Markovic in Petrovic, 2002:61), between the two world wars home
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ownership was the privilege of the wealthy, partly due to a law which did not allow 
the ownership of parts of houses but only of the whole house. That made housing 
ownership difficult even for the middle class who were mostly civil servants and it 
also implied the power property owners had at that time. At certain times rents were 
60% of workers’ wages, resulting in spontaneous housing developments (Markovic 
in Petrovic, 2002:61). According to Petrovic (2002), the ‘initial’ phase of housing 
dates from this period, and the supply phase followed in the socialist period. The 
majority of the underlying causes of illegal construction in Belgrade, and the former 
Yugoslavia in general, were developed during the socialist period during the supply 
phase, especially in the 1970s during the huge economic crisis (Zegarac, 1999).
Due to the multidimensionality of the problem, the purpose of this chapter is to 
analyse in particular the legacies from the socialist period related to illegal building. 
In addition to exploring the major characteristics of the communist type economy 
and urbanisation, and especially the Yugoslav self-management system, the chapter 
analyses five major groups of causes of illegality in construction during the socialist 
period. First, it focuses on unbalanced regional economic growth and development 
that consequently resulted in the migration of some of the population to Belgrade, 
causing an increase in demand that was not met. A second cause was the political 
determination for collective housing and the subsequent neglect of individual 
housing that resulted in the individual housing shortage. Emphasis is also placed on 
an unfavourable financial policy for individual building, ineffective legislation and 
complex city administration and massive bureaucracy that produced the continuing 
lack of available sites and parcels for legal, individual building. Fourth, consideration 
is given to lack of maintenance of the existing housing stock that further increased 
the demand for new housing. Finally, the state’s passive political response, reflected 
by not demolishing illegally built houses, is addressed, as it stimulated illegal 
development too. Additionally, urban planning in Belgrade was viewed as an 
inadequate response to solving the problems of illegality in the city due to its 
slowness and inefficiency, and the production of very rigid and non-flexible plans.
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4.2 The City of Belgrade
Belgrade is located at the mouth of the river Sava where it joins the Danube, on the 
tangent line of Middle Europe and the Balkans, half way between West and South 
East Europe, a location that has been of much benefit to the city. There has been a 
settlement at this site for over 2000 years, from the earliest known town of 
Singhidunum (UN Habitat, 2001). During its twenty-three centuries of existence, 
from ancient Singhidunum to modem Belgrade, the settlement has been devastated 
and rebuilt forty times. The name Belgrade was mentioned for the first time in the 
ninth century when the city was called Alba Graeca -  White Town (Yugoslav 
Habitat Report, 1995). In the twelfth century, it was the capital of medieval Serbia, 
until the downfall of the Serbian Kingdom under the Ottoman Empire. After the First 
World War, during which it was occupied by the Austrians, Belgrade become the 
capital of the newly founded Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and after the Second World 
War remained the capital following the creation of a communist Yugoslavia 
(Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia - SFRY) under Josip Broz Tito.
With the disintegration of SFRY in 1991, Belgrade remained the capital of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Again, in 2002, due to the new political 
conditions and changes of internal borders, the FRY re-arranged its constitutional 
covenant and changed its name to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (S&M), and 
Belgrade has continued as the capital. Belgrade’s metropolitan area today comprises 
16 municipalities (opstina), 10 of which are inner-urban and 6 of which are outer- 
urban or sub-urban municipalities.
Apart from the historical geopolitical and locational advantages, the status of the 
capital has had a substantial influence upon the demographic, economic, social and 
spatial development of the city. The emphasised advantage of the city itself 
contributed to the high density of inhabitants as well as different activities 
(productive and services). Apart from being the political and administrative, as well 
as the educational and cultural centre, Belgrade has emerged in the post-Second 
World War period as the strongest economic and industrial centre in the region 
(Yugoslav Habitat Report, 1995). However, the urban growth of Belgrade was not
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only a result of economic and demographic forces and its own policies, as was the 
case in Western European capitals (Cheshire, 1995), but also of centrally planned 
development led by the communist ideology of high industrialisation and quick 
urbanisation. Petovar (2003) defined development directed by the communist 
ideology by a formula whereby:
Socialism = industrialization + urbanisation
which implies that the main economic driver of socialism was industrialisation and 
gives the ideological rationale behind the rapid development of the cities. “Ruling 
politics and ideology tried to convert cities into the centers of industrial development 
and growth, because they saw industrialization and urbanisation as synonymous, and 
employing the influx of rural population to the cities was the major driver for the 
fulfilment of the ‘project of socialist society’” (Petovar, 2003:10)
4.3 Socialist City
Differences between socialist and capitalist cities were the result of different 
political, economic and institutional contexts within which the cities developed. A 
very minimalist characterisation, but which is sufficient for outlining the main 
attributes of each system, is given by Janos Komai (2000). The first three blocks in 
Figure 1 sum up the fundamental features of each system: what characterises 
political power, the distribution of property rights, and the constellation of 
coordination mechanisms. The fourth block is defined as the type of behaviour 
typical to economic factors, and the fifth block as the typical economic phenomena. 
The figure shows only a few of the behavioural regularities and lasting economic 
phenomena typical of each system, and those lists could be continued (Komai,
2000)10, but for the purpose of this research they show the key differences between 
two systems in which cities have been developing. The capitalist system is based on 
political power being friendly towards private property that consequently had a
10 Komai has not included democracy as one of the features of the capitalist society because he argues 
that democracy is not a necessary condition for development of capitalism, and that it can be 
developed in authoritarian societies as well (2000).
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dominant position in the system. This system is based on a free market economy and 
hard budget constraints. The domination of Marxist ideology, state ownership and 
bureaucratic predominance as well as a soft budget and over-subsidising of almost 
everything by the state, were the features of the communist institutional environment 
in which cities developed and housing policies were created. Thus, institutions and 
relationships within cities and resulting housing politics were heavily marked by 
relationships of the broader contexts in which they operated.
Figure 1: Model of Socialist and Capitalist systems
Model  of t h e  Social is t  Sys t ems
1  Undivided power 
of th e  Marxist- 
Leninist party
2 Dom inant position of 
s ta te  and quasistate 
ownership
3 Preponderance of 
bureaucratic 
coordination
M Soft budget 
constraint: weak 
responsiveness 
to  prices: plan 
bargaining: 
quantity drive
Chronic shortage 
economy: sellers 
market: labor 
shortage: 
unem ploym ent 
on the job
Model  of t h e  Cap ta l i s t  Sys t ems
^  Political power 
friendly to 
private property 
and  th e  market
Dom inant position of 
private property
3 Preponderance 
of market 
coordination
4 Hard budget 
constraint: strong 
responsiveness 
to  prices
No chronic 
shortage: buyers 
market: chronic 
unem ploym ent 
fluctuations in the 
business cycle
Source: Komai (2000:31)
However, there are different opinions on the nature of urbanisation in the state 
socialist system among the researchers concerned with Eastern European cities. 
Some writers argue that the socialist city is very distinctive from the capitalist city 
(Szeleny, 1983). Hamilton (1979) defined socialist cities as cities of industrial 
societies which had abolished private means of production and private property, and 
which were characterised by a centrally planned economic system. According to 
Hamilton, there are three main differences between socialist and capitalist cities. 
First, there is state monopoly ownership of the means of production and of the means 
of collective consumption as well. In the socialist city, land ownership, land use, the 
degree and direction of industrialisation, capital investment in all sectors, and at all 
levels of the economy, rents, wages, prices, and movements of population were 
controlled by the state (1979). The principles of the free market did not exist, only 
the principles of a highly commanded economy. Secondly, there was the political
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domination of the Communist Party. Through a strongly centralised state apparatus, 
it controlled all aspects of social, economic and political life. Finally, there was the 
development of a distinctive class structure or socialist rank order, with the 
elimination of the former city bourgeoisie as a distinctive social category and the 
creation of a modestly differentiated broad ‘middle class of the population’ 
(Hamilton, 1979; Harloe, 1996).
Additionally, Szeleny argues that the socialist city should be seen as the result of an 
independent model of urbanisation (1983). Post Second World War urban population 
growth and spatial concentration of the population has been smaller in the socialist 
city than in the capitalist city. During the extensive socialist industrialisation, the 
growth of industrial jobs seems to have been much faster than the growth of the 
permanent urban population. Thus these cities became ‘under-urbanised’ (Szelenyi, 
1996:294). The ecological structure of the socialist city differs from the pre-war 
structure and from the structure of capitalist cities.
Contrary to Szeleny’s independent model of socialist city urbanisation, Enyedi 
describes industrial and post-industrial cities as cities with the same spatial structure. 
According to him, urbanisation in Central and Eastern Europe is not different, but 
has been delayed, compared to Western Europe, for five centuries due to historical 
reasons. The industrial revolution has never been completed in Central and Eastern 
European cities and it was halted after the First World War. As a result of the late 
transformation from a rural to an urban society, the majority of the national 
population still lived in the countryside in Central and Eastern Europe in the 1950s. 
In , spite of this delay in urbanisation, spatial forms of urban development have 
followed the urban development in Western Europe. As in Western European cities, 
the main features are the ageing of the urban population, the slowing down of the 
growth of the metropolitan population, and the depopulation and social erosion of 
central residential districts. Industrial development has had the same consequences in 
every country in terms of migration from the countryside to the cities, urban 
concentration, suburbanisation, and the integration of villages into agglomerations 
(Enyedi, 1998).
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Either though a delayed urbanisation or under-urbanisation, the countries of Eastern 
Europe have had a different urbanisation process in the post war period. The cities of 
socialism and capitalism both form and are formed by their respective structure of 
economic organisation, elite formation and political factors. As Harloe (1996) 
suggested, the social-spatial organisation of cities, their politics and administration, 
their housing and property markets and their patterns of social interaction are directly 
linked to the major characteristics of the socialist and capitalist orders. In the 
communist countries, the state was the major carrier of the process of urbanisation 
and the determinant of urban-centric politics, which resulted in “specific 
developments of the cities on the one side, and economic, social, and cultural 
underdevelopment and backwardness of the rural areas on the other” (Petovar, 
2003:10). Urban growth, based on the transfers of the working active population 
from villages into cities, was partially followed by the construction of nurseries, 
educational and health institutions, and housing, while the social, cultural, and 
environmental components of urban living were neglected. Development of the 
settlements was not led by economic and independent market criteria but was 
directed by political ideology and the Communist Party. Additionally, the physical 
organisation of old cities in Eastern Europe was similar to those in Western Europe, 
but new socialist towns had a different physical structure11 (Hamilton, 1979).
The former Yugoslavia belonged to the Eastern European group of countries due to a 
shared political ideology and economic systems. It consequently had the same type 
of urbanisation, but with small differences due to its own regional characteristics and 
policies, as well as due to the existing pre-war network of settlements (Petovar, 
2003). The pattern of socialism applied from the Soviet Union to Eastern Europe 
varied from country to country. A major difference between the former Yugoslavia
11 New Towns were based on Milyutin’s post WW n  model of the ‘linear city’ that consisted of 
comprised parallel belts of housing and industrial plants separated by a green sanitary zone. Green 
space and water bodies had to be located windward, and industrial zones leeward of the residential 
areas. Additionally, the basic unit of new housing construction was supposed to be in the physical 
format of a micro unit designed by Strumilin, who was led by idea of a self contained community of 
residential quarters, including dormitories, communal eating and recreational places, kindergartens, 
schools and local medical facilities, shopping and other service provision (Milytin, 1974; French and 
Hamilton, 1979; Bater, 1980). French and Hamilton argue that socialist cities comprise of several 
distinctive zones: historic or medieval core; the relict capitalist city; zone of socialist transition or 
renewal; socialist housing of the 1950s; integrated socialist neighbourhood and residential districts of 
1960s and 1970s; open or planted isolation belts; industrial related zones; and open countryside, 
forests, and hills including tourist complexes (1979).
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and other communist countries was that Yugoslavia had had a more liberal and 
decentralised organisational form of politics and governance called self-management. 
It was adopted in the 1970s and it introduced distinctive characteristics into the 
housing provision system.
4.4 ‘Self-management’
The most unique characteristic of the SFR Yugoslav political economy was the 
concept and practice of self-management, which was the antithesis of the other 
Eastern European systems. Its distinctive feature, self-management, aimed to resolve 
the problem between the state and market and to transfer political power and 
decision-making to the lower layers of society. In the simplest terms, self­
management meant decentralisation of power.
However, if a transition from a communist dictatorship into a self-management 
system is analysed through a framework of institutional change, then at the beginning 
institutions were centralised and one party dominated with totalitarian tendencies and 
with the communist party establishing and defining the rules. The change into a 
decentralised network of political institutions was non-linear with some interruptions 
and lasted until the 1974 constitution (Pusic, 1985). The Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia, which later changed its name to the Alliance of Communists of 
Yugoslavia, held the central place in political life as a consequence of leading the 
revolution and the war and having established the revolutionary dictatorship. 
However, a change of system, led by the group of people from the top of the party, 
took place. Although this process was contradictory in many situations, the change 
from a one party system to a system where people influenced the decision-making 
system through a self-management process, resulted in a move from the national to 
the local level. Self-management was imposed in order to enable the transfer of 
decision-making from the central government to local councils, particularly in the 
fields of culture, urban development and the development of technical and social
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1 0infrastructure. However, the creation of a self-management system and 
decentralisation created uncertainty, since the existing channels of power of the 
Communist party and their elite were broken and the number of people responsible 
for decision-making rapidly increased. Additionally, some of the leaders from the 
Communist party were resisting changes, rendering the process even more difficult. 
Edward Kardelj made the exit from this situation in 1974 by the creation of the new 
Constitution that provided a delegate political system. This was a radical version of 
the Parliamentary system, which suited the Alliance of Communists, giving it equal 
power to the other delegating organisations (Pusic, 1985).
However, the changes followed by constant conflict between reformers and certain 
influential members of the Communist Party who were opposing reform of the 
dominant communist system, had a negative influence on institutions and their 
stability. As a result of the strong ideological influence combined with the imposition 
of the delegate self-management system, a massive system of complex institutions 
was developed. This was the case not only with political institutions but also with 
economic and other social systems. The enormous, bureaucratic but very powerful 
institutions had continued to exist until the 1990s.
The belief was that a decentralised, bottom-up and localised system would produce 
more and progressively distributed benefits for local workers and residents within the 
confines of a one-party state. Self-management was based on the idea of pluralism 
and participative democracy. However, the development of self-management as an 
alternative democratic system was not feasible in the one party system. A free market 
and a civil society, as major components of democracy, did not exist in Yugoslavia. 
The major difference between democracy in Western societies and self-management 
was that the latter was missing an authentic component - civil society - and therefore 
it had not been the product of the need of the civil society as was the case in the 
United States (De Tocqueville, 1994). On the contrary, it was the system enforced by 
the ruling regime. Although self-management meant the participation of ‘everyone’, 
there was a top-down hierarchy in the entire society and in government, and only
12 The equal organisational ‘units’ existed in state enterprises and they were called ‘basic 
organisations of joint work’;
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those who were on the top of pyramid had full access to all information. Access to 
information was not practically decentralised.
In the economic field, problems that arose from self-management were related to the 
justification of the positions of directors, doubts about optimal allocation of 
investments, and increasing discrepancies between the market and the plan. 
Accounted problems were the result of the clash of the principals of self­
management and the hierarchical organisation of work. The failure of the full 
development of free market institutions was additionally exacerbated with the 
problems of slow economic growth and the underdevelopment of the economy (Pusic, 
1985). As described by Pusic, the former Yugoslav society was like a society in the 
middle level of development, in between two worlds with the political and legal 
systems that were constantly under construction. “Illegitimate but well organised 
political and professional minorities (elite and subelite) had to be reconsolidated with 
bureaucracies, politocracies, and technocracies, that were trying to stabilise their 
privileged access to already limited sources” (1985:75). Although the ownership of 
most of the means was transferred from the state to the society, the major role in 
decision approval was still in the ruling party and the top officials, who were the elite 
at the time. Petovar also considers the decentralisation to have been illusory: 
“through careful analysis of responsibilities of newly created communes it can be 
seen that they were based on ‘starting initiatives and taking stances’ on many issues, 
but without real practical and political power in their hands” (2003:24). As a result of 
strong ideological influence combined with the imposition of the delegate self­
management system, a massive system of complex institutions was developed, which 
again were not independent but strictly controlled from the top. This was the case not 
only with political institutions but also with economic and other social systems.
In spite of the fact that the Yugoslav communist system was different from other 
communist systems by a unique attempt to give everyone economic, social and 
political equity, genuine political pluralism did not exist in self-management due to 
the one-party rule. Many witnesses of that time argue that true decentralisation did 
not exist in practice (Simmie and Dekleva, 1991). An explanation might be taken 
from Dahl’s argument that in any socialist country where the planned economy is
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owned by the state or where a so-called command economy functions, 
democratically orientated governance cannot exist but rather there would be an 
authoritative dictatorship (Dahl, 1990). The reason for this is that such an economic 
system enables all resources to be in the hands of the leaders that could be used for 
regulation, compulsion and bribery. Since decentralisation in Yugoslavia was not 
supported by genuine political pluralisation, the imposition of a free economy and 
civil and human rights, the idea of democratisation remained theoretical. “Personal 
connections and party subordination of economic, state and administrative levels 
supported the fulfilment of assignments from the top (vertical or top down hierarchy), 
which resulted in the creation of a horizontally controlled personnel whirligig that 
enabled full implementation of the party politics on the local level” (Petovar, 
2003:25). Self-management created an increased number of inefficient institutions, 
resulting from the principle that every idea from the bottom has to be approved at the 
top. Both the ‘logic of consequentiality’ and the ‘logic of appropriateness’ were 
determined by the ruling elite and institutions did not have the flexibility or freedom 
to make the best choices considered on their own.
With regard to housing, the former Yugoslavia adopted similar housing policies to 
the other communist societies in the post WW II period. With the imposition of a 
more liberal form of socialism - self-management - the housing policies were to 
some extent changed and adapted to the new system, but they were still dominated 
by the ‘Eastern European Housing Model’ developed under communist systems.
4.5 ‘East European Housing Model’
The former socialist Eastern European countries were for several decades governed 
by distinct ideological principles from capitalist countries, with extensive state 
control over property rights and the provision of housing, including infrastructure 
provision, land acquisition, construction and allocation of public rented housing, rent 
control, as well as more indirect measures of control like urban planning, setting 
standards, building codes, determining the level of consumer subsidies and property 
taxes (Pichler -Milanovic, 2000). These characteristics were part of the egalitarian
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philosophy that certain necessities such as health, education and housing should be 
provided as a constitutional right to citizens (Ambrose, 1991; Petovar, 2003). 
Contrary to the neo-corporatist approach to housing in capitalist societies, the 
socialist approach could be defined as statist, considering the small number of 
stakeholders whose interests were included in decision-making by the state when the 
housing policies were created.
There is a perception that due to the similar framework based on a communist 
ideology and planned economy, a common ‘East European Housing Model’ 
developed with similar outcomes in all countries. The specific characteristic of the 
socialist housing sector is that it treated housing only as a consumption good and not 
as a production sector, resulting in economic problems since it had not been one of 
the cornerstones of economic growth but a constant burden on the state budget 
(Hegediis and Tosics, 1992; Hegediis and Tosics 1996). Housing was considered part 
of collective consumption and totally regulated by state institutions and public 
enterprises.13The state and its actors were investors, developers and distributors of 
housing units, and the public renting sector was its dominant type of housing.14 This 
concept assumed that the wage does not include housing investment, in addition to 
fact that the state was both employer and renter to everyone. Consequently, the 
calculation of wages was based on low rents in the public-renting sector (Petrovic, 
2002).15
Public rented housing was built usually in multi-dwelling buildings in mass housing 
estates in large cities and industrial centres. Allocation of public rented housing was 
based according to the criteria of ‘need’ and ‘merit’ and officially recognised space 
standards (e.g. floor space per person). In addition, the rents were subsidised and 
controlled by the state to ensure that they were generally affordable. However, they
13 Social security in communist countries was based on three main pillars: full employment, price 
control and general accessibility to rare goods and resources. Citizens in the cities were promised full 
employment; high and similar level wages, production growth, and consequently, consumption 
growth. The working place was the ‘production’ place but also the channel for distribution of the 
resources of social politics (Dixon and Kim quoted in Petrovic, 2002:66).
14 The term ‘public rented housing’ relates to non-owner occupied housing (e.g. state, social, co­
operative, employers-related, institutional, etc) with a different role to state institutions in ownership, 
financing, construction and distribution of housing (Pichler -Milanovic, 2000).
15 3-6 % per household income (Petrovic, 2002).
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did not cover the cost of maintenance and renovation (Pichler -Milanovic, 2000). 
Additional constraints that the governments in Eastern Europe faced were budget 
shortages for housing provision of new ‘mass housing blocks’, high costs of control 
over private transactions, and the existence of the informal market process (Clapham, 
1996; Hegediis and Tosics 1996).
Consequently, as a result of ‘consumption commodity logic’ and subsidising, the 
socialist housing system was neither efficient nor equitable. The persistent housing 
shortages, overcrowding, long waiting lists, and deferred maintenance of multi­
storey buildings were the main characteristics of housing systems across Eastern 
Europe (Pichler-Milanovic, 2000). Due to all the problems described above, and in 
spite of official support of public rented housing, many governments directly or 
indirectly allowed owner occupation, which had became a dominant form of tenure 
by the end of the 1980s, especially in Bulgaria (92 %), Hungary (77 %), Romania 
(76 %) and the former Yugoslavia (80 %) (Pichler -Milanovic, 2000). Furthermore, 
priority in access to public rented housing was given to political and party officials, 
bureaucrats, military members, and employees of the strategic industrial sectors 
rather than to workers and disadvantaged social groups (Szeldny, 1983, Szeleny, 
1987), which created a non-equitable housing system that ran contrary to a Marxist 
ideology based on an equal and classless society. As Ladany argues, the state 
distribution of housing was not guided by a unique criterion, but there were two 
principles. The first was social, based on the needs of citizens for accommodation. 
The second was determined by status, and this ‘merit’ based principle became the 
dominant one (Ladany, 1992).
In free market systems, attention was given to the institutionalisation of cooperation 
and solving of housing problems in both directions, with a top-down approach from 
policy creators and a bottom-up approach from other actors. Contrary to that, in the 
socialist system, the creation of housing policy was predominantly in the hands of 
the political elite (top-down) without any institutional possibility for the creation of 
bottom-up influence. The experience of the socialist housing policies implied an 
indirect influence by those social actors who did not have an opportunity for 
firsthand impact on the housing system. The non-efficiency of the housing system
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led to the creation of alternative approaches, mainly used by people excluded from 
an official system of provision of flats, which had resulted in an expansion of illegal 
building and the creation of informal settlements. The political elite’s response had 
been one of reactive policies (Petrovic, 2002).
However, certain differences between housing systems in those countries existed and 
these were based on their institutional and political characteristics, while common 
trends were driven by structural and economic changes. Consequently, due to self­
management, the Yugoslav model was different and was considered a ‘deviation’ 
from the ‘mainstream’ communist housing policy (Hegediis and Tosics 1998). 
Therefore, the aim of the following section is to assess the extent of ‘deviation’ in the 
Yugoslav housing system.
4.6 Urbanisation and Housing in Socialist Belgrade
The population of the former Yugoslavia has been growing continuously for the past 
fifty years from less than 6.9 million in 1948 to 10.6 million in 1996 (UN Habitat,
2001). However, beside the natural growth of population, one of the major drivers of 
the increasing urban population was agricultural reforms that were also part of the 
forced urbanisation imposed by the communist government in its project of creating 
a socialist society. This rapid increase of the urban population was not met by a 
proportionate increase in urban housing stock mainly due to the inefficient housing 
policy.
4.6.1 Urbanisation and Rural reforms
The first agricultural reform started on 23rd August 1945 with the passing of an Act 
on agricultural reform and colonisation. According to this Act, the state allocated 
half of the previously nationalised and expropriated land to people who did not
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possess any, such as small agricultural producers and colonists.16 Approximately 
316,000 rural households received plots of 2.5 hectares average size, which they 
were allowed to sell in 15 or 20 years’ time. According to Petovar, this reform had a 
‘social function’ (2003:11) and it was politically popular among the rural population, 
because it confirmed the concern of the communist state for their welfare (Veselinov 
quoted in Petovar, 2003). However, this reform was followed by other less popular 
policies that were anti-stimulating, especially for the bigger farms, due to the 
limitation of the farm size (10 hectares), the ban on buying necessary machines, 
experiments with collectivisation of the farms which were taken from the Soviet 
model, and price control. Additionally, farmers and the agricultural population had 
less privileged social rights and had restricted access to social welfare institutions 
compared to the urban population employed in either state enterprises or 
administration. All those disadvantages of rural living stimulated numerous farmers 
to immigrate to the neighbouring cities or to the capital, and look for a job in the 
state sector where the working class had many privileges that were attractive to the 
rural population. Among them, the most popular were access to public rented 
housing, free education and health insurance. The right to ‘sick leave’, which was 
very often misused by workers, guaranteed wages no matter what quantity or quality 
of work, and all these exerted a magnetising force on the rural population to give up 
their hard life in the villages and move to the cities. In addition, the Communist Party 
was relieved of the potential development of socially and economically strong and 
independent ‘peasants’ that might have resisted their rule. Petovar argues that these 
were the instruments of ‘pacification and integration’ of the rural population into the 
system which made them even safer from further political uprises and changes 
(2003: 12).
Furthermore, Petovar suggests that this was not only the result of labour migration, 
but was the product of ‘forced urbanisation’ that had a political background (Petovar, 
2003). One of the goals of the communist party was to industrialise the country and 
as part of that project, ‘peasants’ had to be discouraged from living in rural areas by 
various policies, and consequently transferred into the industrial working class in the
16 Colonisation was the process of a massive transference of the local population from poor 
mountainous areas into more developed agricultural regions with houses and land that the state gained 
by nationalisation and expropriation.
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cities. Table 3 shows the actual change in percentages of the rural population from 
72.9% in 1953 to 28.4 % in 1991. The total population in rural settlements decreased 
by 44.5% over 38 years, and the urban population increased by 34.8 % (Petovar, 
2003). It is also evident that the process of de-agriculturisation was much faster than 
the process of urbanisation.
Table 3: Percentage of rural, urban and mixed population in former Yugoslavia
Population
1953 1961 1971 1981 1991
Rural 72.9 62.8 40.2 31.0 28.4
Mixed 5.1 7.9 10.8 16.4 14.8
Urban 22.0 29.3 49.0 52.6 56.8
Source: Petovar, 2003; Federal Statistics Office. Statistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia 2000
Through these marginalizing policies, the state managed to keep the rural population 
and farmers under economic control and on the social and political margins (Petovar, 
2003). In addition, the price of food was in the function of a transfer of accumulation 
from agriculture into industry, the creation of high spending on agricultural goods by 
urban citizens, and subsidising the industrial overpopulation. “That was the politics 
of the anti market, cheap agriculture and cheap food” (Veselinov, 1987: 172 quoted 
in Petovar, 2003).
The situation was that rural households sent one member to find a job in the state 
sector, in order to get free access to health and education, and through this state 
employed individual the rest of the household would have access to these benefits. 
Another phenomenon created because of those politics was the emergence of 
‘peasant-industrial workers’. These were the peasants who worked in the factories 
during the week, and then spent weekends working on their farms. They travelled 
every day from their farms to their work place and back (Petovar, 2003).
Consequently, massive migrations from rural to urban areas resulted in the rapid 
increase of the urban population, but at the same time the cities were not capable of
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accepting the huge flow of new residents. As an outcome of this forced urbanisation 
(Petovar, 2003:14), cities were characterised by low living standards for working 
class households, bad infrastructural equipment and finally, a shortage of housing 
that resulted in the development of illegal building mostly in suburbs and on plots 
without the necessary communal infrastructure. Consequently, Belgrade was not 
sprawling from the centre towards the periphery, but the sub-urban matrix and the 
culture represented there were aggressively conquering the old traditional urban 
spaces, bringing their own rural culture (Vujovic, 2000).17
The local authorities, in the late 1970s when the eruption had started, did not have 
the necessary autonomy and instruments to prevent those inflows due to the top- 
down decision-making system. Additionally, due to the incapacity to talk publicly 
about city problems, local authorities that had the political will to resolve raising 
housing and shortage problems could not have found an adequate policy response 
(Petovar, 2003; Vujovic, 2000).
The number of citizens in the city of Belgrade continued to rise, and consequently 
increased 2.27 times and grew in administrative area 1.56 times from 1948 to 1991 
(Spatial Plan of Serbia, 1996).
Table 4: Increase of population in Belgrade from 1948-1991
Year Administrative 
area of Belgrade
1948 633,209
1953 731,837
1961 942,190
1971 1,209,361
1981 1,476,000
1991 1,602,226
Source: Spatial Plan of Serbia (1996)
17 Rural culture relates to culture of the rural immigrants who were not using cultural, urban amenities 
of the cities like theatres, cinemas, etc. They were mainly preserving the habits brought from rural 
areas, and were trying to live the same lifestyle in the city as they did in villages (Vujovic, 2000).
In summary, agricultural reforms had the political aim of transforming the society 
from a rural into an urbanised and industrialised one. The rural population was then 
stimulated to migrate to the cities which created a pressure on the housing sector. 
However, the supply of housing in the cities, and especially in Belgrade, was not 
enough to support the increase in the urban population and the demand for housing 
units. One of the reasons behind the housing shortage was the housing policy.
4.6.2 Housing policy
The aim of this section is to assess what the major features of the housing system in 
the former Yugoslavia were and the extent to which it had an impact on illegal 
building.
Similar to the other Eastern European housing systems, the housing system in the 
former Yugoslavia after WW II was determined by ideological principles which 
considered the mechanisms of the free market to be the primary source of inequality, 
and private ownership the major result of exploitation. Led by Marxist ideology, 
political and party hierarchy was marginalising the market, private ownership and 
private initiative. The relationship between the state and marginalised civil society 
and the market was based on a full asymmetry of power (power held by the state) 
and without any possibility for its future formalisation or institutionalisation 
(Petrovic, 2002).
However, a housing reform was introduced in 1953 and completed by constitutional 
changes in 1969 and 1974 by the full introduction of self-management. Even before 
the imposition of self-management, the government realised the increasing financial 
and organisational burden of trying to maintain a very large amount of collective 
socially owned housing across the country. In the 1960s, the government tried to sell 
part of the housing stock under its control to the existing tenants, but had little 
success. The economic reforms of 1965 set new policies for housing that encouraged 
savings and attempted to increase housing rents to market levels. However, the
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progressive increases in rents were discontinued in 1968 in order to reduce the 
accompanying pressures to raise wages (UN Habitat, 2001). In the early 1970s, the 
state faced the shortage of necessary housing funds and consequently transferred 
ownership of its housing stock to the Republics and Autonomous Provinces who 
subsequently turned them over to the cities.
The constitutional changes of 1974 aimed to establish a decentralised and plural 
system of industrial, political, territorial and interested delegated decision-making. 
Regarding the housing sphere, the proposed ideal was to be realised through the 
formation of “self-managing housing communities in which both the consumers and 
the producers were represented” (Mandic, 1992: 297). Self-management
communities were fully responsible for the organisation and management of the 
housing sector. Housing in towns and cities was mainly provided through the 
construction of apartment buildings developed through social development housing 
funds. However, economic criteria were not used to govern the construction and use 
of housing (Petovar, 2003; UN Habitat, 2001).
Consequently, as suggested by Mandic, self-management reform did not lead to a 
markedly more efficient form of housing provision than the previous socialist model 
(1992). “The self-managing housing communities ended up functioning as a hyper- 
protective institutional environment, which reduced both efficiency and the 
productivity of the socialist housing sector” (Mandic, 1992:299). In the self­
management housing model, competition between building companies was avoided, 
and the monopolistic position of state owned developing companies caused a steep 
price increase. The existing private sector was under strict control to prevent the 
development of free market elements. Private ownership was restricted to two 
housing units per family, and there was not much possibility for private development 
to occur legally. Despite the fact that private earnings and savings were channelled 
into housing (in the absence of any other possible investment), state control over the 
housing sector prevented the private sector from developing in free market terms 
(Mandic, 1992:302).
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Local self-management housing communes ran urban land management too, and they 
estimated future needs for development. After needs were predicted, with planning 
documents, the communes would assign the urban building land for specific 
requirements to already known investors, most often to socialist enterprises (Babacic, 
2005). These processes of development were specifically defined in Programmes. 
The Programmes used to be carried out in two forms: as a medium-term, which was 
a five-year period Programme, or as an annual Programme. The latter was only an 
expansion of the former, with detailed specification of the works. The main goal of 
the medium-term Programme for Belgrade was to accomplish the social plan for the 
development of the City of Belgrade and to provide residential space for the 
population, so usually around 80% of the financial means was determined for the 
arrangement of land for public housing (Babacic, 2005).
Although the self-management housing model was giving a more decentralised 
approach in decision-making than was the case in the other Eastern European 
countries, it was still not the bottom-up approach represented in Western European 
countries. There was no private initiative and free market competition, and 
consequently the state and state enterprises were subsidising most of the housing. 
This resulted in a shortage of funds, and subsequently in a shortage of housing. As 
argued by Simmie, due to economic non-sustainability and inefficiency and the lack 
of a real democracy, at the end of 1980s the system and practice of socio-economic 
planning in Yugoslavia, or so-called societal self-management planning, had been in 
a deep crisis for more than a decade (Simmie and Dekleva, 1991). From the 
institutional point of view, the real democratic institutions were not developed. The 
housing allocation was, as in the other Eastern European countries, led by criteria of 
need and merit. The dispersed decision-making resulted in long waiting lists and 
bureaucratic rules that were waiting for approval from the top before implemented. 
For the private sector, the laws were very restricting, and even if land was provided 
for an individual building, the process of getting of building permit could last for 
years, if in the end it was approved at all.
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4.6.3 Development versus Bureaucracy
The process of building for the small individual sector was characterised by long 
waits for necessary permits. Before starting construction, individual developers had 
to obtain building permission that allowed them to build property on the specific site, 
where this type of property had been planned by the planning document. There was a 
large number of documents that individual developers had to submit when applying 
for building permission. They had to prove that they had the right to use the land in 
question, that their proposed development was in accordance with the planned 
development, and that they had the consent of all PCEs (Public Communal 
Enterprises) that the building can be connected to the utilities. The process of 
individual development was not favoured by the state and was not helped by 
complicated and time-consuming bureaucratic procedures. However, the argument 
was that this was necessary since it enabled the property to be built by adopted 
standards.
In practice, the process was even more complicated. There were around 64 legal 
regulations that were related to building in Serbia. There were approximately 64 
legal acts that an ordinary citizen had to understand and interpret in order to get a 
building permit (Janie, 1998). This is the clearest evidence of how bureaucratic this 
system is. Furthermore, there was a lack of information systems and networks 
between all organisations included in the process of granting building permits which 
are necessary when confusing procedures like this exist. In addition, the granting of 
building permits was often rendered more difficult by the obstacles placed by civil 
servants (Janie, 1998) whose attitude to private developers reflected the general 
attitude of the state and Communist party towards them. According to Djuricic, the 
applications of private developers were usually put on the bottom of the list of the 
applications which made the process even longer (Interview 1, 2001).
In addition to the complicated process of getting a building permit, another obstacle 
for individual building was the shortage of available building land. After WW n,
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large companies were either divided into smaller units or converted into state-run 
enterprises. The vast majority of land in rural areas continued to be privately owned. 
Large areas of urban land were proclaimed “building land” in the period between 
1956 and 1959 and automatically became owned by the state.18 Land and property 
ownership within urban areas were recorded as being held by the city in a cadastre 
court, which resulted in the elimination of any practical need to keep the legal 
property cadastre up to date. Land ownership was no longer considered when land 
zoning, plans and site layouts for new development were made, either in their 
conceptualisation or implementation. Only the use of land was recorded and kept up 
to date, since it helped to determine the amount of fees to be collected by the 
government for using the land (UN Habitat, 2001).
However, the complicated building permit procedure and lack of available building 
land were not the only obstacles that individual developers were facing. Even if there 
were an available site, and all necessary documents obtained, there was a lack of 
necessary supporting financial means.
4.7 Financing
One of the major issues facing the housing sector in socialist Belgrade was the very 
limited access to formal housing finance. Two main sources of funds used in the past 
to finance new housing building were individual housing finances and collective 
housing funds created from wage deductions from public sector and enterprise 
employees.
Individual household finance included incomes, savings, and, to a significant degree, 
remittances from expatriate workers that were used for the construction of individual 
housing outside the urban areas. The amount of remittances grew steadily during the 
1970s and 1980s and more than doubled between 1985 and 1990, when it increased 
from the equivalent of US $ 3.3 million to US $ 8.8 million. It is been calculated that
18 This was regulated by the Leasehold Properties and Land Nationalization Act (1958) or by the Act 
on Proclamation of Building land in Cities and Settlements with Urban Character (1968,1969).
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US$ 22 billion or around 70% of the documented remittances to the former 
Yugoslavia was spent on housing (UN Habitat, 2001).
In the self-management period, monies accumulated by the solidarity housing funds 
were the major source of housing finance in cities. Between 3% and 6% (Petrovic,
2002) of wages were deposited into public enterprise funds and some enterprises 
allocated parts of their corporate profits into housing funds in order to provide 
housing for more workers. Half of the money from these funds was allocated for new 
socially built housing and the other half was used for the building of low income 
rented public housing, rent subsidies for low income tenants in public housing, 
developing land and infrastructure and later, in the post socialist period, for building 
a limited number of housing units for war veterans (UN Habitat, 2001). The same 
principle for housing funding was applied in government and public organisations as 
well as in military institutions.
The construction of individual housing was mainly dependent on household income 
and funds. Individual houses as well as apartment buildings were built on a 
contractual basis by public construction enterprises. However, there was only a 
limited choice in the supply of individual units or flats built for the market and they 
could have been bought either from construction firms directly or self-managed 
housing communities. Additionally, enterprises were solely responsible for both 
housing funds and for extending privileges to their employees (UN Habitat, 2001). 
They could allocate housing funds or low interest loans for the purchase of 
apartments, renovation or construction of new houses on enterprise grounded criteria. 
The number of years spent working in a company and household size were the main 
criteria for access to the housing waiting lists. However, these criteria were not 
applied equally to everyone, and privileged managers were always on the top of the 
list, while non-qualified workers could be on the list for years.
Additionally, there was very little access to commercial credit for housing, because 
banks were not interested in providing mortgages for housing. A limited number of 
loans were obtained, but only accompanied by strong guarantees based on the 
income of the borrowers. Commercial banks required a down payment amounting to
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almost a third of the loan, often payable in hard currency, and annual interest rates 
were generally fixed ranging from 5 to 10 % until the 1980s and from 10 to 18 % in 
the 1990s (UN Habitat, 2001). However, the prices of newly built apartments were 
very high in relation to incomes. “In the 1970s and 1980s, the price of a 60 sq m flat 
was equal to 60 annual salaries. There were no subsidised housing mortgages, and 
most often buyers of flats were big and economically very powerful companies, and 
especially state and state agencies and institutions, financed from the budget” 
(Petovar, 2003: 27).
This financial constmction left many people in a position of never being able to 
afford formal housing. The waiting lists in enterprises and other organisations were 
too long, and the possibility of getting a mortgage was very limited and to the 
majority of citizens unachievable. The non-efficiency of the housing system led to 
the creation of alternative approaches, mainly used by people excluded from an 
official system of provision of flats or mortgages, which had resulted in the 
development of illegal building and the creation of informal settlements.
4.8 Urban Planning
Finally, urban planning was the factor that worsened the housing situation and made 
illegal builders even more determined to build. As with the other institutions, 
planning went through various changes, usually following the changes in socio­
economic planning. Papic (1998) identified three different periods of socio-economic 
planning in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY):
i. During the 1947-1965 period, the mode of central administrative planning 
dominated, directed at the reconstruction of the country (1947-1951), and 
subsequently supporting dynamic economic growth and social progress (until 
1965);
ii. In the period between the mid 1960s and the mid 1970s, along with partial 
de-etatisation and recourse to market mechanisms, a new system of so-called
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"societal planning" was put in effect, aiming at supporting integral 
development;
iii. From the mid 1970s until the end of the 1980s, a system of self-management 
bargaining and societal negotiating in planning was developed (Papic, 1998).
One of the most decentralised forms of social and physical planning in communist 
societies was to be found in Yugoslavia during the self-management era (Simmie and 
Dekleva, 1991). The essential formal features of this are that decisions were 
supposed to be generated from the bottom to the top. This principle was incorporated 
in most forms of local government. In spite of this, there was still a dominant 
position of state and quasi-state institutions and actors, which resulted in urbanism 
and planning with double standards (Simmie and Dekleva, 1991).
Republican and local authorities have always been responsible for the provision of 
urban planning in the former Yugoslavia. The plans were hierarchically organised, 
and those on the top made by Republic governments had power over those made at 
city and local level. The plans were produced for territorial units and their time 
length was strictly determined. These plans were categorised in the following 
clusters:
1. Long-term spatial plans for the republics, provinces, and regional associations 
of communes;19
2. Long-term spatial plans for infrastructure and demography;
3. Long and mid-term urban plans for the city areas;
4. Short term ‘site plans’ for specific development projects;
5. Plans for rural areas called ‘urbanistic orders’ (Simmie and Dekleva, 1991).
Such a diversity of plans resulted in many inconsistencies in both the process of 
preparation and their implementation in practice. Madzar listed a number of both 
general and specific deviations of the Yugoslav planning system: First, inadequate 
institutional location of planning units within the central guidance cluster followed 
by improper organisation and poor performance of planning institutions (a huge
19 SFRY consisted of six republics (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro 
and Macedonia) and Serbia had two provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo.
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discrepancy between the “planned” and the “realised”); secondly, there were 
inconsistent changes in institutional and organisational arrangements: a number of 
inconsistencies between development documents at various planning levels (and 
often within the same level); a lack of harmonization between macroeconomic policy 
and development planning as well as insufficient financial and other resources were 
making system even more ineffective; and finally, the decentralisation of decision­
making in planning made it slow and bureaucratic (Madzar, 1992). “However, the 
misconceptions in question were not ascribed to planning in general, but rather to the 
hypertrophied and bureaucratized system of ‘societal self-management planning’ on 
one hand, or to the ‘central-command planning system’/ ‘administrative-dominant 
style of planning’ - ‘GOSPLAN system of planning’, on the other” (Vujosevic, 
2001:2).
One of the reasons why planning was not efficient or benevolent towards individual 
housing was the definition of the public interest. The public interest in the Former 
Yugoslavia was imprecisely defined as a ‘common interest’ of all citizens. It was 
equated with state public ownership which meant that the public interest could be 
achieved only by the actors who were the representatives of publicly owned sectors. 
It is also considered of key importance for planning as a public activity and as a 
mechanism of intervention, equally in socioeconomic development and land use 
planning. As long as the public interest is not being jeopardised, planning decisions 
appear legitimate in socio-political terms, in conjunction with promising “smooth" 
implementation. Identification of the public interest with state ownership formed the 
key legitimising base for planning and policy making in Yugoslavia (Vujosevic, 
2001). Consequently, “urbanism was very open towards the representatives of 
common/public interest which were coming exclusively from the state sector, and on 
the other hand, urbanism was very restrictive towards individual or private interests, 
which were equated with private ownership and interpreted as being dissonant to 
public interest. For example, construction of collective housing had been considered 
as a public interest, while construction of individual family housing as an individual 
interest” (Petovar, 2003:32).20 Due to the equation of ‘public interest’ with ‘state
20 Additionally, Law on Expropriation enabled compulsory purchase of buildings with private 
apartments in order to build collective housing on the plot, which was defined as a public interest, and 
the developer was public enterprise (Petovar, 2003).
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ownership’, state actors had been able, through planners, to fulfil every intention in 
city spaces, because that was defined as being in the public interest, and planners 
were covering it with necessary plans (Petovar, 2003).
There were a number of failed attempts to make the planning system more 
operational and transparent (Vujosevic, 2001). Therefore, in 1984, planning 
authorities, aiming to decrease the inconsistencies among plans and to improve their 
coordination, passed new legislation. Legislators aimed to cover all aspects of 
development by ‘integrated societal planning’ and the planning integrated long and 
medium-term social, economic and physical plans into ‘societal planning’. Short­
term plans in each of these primary concerns were derived from the requirements 
which emerged from societal planning (Simmie and Dekleva, 1991).
Concerning planning in Belgrade, there were only two Master Plans prepared for the 
post WW II period. The first one was made in 1950 and the second in 1972 (IAUS, 
2001). They were very rigid and complex and they did not incorporate ongoing 
economic and social changes. Moreover, Master plans were also led by the definition 
of ‘common’ interest and were not concerned with private ownership. Consequently, 
the Master Plan and supporting detail plans became some of the main obstacles to 
housing development in Belgrade, by not allocating enough space in the city for 
individual building. Politicians kept their eyes shut to the rising problem of illegal 
building. Perisic ironically described the attitude of plans towards illegal building 
using the example of the Master Plan for Belgrade, that treated Kaludjerica, the 
biggest illegal settlement in Europe, as a location for a golf course (1995).
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4.9 Legal versus Illegal Building
In spite of the impressive amount of building, there were serious shortfalls in 
meeting housing needs, related especially to low income and self-employed urban 
families (UN Habitat, 2001) because housing costs and various constraints in 
obtaining access to socially owned housing made it difficult for these households to 
obtain decent, affordable housing.
Annual production in Serbia during the 30 years prior to 1990 averaged 40,000 units, 
mainly as a result of general post-war economic prosperity and the need to 
accommodate the migration of workers to the cities (UN Habitat, 2001; Petovar,
2003).
The population of the city increased by 33 % from 1971 to 1991 (Table 4). Although 
there was a boom in housing construction, the housing stock did not increase by 33%. 
The years in which the greatest number of flats were built were 1974 (14,056 
residential units) and 1981 (13,042 residential units), followed by a decrease of 25 % 
on average per year as presented in both Table 5 and Figure 2. In the period between 
1981 and 1991, there was a decrease of 60 % in legal housing provision in Belgrade, 
while the number of citizens increased by an additional 8.9 %, which resulted in an 
even wider gap between demand and supply in housing.
The total number of residential units/ housing units in 16 municipalities was 512,407 
(30,281,055 sq m) (LAUS, 2001). If compared with the number of households, 
assuming that there is one residential unit per household the result was a deficit of 
2,633 units in the suburban municipalities, and of 9,488 in the urban municipalities 
(IAUS, 2001). The building of one, or at maximum two, family houses was the only 
type of individual housing production allowed by the urban regulations and planning. 
Law did not allow private companies to buy locations in the city and build
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apartments to market, and therefore the building of family houses was the only form 
allowed in the private sector (Petovar, 1992).
Table 5: Number of residential units built by Individual and Collective Sector in Belgrade 
(1974-1991)
Year Total Individual Collective
1974 14,056 2,461 11,595
1975 12,170 3,222 8,948
1976 13,323 2,194 11,129
1977 9,247 2,832 6,415
1978 7,782 2,136 5,646
1979 12,874 2,541 10,333
1980 9,542 3,272 6,270
1981 13,042 3,023 10,019
1982 8,940 2,779 6,161
1983 8,649 2,545 6,104
1984 8,878 2,616 6,262
1985 7,860 2,198 5,662
1986 8,993 2,368 6,625
1987 7,182 2,015 5,167
1988 8,794 3,401 5,393
1989 9,879 3,728 6,151
1990 9,084 3,293 5,791
1991 5,188 1,516 3,672
Source: Statistical Yearbooks for Belgrade, 1974-1991;
Figure 2: Number of residential units built by Individual and Collective Sector in Belgrade 
(1974-2000)
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According to the 1991 Census, in 10 urban municipalities, two or more families lived 
in 10,000 residential units, 61,000 units were in the category of ‘overcrowded’ in 
which every inhabitant had between 6 to 10 sq m, approximately 15,000 units were 
older than 70 years, and 31,500 units could be categorised as being unhygienic, 
without basic living necessities like water, electricity or connection to a sewage 
system (Census 1991, and IAUS, 2001). If data on the deficit number of flats are 
combined with data on the flats where two or more families lived, the real projection 
of the housing deficit was 19,500 units in 1991. If the number of deteriorated 
properties is added to this number, the deficit was 70,000 residential units (IAUS, 
2001)
Due to the constant housing shortage exacerbated by the inflow of immigrants, 
citizens used many strategies to provide a secure tenure for themselves. Illegal 
building in Serbia was the outcome of housing shortages. Urban plans were rigid and 
slow to incorporate changes on the ground, and many objects thus had an illegal 
status, because they were built on plots that were not zoned for individual residential 
buildings. Additionally, construction in the cities was very expensive due to the high 
infrastructure and administrative costs and the monopoly over building by state 
enterprises. The result was incredibly high housing prices. “In the 1970s and 1980s, 
one residential square metre was more expensive in Belgrade than in London and 
some other European capitals” (Petovar, 2003:30). Since the state was not capable 
financially of providing housing for everyone, in addition to creating inefficient 
housing policies, people were forced to turn to illegal ways to provide housing. Most 
of the houses were built in suburban areas of the cities, on agricultural land. “The 
carriers of illegal building are mostly immigrants from rural areas, with low 
economic capability, 10 to 20 years employed, with basic education, with small 
savings and a high share of bank loans borrowed for building purposes” (Vasic 
quoted in Petovar, 2003:35). According to Vujovic, many illegal builders in the 
former Yugoslavia were construction workers and builders, employed in public 
construction companies. Many of them were not able to get on official lists for 
subsidised public renting housing, and their wages were not enough to provide 
housing. Therefore, they were using resources, for example, building material from
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most often obtained in an informal and illegal way, to build houses. The political 
elite’s response was one of reactive policies such as the temporary legalisation of 
objects (Petrovic, 2002). Additionally the political elite was not even opposing the 
low wages they were earning because, contrary to the working class, they had open 
access to the distribution of luxury goods and houses (Petrovic, 2002).
Other types of illegal building included housing extensions or renovation. Due to the 
rigid planning regulations, many individual housing areas were banned from any 
intervention on the houses. Residents were extending or renovating their properties 
in order to improve basic housing standards. Interventions like building a balcony or 
a necessary lavatory were penalised by either fines or a jail sentence up to 60 days. 
The households were taking this step because to obtain a permit for these kinds of 
interventions was very time consuming. “It lasted for months if not for years, and 
was dependant on the goodwill of the local council or city servant, intermediation, 
family connections, bribing or giving a counter service” (Petovar, 2003: 35).
Table 6: Housing construction by categories in cities in Serbia (1971-1976)
Total Collective 
building (1971- 
1976)
Individual 
building (1971- 
1976)
Number of
issued
building
permits
(1971-1976)
Estimation of 
number of 
illegal objects 
(1968-1976)
Serbia (32 
cities) 172,64 92,229 80,411 41,769 38,642
Belgrade 72,337 58,993 13,344 5,718 7,626
31 city 100,303 33,236 67,067 36,051 31,016
Source: Petovar (2003:61)
Table 7: Housing construction by categories in cities in Serbia (1971-1976), percentage
Total Collective 
building (1971- 
1976)
Individual 
building (1971- 
1976)
Number of
issued
building
permits
(1971-1976)
Estimation of 
number of 
illegal objects 
(1968-1976)
Serbia (32 
cities) 100 53.4 46.6 24.2 22.4
Belgrade 100 81.6 18.4 7.9 10.5
31 city 100 33.1 66.9 36 30.9
Source: Petovar (2003:61)
Due to the lack of data on illegal building in Serbia at the time, Petovar (2000) used 
the number of collective and individual housing units built and compared them with 
the number of issued building permits (Table 6 and Table 7). In Belgrade, collective 
housing dominated over individual housing, and the ratio was 81.6 % collective 
housing units versus 18.4 % individually built units. In that period, the ratio between 
legally and illegally built individual housing units was 50:50 in Serbia. In Belgrade, 
the number of illegally built objects was greater than the number of legally issued 
permits for legal building. In the rest of the cities, the average share of illegal 
housing object was a third. Additionally, as a result of unequal regional development 
policy, 64 % of all collective housing in Serbia in the period between 1971 and 1976 
was built in Belgrade (Petovar, 1992)
Illegally built objects in Belgrade were evidenced twice. First in 1975, when it was 
recorded that the number of illegally built residential objects increased by 10,975, 
1,062 weekend cottages, 8,628 auxiliary objects, 3,564 other and 6,928 renovations 
in the period between 1955 and 1975 (Saveljic, 1988). Between 1976 and 1986, the 
number of residential illegal objects increased to 20,060; 2,456 illegal weekend 
cottages, 20,152 auxiliary objects, 7,974 other illegally built objects as well as 
17,670 adaptations and renovations (Saveljic, 1988).
Table 8: Increase of illegal building in Belgrade (1955-1997)
Year Residential
Objects
Weekend
Cottages
Auxiliary 
and other 
ohiects
Others Total
1955
(Saveljic,
1988)
6,928 0 0 23,599 30,527
1975
(November)
17,903 1,062 12,192 30,527 61,689
1976-1986
(Saveljic,
1988)
37,963 3,518 40,291 48,197 129,969
1995
(November)21
33,594 3,351 39,754 76,669 153,368
1997 (August)
37,425 3,357 43,290 84,072 168,144
Source: Internal data on illegal construction in Belgrade (1998), Belgrade Town Planning institute; 
Saveljic (1988);
21 The number of illegally built objects in 1995 seems smaller than in 1986. That can be explained by 
the lack of data and the lack of accurate information held by the Town Planning Institute in 1995 
(Zegarac, 2001) as it is explained in the Methodology Chapter 3.
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If we compare the number of 12,170 legally built housing objects in Belgrade (Table 
5) in 1975, with the 17,903 illegally built residential objects (Table 8), we can see 
that for each legally built residential unit, 1.47 houses were illegally built. If we 
compare the number of legally individually built houses with the number of illegally 
built residential objects, the ratio is 5.56 illegal houses to one legal.
The city government did not have a strategy to stop illegal building, apart from 
demolition. According to Saveljic, only 26 % of illegal objects, including auxiliary 
and others, were demolished in the period 1976 to 1986 (Saveljic, 1988). In 1975 it 
was realised that demolition would not stop illegal building, and the city government 
passed the Programme for prevention against illegal building that allowed all citizens 
who lived in pre-1975 illegally built objects to stay and live in them until the urban 
plans for that area were implemented (Petovar, 1992). This decision was only a 
reflection of the lack of political will to change housing policies, which were still 
dominated by collective social housing provision. Consequently illegal building 
continued its steep increase.
4.10 Conclusion
This chapter has examined various features of the now defunct socialist system in the 
former Yugoslavia, and the heritage from this period that has been shaping more 
recent patterns of behaviour and illegality. However, this inheritance has been 
different from the stated goals of a communist ideology that included the abolition of 
private property, the removal of privileged classes, and the application of equity 
principles espoused by Marxist leaders, which should have radically altered urban 
patterns. In the housing arena, the expectation would be one of non-discriminatory 
and non-spatially differentiated housing in general. “No social or occupational group 
would have better or more favourably located residential sites so that one would find 
a randomly distributed housing pattern. Similarly, public services of all kinds, 
including transportation, should have an equal quality, availability, and 
accessibility.... Such amenities as high quality physical environment, including
104
recreational environment would be equally accessible to all” (Demko and Regulska, 
1987: 290).
Clapham (1996) summarised four major principles that applied to most state socialist 
countries to varying degrees. First, everything was under state ownership and 
distribution, which meant that housing was built and owned by state agencies and 
distributed according to state defined needs, and this was achieved through public 
rented housing. Second, there was centrally planned production coordinated with a 
central economic plan which defined the quantity of resources that would be 
allocated to housing based on the assessment of needs. Third, housing was 
considered a necessity and therefore was free. It was paid out of general taxation, and 
housing expenditure was to form a part of the social wage. Finally, there was an 
exclusion of free market mechanisms and private ownership because state planning 
was meant to be a more egalitarian mechanism of allocating resources, and since 
private ownership was the driving force of capitalism, it was to be abolished 
(Clapham, 1996).
However, those main principles behind Eastern European housing were never 
developed to their full extent, due to the shortage of finances and resources for 
investment. Nevertheless, the failure of the socialist housing model, cannot be 
blamed on the command economy alone. The socialist housing policy had a.major 
function in the complex process of reproducing the social system and the control of 
social inequalities, because it contributed to the implementation of a policy of 
controlled wage differences (Lazic, 1987, Lazic, 1994). The agricultural policies, 
unequal regional development, migrations of people from poor rural areas into cities, 
and industrialisation and investment mostly in the cities, were additional factors that 
created the massive shortage in the housing sector. Although the communist housing 
model ideal called for collective housing and defined housing as a basic need and as 
an interest of the working class, it had not been removed from the social context 
because its removal would further increase the existing housing crisis (Rogic, 1991).
In the former Yugoslavia, economic pressures and a housing shortage led to the 
support of individual housing building through the provision of loans and mortgages
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from enterprises and public agencies. Thus, in Yugoslavia, the difference was that 
the pressure for housing was transferred from the state to enterprises and social 
communes by reforms from 1965 to 1974. However, as Clapham suggested “the 
difference is only a marginal one as the enterprises were subjected to similar 
pressures and constraints which faced the state in other countries” (1996: 683).
As a result of the Eastern European housing model, four basic types of housing 
developed. The first type was legal-formal practices that were part of the socialist 
type of housing provision. Second was the legal-informal type of self-built housing. 
The third type was the illegal-formal type in which the actors were socially powerful 
people in both the private and social housing sector. Finally, the fourth type of 
housing was illegal - informal housing in which the actors were desperate people 
without any other option (Kos quoted in Petrovic, 2002). Privileged social groups 
were attached to the official housing politics and they were fulfilling the ‘right on 
housing’ principle, but the less privileged groups had to develop alternative strategies 
to secure tenure. Most of those strategies were either quasi-legal or illegal and they 
were out of step with the official communist housing system (Hegediis and Tosics, 
1992). So in addition to constraints that the governments in Eastern Europe faced 
due to shortages of finances for housing provision of new ‘mass housing blocks’ and 
high costs of control over private transactions, was the existence of the informal 
market process too (Clapham, 1996; Hegediis and Tosics 1996).
In the former Yugoslavia, the illegal sector was developed as a result of the 
weaknesses of official housing policies. Apart from minor demolitions and the 
adopted Programme for prevention against illegal building that allowed all citizens 
who lived in pre 1975 illegally built objects to stay and live in them until the urban 
plans for that area were implemented, there were no other organised political or 
institutional actions against illegal building. Furthermore, the elite mobilised the 
question of illegal building out of politics, and never started action on a broad scale 
to tackle the rising problem. Consequently, the housing sector became a fertile 
ground for the development of a black economy, corruption and nepotism (Petrovic, 
2002).
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The consequences of the communist housing model and self-management practices 
in Belgrade were the following: in 1991 there was a deficit of 70,000 residential units 
(IAUS, 2001), and around 40,000 illegally built houses. The elite and privileged 
groups with social power had priority in housing allocation. This trend carried on in 
the post-communist period as well. Following Kleinman et al’s (1998) argument that 
housing policies are ‘path dependant’ on historical circumstances, and that political 
and institutional forces have an impact on housing systems and set parameters for 
future changes (Pichler-Milanovic, 2000), it can be argued that there was a ‘path 
dependency’ of illegal building in Belgrade, resulting from its connection with an 
‘East European Housing model’ and self-management policies from that time. The 
institutional context for illegal building was grounded during socialism, and not only 
that those institutions shaped cities during the communist era, but that they also left 
residues on present institutions. Choices from the past shape present preferences and 
therefore it was important to see ‘not just where we sit at the moment but also how 
we got there’ (Goodin, 1996:10).
To summarise, the features from the communist period that remained and 
exacerbated illegal building in the post-communist period are: a massive and 
bureaucratic institutional system, state control over property rights, priority in access 
to housing given to political and party officials -  the political elite and based 
according to the criteria of ‘merit’. The people and the private sector inherited the 
complicated building permit procedure and the lack of available building land as well 
as the informal market practices. There was a huge shortage in housing and the 
planning process stayed almost unchanged, rigid and inflexible, with a top-down 
approach to problems.
The elite with economic and social power in their hands had an active role in 
decision-making and capitalised on that power and became the ‘new’ political elite in 
post-communist Serbia (Lazic, 2000). Using the same channels as during the 
communist era, the elite continued to allocate properties to themselves. Furthermore, 
they used the newly emerged political and economic situation to fuse power from 
institutions to their hands, leaving institutions complex, bureaucratic and mostly 
inefficient. Institutions were selectively applying the mles, as a result of their bias,
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and consequently produced a deviation in society which was the fertile basis for the 
development of corruption and an explosion of illegal development. Moreover, 
learning from the experiences of the past, when the communist government 
mobilised illegal building out of general politics, the public realised that they could 
bypass the law and build illegally without major consequences. The result was that 
informal links and corruption became the major weapons for the fulfilment of their 
interests.
108
5 Chapter : Political and Economic context of Post-Socialist Belgrade
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter addressed the political and economic context of communist 
societies, in particular the former Yugoslavia. The chapter also addressed the housing 
policies in communist states and the variety of problems which resulted. However, 
due to defects in the planned economy, which were part of a broader systemic crisis, 
communist systems had become urgently in need of change. In the late 1980s and 
early 1990s the communist governments in the Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEs) that had dominated political life since the World War II were 
overthrown or collapsed. The present chapter considers the changes in both the 
political and economic contexts in post-communist Serbia and addresses their impact 
on institutional change. Furthermore, it addresses the shortage problems and the 
financial problems in the housing sector and the rise of illegal building.
As suggested in the previous chapter, in the communist period cities’ development 
was not based on their own economies but on sources redistributed from central 
government. Cities were financed from state budgets and from large, heavy 
industries that were located within them and the service sector was underdeveloped. 
With the collapse of the communist regime, the system of centrally planned 
urbanisation was destroyed (Harloe, 1996:21) and the transformation of cities started, 
but due to their path-dependency on the previous systems (Smith and Stenning,
2004) they could not change overnight into capitalist cities.
Furthermore, as central level political arrangements shape urban politics, it is 
therefore necessary to examine the extent and the relationship between institutions 
and organisations in state and urban politics (Pierre, 1999). “National politics and 
state traditions remain the most powerful factors in explaining various aspects of 
urban politics, including urban political economy, urban political conflict, and
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strategies of local resource mobilisation” (Gurr and King, 1987; Keating, 1993; 
Pickvance and Preteceille, 1991 quoted in Pierre, 1999: 375).
The first part of this chapter is related to economic transition. Instead of economic 
restructuring, political decentralisation and democratisation, the Serbian transition 
was marked by civil wars, the war with NATO, economic collapse and systemic 
corruption. The second part of this chapter is focused on the period after the 1989 
elections when Serbia experienced a change in political context which was followed 
by the emergence of a new elite and new interests and conflicts. New political forces 
appeared on the Serbian political scene, although most of the key positions in politics 
were kept by members of the previous communist hierarchy. The political set-up of 
Belgrade and its political relationship with frequent federal and republic elections 
and the participation of numerous political parties is also analysed. From 1989 to 
1996 Belgrade was ruled by a pro-communist nationalist coalition. In autumn 1996 
pro-democratic forces overthrew it. However, the pro communist-nationalist 
coalition stayed in power on the republic level and controlled Parliament, all state 
owned enterprises and the budget. Differences in ideology and political programs 
between parties ruling on the Republic and city level were evidenced with many 
conflicting decisions and passed laws. However, regarding illegal building, different 
parties often made silent and informal coalitions.
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the newly created political and economic 
contexts and to see whether and how they influenced the transformation of political 
and economic institutions inherited from the communist period. The first part focuses 
on the economic context and analyses how it was influenced by political changes, 
and what the mutual effect of the changed political and economic environment on 
institutional settings was. The second part of the chapter addresses the political 
setting using the concept of ‘post-modernist dictatorship’, viewing the parties as the 
main organisations that set the rules in political institutions. The third part of the 
chapter focuses on changes in housing politics resulting from the new economic and 
political settings.
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5.2 Economic collapse
The economy in Yugoslavia failed to start a restructuring process as was the case in 
the other Eastern European countries. The reason for this was the capacity of the 
former communist elite that had controlled the all resources in the previous regime to 
reposition themselves and take part in the new political arrangements (Lazic, 2000). 
Lazic used the term ‘adaptive reconstruction’ of the elite by which he implied that a 
high percentage of members of the ex-collective class was now a part of the new elite 
(2000). He was criticised by Petrovic (2002) for failing to analyse the changing 
mechanisms of social reproduction under which the elite had to create these new 
adaptive strategies in order to be coordinated with the nature of resources that had to 
be accumulated and over which power had to be concentrated. The new mechanisms 
of recruitment for elite positions were carried under the conditions of the breakdown 
of the command economy, irregular privatisation and constant political competition 
for new positions. However, Lazic (2000) argues that many members of the 
communist elite and subelite managed to convert formerly accumulated resources 
and become members of the post-communist elite. Under non-democratic political 
conditions and due to their renewed political power, they managed to control the 
level of transformation of the economy and state apparatus, keeping control over all 
the critical resources of social reproduction. That led to a freeze of the necessary 
separation of politics from the economy, which was, according to Lazic (2000), the 
main barrier to transformation in Serbian society in the 1990s.
Genuine economic reform was not a priority for the political leadership of the 
country. The most successful, society-owned enterprises were transferred into state 
ownership, and the members of the new political elite took managerial positions in 
them. Newly created private enterprises had to compete with the monopolistic 
position of the state-owned ones and their success was dependent on their 
connections with the ruling elite.
I l l
According to Staniszikis (1991), the relationship between the private and public 
sector had features of political capitalism in which members of the political elite 
simultaneously took on a managerial role in state enterprises but at the same time 
held a shareholder position in private companies. “It is also followed by a transfer of 
costs from private companies to state ones, keeping the profits at the same time, 
which led to erosion of laws, delayed the implementation of regulations, and 
strengthened monopolistic positions of state companies” (Staniszikis, 1991:48). The 
economy functioned according to rules which were social and bureaucratic rather 
than economic and legal (Thomas, 1999). In 1996, 85% of economy was still state 
owned while only 15% was privatised (Goati, 1996). Additionally, the 
transformation of the Serbian economy had characteristics of demagogic populism as 
defined by Greskovits (1995), which although very often used by rightwing 
commentators to insult the regimes they did not like, was obviously characteristic of 
Milosevic’s regime. It was characterised by a strategy that aimed to ensure the 
popularity of representatives of the national economy with the lower class of society. 
It was based on unrealistic economic promises supported by state subventions and 
other redistributive policies (Greskovits, 1995: 96), and promoted through state- 
controlled media. An example was when the SPS announced through Radio 
Television of Serbia that they had discovered oil resources in Pozarevac, the birth 
town of Milosevic, which would bring enough income to improve the economic 
situation in the country.
This approach to the macro economy, followed by civil wars and economic sanctions 
by the United Nations and the international community, resulted in an extremely high 
rate of almost 50% unemployment amongst the population in 1995 and a rapid 
decline in GDP. According to official figures, the economy shrunk at an average rate 
of 7% a year between 1990 and 2000. Bouts of hyperinflation in 1993, followed by 
the freezing of hard currency savings to pay for the war in Bosnia, had affected the 
middle class (The Economist, 2000: 31). Average wages in 2000 were $38 a month 
and GDP per capita was $1,200, less than half the GDP per capita of 1989.22 Foreign 
debt in 2000 reached $14 billion which was 116% of the GDP. The whole economy
22 If GDP slips below $1,000, health, education and welfare systems cannot function properly any longer. 
“And once you've lost those, you're staring third-world poverty squarely in the face” (Economist, 2000:31).
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had a technologically obsolete structure and had not started restructuring, unlike the 
other Eastern European countries.
In order to survive, people turned to illegal and semi-legal ways of making a living. 
The black economy is estimated to account for as much as 70% of the country’s 
economic activity. The black economy and farming prevented people from starving. 
However, crime is hardly an ideal form of social welfare, although it was unofficially 
allowed by the ruling government because it meant social peace for them. 
Gangsterism, which is characteristic of many Eastern European countries, is 
exceptionally powerful in Serbia. Almost every layer of Serbian society is involved 
in the black economy in some way. Corruption is deeply rooted at every level of 
economy, politics and society and it is the most obvious characteristic of everyday 
life (The Economist, 2000; Transparency International, 2000).
Economic decline was followed by extreme social polarisation. A process of 
pauperisation occurred, which is also characteristic for many ex-communist countries, 
but again was exceptionally strong in Serbia. Two thirds of the nation became poor 
in contrast to approximately 5% of the population who became extremely rich 
(Vujovic, 1998:9). This nouveau riche class comprised individuals who were 
politically and economically close to the ruling regime of Slobodan Milosevic. The 
state did not have the resources to deal with the increasing number of refugees due to 
the huge crisis of public finances. The scarcity of public revenues, the adverse 
structure of public expenditures and bad management of existing resources 
contributed even more to the very bad situation. As a consequence of the lack of 
investment, infrastructure was in an extremely poor condition. Contrary to the other 
post-communist countries, there was virtually no foreign investment in Yugoslavia in 
the 1990s.
Zoran Zivkovic, Serbian Prime Minister (2002 to 2004), summarised the economic 
conditions his party faced when they came into power in 2000. Serbia was excluded 
from all international organisations and had a part of its territory (Kosovo and 
Metohia) under a foreign protectorate. The damages due to NATO bombing totalled
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over EUR 20 billion and the internal debts totalled to EUR 15 billion. The overall 
debt for unpaid pensions and other social benefits totalled EUR 230 million. Inflation 
was 113%, the average salary amounted to around EUR 40 (7.7 times less than in 
1990) and the average pension amounted to around EUR 35 (5 times less than in 
1990). There were 735,000 unemployed and approx 770,000 “sheltered” unemployed 
workers (on forced leave) and 65% of families with income per household member 
lower than needed to survive. Zivkovic explained this by the existence of the 
monopoly enterprises and the individuals intimate with the ex-authorities who used 
state funds and budgetary resources to get richer. Additionally he argued that there 
was a strong conjunction between the state and the police leaders and the mafia with 
alienated centres of power, which resulted in a high degree of criminality in society. 
Consequently, Serbia became one of the poorest countries in Europe with a 
completely destroyed economy. Moreover, “Serbia was the state that ranked among 
the first ten countries in the world for jeopardizing the human rights of its citizens, 
restricting the freedom of the press, persecuting and assassinating political 
opponents” (Zivkovic, 2004).
In addition to economic collapse, the civil wars in neighbourhood countries created 
further economic pressure and a constant inflow of refugees for whom the state did 
not have enough resources. This had a similar effect on housing as the rural urban 
migrations from the socialist period, resulting in an increase in population and a 
bigger shortage of housing.
The pre-publication manuscript by the United Nations Refugee Agency UNHCR and 
the Serbian Commissioner for Refugees regarding the refugee registration exercise 
which took place in Serbia from March to April 2001 indicates that the total number 
of registered refugees and other war affected persons23 decreased by 165,748 persons 
from the previous registration which took place in 1996, and stood in 2001 at 
451,980, of which 377,131 were registered refugees and 74,849 were war displaced 
persons (UN Habitat, 2001). By July 2001, more than 200,000 DDPs from Kosovo 
and Metohia were registered in Serbia. The greatest number of refugees was from
23The UNHCR definition refers to citizens of FR Yugoslavia who have been displaced within its 
territories as Internally Displaced Persons.
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Croatia (about 63%), while the percentage of those from Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
declined to 36% as refugees from the latter returned to their homes in greater 
numbers than those contemplating return to Croatia, where the process is quite 
difficult. Within Serbia there were 408 registered collective centres, accommodating 
30,056 people in 2001. Of this number, 20,949 were refugees, while 9,107 were 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) from Kosovo-Metohia. About 10,000 lived in 
unregistered collective centres, while others lived with their relatives or friends, in 
their own houses and apartments or in rental housing.24
However, the economic situation in a country results from the political context and 
the politics created by the political leadership. The following section analyses the 
political conditions in Serbia in the 1990s and explains the role of the elite and 
political parties in the reshaping of Serbia’s institutional context during the post­
communist period.
5.3 Post-modernist dictatorship
After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989, ex-communist countries set out to 
deconstruct the mechanisms and institutions of complete social and political control 
which had characterised the old order. In their place they started to try to build 
durable and pluralist institutions. In Serbia, however, the real shift away from 
dictatorship to pluralism had not been realised by 2000. The political system had 
seen the adoption of some of the formal attributes of democracy without the stable 
institutional underpinning associated with that system (Thomas, 1999). This section 
aims to analyse the political deviation of the Serbian political system during the 
1990s.
There are several definitions of the Serbian political system in the 1990s. Linz and 
Stepan identified it as being an ‘authoritarian system with limited, not responsible, 
political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding ideology but with distinctive
24 www.srbiia.sr.gov.vu/refugees at the time when the website was accessed.
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mentalities, without extensive or intensive political mobilisation, except at some 
points in their development, and in which a leader or small group exercises power 
within formally ill-defined limits, but actually very predictable ones” (Linz and 
Stepan, 1996:38). Furthermore, Linz and Stepan described Slobodan Milosevic’s 
regime in particular as being a ‘sultanist’ regime where “public and private are fused, 
and there was a strong tendency towards familial power and dynastic succession, 
there was no distinction between state career and personal relationship to the ruler, 
and finally there was a lack of rationalized impersonal ideology. Furthermore, 
economic success depended on personal relationship to the ruler, and the mler acts 
only according to his own unchecked discretion” (Linz and Stepan, 1996:52). 
However, Thomas disagrees with such a definition of the regime in Serbia since it 
left little room for the competing opposition political parties, independent media and 
civil initiatives, which despite their evident weaknesses, had been a part of Serbia’s 
political life in the post-communist period. Instead, “Serbia exists in a classificatory 
limbo where stunted democratic institutions mix uneasily with authoritarian 
structures and both of these elements are overshadowed by the sultanist influence of 
the leader of the ruling party Slobodan Milosevic” (Thomas, 1999:4). Milosevic used 
‘nationalist mobilisation’ as a means by which Serbia was kept in a state of 
‘permanent revolution’. The fact that the Serbian people were faced by constant 
threats and crises meant that an ideological vacuum developed in political life where, 
in the eyes of part of the electorate, the government was not held responsible for its 
failings and political suitability was assessed on the basis of dedication to the 
national cause (Thomas, 1999). Mobilisation of bias by the elite based on 
nationalism resulted in basic issues, such as housing for example, being organised 
out from political life, and considered less important.
A third definition is given by Prodanovic, who defined the Serbian political system 
as being a post-modernist dictatorship (2000). “The dominant communist hierarchy 
(state capitalist/ bureaucratic class) maintained its hegemony through systematic 
misuse of information and telecommunication technologies and the media to exercise 
‘a monopoly of knowledge’. This control of information in large part ‘enabled’ 
initially informal groups of ‘apparatchiks’ in the former Yugoslavia to induce 
regional conflicts and war as a principal means of retaining power in the face of
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otherwise determining processes of ‘transition’ (to the market economy and 
democratic politics) and to create new forms of ruling regime that can best be termed 
‘post-modern dictatorship’” (Prodanovic, 2000:278). The post-modern dictatorship 
that has transformed the cities has been characterised by the development of specific 
instances of selective and fragmented control whereby dictatorial power no longer 
expressed itself in obvious and visible forms of oppression (Prodanovic, 2000). 
Ironically, there were visible appearances of a multiparty system and a form of 
parliamentary life with quite frequent elections and there were also symbols of the 
market economy with privatised commerce and advertising, giving an impression of 
an ongoing transition. The frequent elections were usually used to legitimise the 
mling regime’s reign making the state appear more democratic. Additionally, 
elections were the mechanism for the relief of the internal pressure made by 
opposition parties, and for giving an impression of developing democracy. Due to the 
control of the majority of media, along with electoral law which ruling parties were 
changing according to their needs, the ruling regime had a significant advantage and 
so was very keen on the use of elections as a defence tool from opposition parties. 
However, the opposition parties had significant support from voters, and therefore 
the ruling parties were trying either to remove them from the political scene by using 
the media they controlled or to get them into the coalition. Therefore, an analysis of 
the political parties and their building up, and why they mattered in the post-modern 
political dictatorship environment, is crucial for any explanation of the political 
institutional context, and for an explanation of the function of defining the ‘rules of 
the game’ that ruling parties overtook from existing institutions.
5.4 Elite and political parties in Serbia in the 1990s
Similarly to Hunter (1958), this thesis argues that there is not only one pyramid of 
power but a few smaller ones in Belgrade. Depending on the nature of the initiatives, 
both formal and informal, these elites and subelites participated in the decision­
making process. Lazic (2000), who used elitist theories to define the elite in Serbia, 
analysed the emergence of the new elites and subelites in the post socialist period. 
According to Lazic (1997), the elite during communism was a collective class, 
consisting of top party members/politicians, managers of state-owned companies and
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the highest military officials, which monopolised in a totalitarian way control over all 
aspects of society, while other social groups had no power for collective action. The 
ruling elite in communism had control over all resources -  economic, political and 
cultural. This fusion of control over economic, political and cultural systems also 
characterised the beginning of the transformation of Serbian society in the late 1980s. 
The emerging elite consisted of members of the previous hierarchy who converted 
previously accumulated political capital into economic capital, and became 
entrepreneurs and managers; intellectuals converted their cultural and social capital 
into political capital and became leaders of political parties (Lazic, 2000). In addition 
to the various members of the previous elite such as Milosevic himself that converted 
various capitals from the previous system, the transformation process was 
characterised also by growing subelites that were also converting their capital. They 
found it easier to succeed due to the lack of direct connections with the previous 
regime, and they were becoming an entrepreneurial and political elite. Those 
conversions of capital were very often illegal, and in order to keep its position the 
new elite blocked the full transformation of Serbian society (Lazic, 2000).
Contrary to Hunter who defined the elite in Atlanta as coming from powerful 
business organisations such as banks, in Serbia the elite could be defined through 
political organisations. It can be argued that the members of the elite in Serbia in the 
1990s included Slobodan Milosevic, members of the federal and republic 
governments (ministers, MPs and various advisors) and the leadership of his party. 
Contrary to Hunter’s Atlanta which had a strong business elite, most of the political 
elite members in Serbia were becoming the business elite by getting managerial 
positions in the state-owned companies as a result of party membership. Subelites are 
also defined through political organisations. All leaders as well as the leaderships of 
the opposition parties represented in Parliament and/or the city government are 
considered as subelites.
A majority of the relevant political parties in Serbia formed mainly in 1989 and 1990 
managed to, in less than a decade, build up and set up ‘capillary’ organisations 
countrywide, despite a string of financial, personnel and institutional difficulties 
(Goati, 1999). Goati (1999) suggests that it is safe to consider these parties
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institutionalised in the sense used by Richard Rose and Thomas Mackie (1988:536), 
who argue that a party is institutionalised if it has contested national elections more 
than three times. Political life in Serbia and Belgrade was marked by the existence of 
many political parties that were taking part in elections. The ruling regime 
deliberately initiated the formation of many parties for two reasons: first, to confuse 
the electoral body, and by showing them the weaknesses of new parties to persuade 
them that they are the only appropriate party; second, to prove the existence of 
democracy by having a multiparty system.25 However, there are only six parties that 
could be put under the category of ‘institutionalised’. Parties that were ruling on the 
national level from 1989 to 2000, sometimes independently and sometimes in 
coalition, as well as at city level, from 1989 to 1996, were the Socialist Party of 
Serbia (SPS), the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) and the United Yugoslav Left (JUL). 
JUL cannot be considered being an institutionalised party since it has not participated 
three or more times independently in elections. Still, due to the marriage relationship 
between Slobodan Milosevic and Miijana Markovic, leaders of the parties, JUL was 
mostly in coalition with the SPS which granted those seats in Parliament as well as a 
few Ministry positions.
The Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) is a party that emerged from League of Serbian 
Communists and led by Slobodan Milosevic. It was a party with an official 
communist infrastructure and ideology, created by members of the former 
communist elite. Due to the inherited well-organised infrastructure, the SPS had an 
immediate advantage in politics, compared to other parties that had to develop their 
organisation, attract memberships, and develop statutes and rules. The SPS inherited 
not only the buildings, funds and Organisation from the previous communist party, 
but it inherited the membership, including powerful members from the army and the 
police as well as managers from public companies. However, the SPS was different 
from its communist predecessors in its policy. Contrary to the politics of ethnic 
tolerance, developed by communists, the SPS, as well as leading parties from other 
former Yugoslav Republics, started ‘nationalist mobilisation’. Milosevic, using his 
charisma, started spreading nationalism and mobilising political bias, arguing that
25 In the period between Novemeber 1989 and the end of 1990, 50 political parties were established. 
This number increased to 160 at the beginning of 1996, while in 2001 there were 230 registered 
political parties in Serbia (Goati, 2004).
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Serbs were economically and politically disadvantaged compared to the other ex- 
Yugoslav nations.This became his major political weapon for getting popular support 
for the coming civil wars. Milosevic’s popularity was rapidly increasing due to the 
control over media which the SPS inherited from its predecessors, which became his 
strongest mobilising weapon. There were few independent media that existed at the 
time, and these were powerless compared to the massive state-owned and SPS- 
controlled media and propaganda machinery. In addition to control over media, 
Milosevic took control of the army and the police, which made him the most 
powerful person in the country.
The SPS was always supported in its politics by the United Yugoslav Left (JUL), 
party established by Milosevic’s wife Mirjana Markovic. The program and ideology 
of the JUL was closest to the authoritarian communism in the former Soviet Union. It 
is not represented in Table 9 because it had not managed to get into Parliament 
independently but always as a coalition partner of the SPS. Due to the seats in 
Parliament and Ministry positions that the JUL was getting due to the marriage 
connections of its leader to Milosevic, it became very influential and powerful, 
especially in the business community.
The third party that was occasionally in coalition with the SPS, but always 
represented in Parliament, was the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), an ultranationalist 
right party led by Vojislav Seselj. Although it represented itself as being an 
opposition party to the SPS, the SRS actually supported the SPS in its politics 
whenever it was necessary, justifying such support with the idea of the nation being 
endangered by the international community. They also formed coalition governments 
after elections in 1996 and 1997. Additionally, the SRS was sponsored and bolstered 
by the SPS as a shield for its nationalistic policies (Thomas, 1999). The SRS was 
particularly popular among refugees due to the promises it gave out on fighting to get 
back the territories that were lost during the civil wars.
On the opposition side, the most influential opposition party at the beginning of the 
1990s was the Serbia Renewal Movement (SPO), led by its charismatic leader Vuk
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Draskovic. Established in January 1990, it was a nationalist party at the beginning, 
but it moved towards the centre in the mid 1990s. Another prominent and very active 
opposition party was the Democratic Party (DS), established by Dragoljub 
Micunovic on 3rd of February 1990. Zoran Djindjic took over the leadership in 1992. 
The DS is a centre-right orientated party with a pro-European program and mobilised 
the intellectual elite in Serbia. The Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) was a small 
pro-nationalist opposition party formed by a fraction of the DS, led by Vojislav 
Kostunica in May 1992, but it only took part in elections in 1992 and 1993, after 
which it boycotted them due to an irregular electoral process. Another party that was 
very active, although small in size, was the Civic Alliance for Serbia (GSS) with a 
pro-European program, led first by Vesna Pesic, and then by Goran Svilanovic. It 
had been always in coalition with the DS and occasionally with the SPO when the 
broader coalition blocks were formed. The majority of the leaders of the opposition 
parties belonged to the intellectual subelite during communism which they were 
criticising and to which they were opposed.
Apart from analysing different orientations among parliamentary parties, it is also 
important to analyse how those parties performed in elections and the effects of the 
electoral patterns on institutions. Frequent elections were held but under conditions 
which were determined by the ruling party (Thomas, 1999). According to Thomas, 
the political dominance of the electoral system whereby contests are weighted in 
favour of the ruling party meant that the ‘democratic bargain’ did not function 
properly. Opposition parties did not have a guarantee that they would have a fair and 
legally equal chance of contesting the dominance of the political scene by the ruling 
party, which had fused its power structures with those of the state. Furthermore, civil 
society remained weak and under constant harassment by the ruling elite (Thomas, 
1999).
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Table 9: Political parties and votes (%) on Parliamentary elections 1990-2000
Parties Orientation Votes in per 
cent
Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) From pro communist to 
nationalist
46.1 (1990)
formerly League of Serbian Communists (SKS) 28.8 (1992)
led by Slobodan Milosevic 36.7 (1993) 
34.3 (1997)* 
13.2 (2000)
Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO)
Organised in January 1990 and led by Vuk 
Draskovic
From the ultra-nationalist in 
1990 to pro royalist centre- 
right in 2000
15.8 (1990)
16.9 (1992)** 
16.6 (1993)** 
19.2 (1997)*** 
3.5 (2000)
Serbian Radical Party (SRS) Militant ultra-nationalist party
led by Vojislav Seselj 22.6 (1992)
(sponsored and bolstered by Milosevic regime . 13.8(1993)
as a shield for its nationalist policies) 28.1 (1997) 
8.6 (2000)
Democratic Party (DS) Pro-European rightist party 7.4 (1990)
(founded on 3rd February 1990, led first by 
Dragoljub Micunovic, than by Zoran Djindjic)
16.9 (1992)**
5.1 (1993)
Boycott
64.7 (2000)***
Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS) Small right wing party
in May 1992 left DS and joined DEPOS for '92 
elections led by Vojislav Kostunica
16.9 (1992)**
5.1 (1993)
Boycott
64.7 (2000)***
Democratic Community of Hungarians in 
Vojvodina (DZVM) ****
2.6 (1990)
3.0 (1992)
Boycott
64.7 (2000)***
*Coalition of SPS, Yugoslav United Left (JUL) and New Democracy (ND)
** Alliance of DEPOS - Democratic Opposition of Serbia against Milosevic
***DOS - coalition of 17 opposition parties
**** Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina (DZVM) who represents 
Hungarian ethnic minority was participating in elections
Source: www.cesid.org.yu
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Opposition parties tried various strategies for elections, but were failing on the 
national level. Beyond the control of institutions by the ruling elite, and the lack of 
accessibility to the media, another reason for this failure was that they could not have 
based their strategies on social and economic development programs. Due to the civil 
wars, they had to play on nationalist strategies in the same way as the ruling parties. 
In addition, the proportional electoral system provided the ruling party with a certain 
number of seats in Parliament for many years. Although this system is the most 
common of all electoral systems, because it is designed to elevate minority parties, in 
Serbia it was not working due to the boycott of elections by Albanian parties in the 
province of Kosovo. The boycott by Albanian parties resulted in the taking over of 
their seats by the ruling regime.
Due to the frequent elections and political trading for positions between political 
parties, institutions started losing their continuity. The major political institutions like 
Parliament were constantly changing and this was followed by changes in laws 
passed as well as rules and routines, which created an uncertain institutional and 
legal atmosphere, and subsequently produced grounds for the flourishing of informal 
links influencing decision-making.
5.5 Electoral patterns in Serbia during 1990s
From 1989 to 2000 there were four elections at the Republic level, three at federal 
level and three at the local level in Serbia (see Appendix 3 for information on 
electoral turnouts and political parties’ success). At the local level, the opposition 
took over certain municipalities. This provoked the ruling regime to keep changing 
laws to try to hinder them as much as possible. This section addresses the way 
political institutions were affected by frequent elections and the resultant emergence 
of new values and mles.
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5.5.1 Federal and Republic elections
The first Serbian multiparty elections, held in 1990, were characterised by the spread 
of nationalist euphoria and xenophobia in Serbia due to the increasing ethnic tensions 
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Opposition parties forced the Socialists to 
organise elections on the tide of euphoria about the fall of communism in other 
Former Yugoslav republics, and were positive of their own victory. Opposition 
parties failed to react to the fact that the media and public information were 
controlled by the SPS which was running propaganda against any reformist or civic 
option. The opposition experienced complete disaster and did not win any seats in 
Parliament. The nationalist political option, personified in Slobodan Milosevic, 
won convincingly in the elections. In spite of election irregularities implied by the 
Organisation for European Security and Development (OESD) observers, the 
opposition was unable to prove them in any institution. This resulted in the creation 
of a belief concerning the invincibility of Slobodan Milosevic among voters 
(Stevanovic, 1998). This invincibility was also derived from the exercise of power 
through a disrespect of law and the institution of free elections. Since Milosevic held 
control over the secret as well as national police, and already controlled the army, he 
set his own rules as the major sources of power and enforcement were in his hands.
The next elections were before schedule and held in 1992 in the context of civil war 
in neighbouring republics and under an atmosphere of economic and political 
sanctions imposed by the international community and the UN. The opposition took 
part in the election and united into the Democratic Movement of Serbia (DEPOS), 
led by Milan Panic, a Serbian businessman from the United States. The DS and the 
GSS took part independently. Although 62% of Belgrade’s citizens, approximately 
20% of the electoral body, voted for Milan Panic, and Milosevic’s number of votes
26A s a result of the collapse in the elections, the opposition parties decided to form a coalition -  the 
United Opposition of Serbia. They made an agreement that every opposition party would support the 
candidate that won the most votes in the voting district in the first round. After that agreement, the 
opposition had 23.4 % of votes as opposed to 76.7% won by the SPS (Goati, 1999).
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decreased by one million compared to the 1990 election, he won again and remained 
the president of Serbia.
onElections in 1993 were also marked by nationalism and xenophobia. Opposition 
parties united under the DEPOS. At this point, the SPO moved from the right 
towards the centre, the DS from the centre to the right and the GSS left the coalition. 
This incoherence of opposition parties and change of orientations resulted in a 
convincing victory for the Socialists who won approximately 21% more votes than in 
the previous election (Goati, 1999). However, for this election the mobilisation of 
bias based on nationalism was again used by the ruling elite as the winning 
mechanism.
In 1995 Milosevic signed the Dayton agreement, marking the end of war in Bosnia. 
The United States and the European Union politicians called Milosevic a peacemaker 
and ‘the factor of peace and stability in the region’, which strengthened his already 
powerful position on the national political scene making him even more unbeatable 
in elections by the opposition.
In 1996, once again the SPO, the DS and the GSS formed a coalition, this time called 
‘Zajedno’ (Together) in order to take part in the forthcoming 16th November federal 
and local elections. Due to the huge disappointment of voters in the previous election, 
Belgrade experienced the highest level of abstentions among voters. 37.35 % refused 
to vote and the SPS in coalition with the JUL won 38.15% of the vote. At the federal 
level, the coalition ‘Together’ won only 22.5% of votes compared with the 47.3% 
won in elections in 1993 which also implied a decreasing popularity among voters, 
and the Socialists won 42.9% (Goati, 1999).
Republic and Serbian presidential elections in 1997 were held under peaceful 
conditions. Milosevic, who in the meantime shifted from the position of President of 
the Republic of Serbia to the President of Yugoslavia, based his party campaign on
27 The ruling regime blamed the international community, especially the United States and the 
European Union for the ‘genocidal sanctions’ imposed that resulted in the deterioration of the 
economic situation as well as for wars in surrounding countries.
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economic growth realising that he could not play on nationalism at that time. The DS 
and the GSS decided to boycott the elections because of the newly passed electoral 
law that favoured the regime and restricted opposition access to the media for 
campaign purposes. The leader of the SPO, Vuk Draskovic, took part in the elections, 
despite the bad public polls and appeals from the other opposition parties to boycott. 
Understandably, the SPO lost the presidential election without its candidate passing 
into the second round. The SPO won approximately 50% of 824,674 votes won in 
the 1990 election (Cesid, 1998). The failure of Vuk Draskovic and his party was 
explained as a response of citizens towards the SPO’s bad governance of Belgrade, 
illegal building, and the corruption in which they were involved.
Additionally, on 23rd March 1999, due to the war in Kosovo, NATO decided to 
intervene and bomb Yugoslavia. Belgrade and the rest of the country were bombed 
for 78 days. Many civilians were killed, and many buildings were destroyed or 
damaged. In the internal political scene, Milosevic’s position among his voters had 
strengthened, as he was a ‘defender’ of the country against the entire international 
community.
The next elections were called for 24th September 2000, a year and a half after the 
NATO intervention. Seventeen opposition parties from all over Serbia, with the 
exception of the SPO, joined into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (Demokratska 
Opozicija Srbije, DOS), and defeated Milosevic at the federal and local level. The 
regime refused to accept the results and hand over power. As a response, the DOS 
organised the uprising and demonstrations of more than one million people in 
Belgrade on the 5th October 2000 which brought the removal of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s regime from power. Milosevic himself was arrested and extradited to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia located in The Hague, 
Netherlands in June 2001.
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5.5.2 Elections in Belgrade
Belgrade had experienced to some extent different election outcomes and 
consequently different parties had governed it. In Belgrade in 1990, the opposition 
won significantly more votes than in the republican elections. The ratio was 35.71% 
for the opposition versus 64.9% for the Socialist party. There was also a difference in 
results among Belgrade’s municipalities. In the inter-urban municipalities Vracar, 
Savski Venae, Stari Grad as well as the parts of Palilula and Vozdovac, closer to 
central Belgrade, the United Opposition of Serbia won 62% and SPS 38% of votes 
(Stevanovic, 1998). However, in 1992 at the local council level, the situation 
changed slightly in favour of the opposition. In addition to the three central 
municipalities the opposition ran since the previous elections, Vozdovac and Zvezdra 
were also taken by the opposition. In the remaining eleven municipalities, the 
Socialists retained the majority. At the city level, the government remained under 
Socialist control. The DEPOS had 18 representatives and the DS 8 as opposed to the 
SPS who had 60 and the extreme right wing SRS who had 9 (Table 10).
Table 10: Number of representatives by Parties in Belgrade’s City Council, 1992-2000
Parties 1992 1996 2000
SPS (Socialist Party of Serbia) 60 24 4
SRS (Serbian Radical Party) 9 17 1
DEPOS 18
DS (Democratic Party) 8
DSS (Democratic Party of Serbia) 2
Together 67
DOS 105
OTHER 5
TOTAL 100 110 110
Due to the growing power of opposition parties in the capital, the regime had decided 
to try to prevent this. Consequently, the ‘post-modernist’ regime imposed forced 
receivership in opposition-run municipalities and took control over all media 
including Belgrade’s independent TV station Studio B, leaving the capital without 
any independent electronic media.
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The next local elections were held in November 1996, when at the second round the 
opposition coalition won a majority in 27 Serbian cities, which came as a big surprise 
for both the opposition and the Socialists. However, Milosevic decided to annul the 
elections and to proclaim the victory of the socialists the day after he recognised the 
opposition victory (Thomas, 1999). Since he and his party controlled the judiciary 
and the electoral commissions, it was easy to ignore the voters’ will and to impose 
his own rules of the game. Again, the basic institution of democracy, free elections, 
was ignored and informal rules were imposed. The signal sent to voters was that the 
elite was stronger than formal institutions, and that they can change the rules in 
accordance with their needs.
Nevertheless, rigging the elections mobilised the citizens to react and to start 
demonstrating against the violation of their basic human rights. Eighty-eight days of 
continuous all-day demonstrations on the streets of all Serbian cities28, and the 
boycott and closure of Belgrade forced the SPS and the JUL to hand over power in 
the cities to the opposition. Consequently, the Belgrade City assembly was composed 
of 67 municipalities from the opposition coalition ‘Together’, 24 Socialists, 17 
municipalities from the Serbian Radical Party and 2 from the Democratic Party of 
Serbia (Table 10). The opposition won the majority in most of Belgrade’s 
municipalities, apart from Zemun, where the nationalist Radical Party won power.29
However, the Socialists were the majority in the Serbian Parliament that passed the 
laws and controlled the judicial system, the police and all state-owned enterprises in 
the country which enabled them to use all means to prevent the proper functioning of 
the city government. One of the many blockages by the Republic government was, 
for example, not to allow buses intended for public transport, that were donated from 
the German government to the opposition government, to pass the border. The 
Socialists and the JUL also closed an open market in the New Belgrade council
28 Although the regime used brutal police force many times, it did not stop citizens from 
demonstrating on a daily basis in order to get their political will respected.
29 That was explained by the huge numbers of refugees from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
who lived in Zemun and voted for the leader Vojislav Seselj, due to his nationalistic promises that the 
Radical party would return lost territories and help them back to their houses in Croatia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.
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(Buvljak) that was the most profitable city enterprise at the time, in order to prevent 
the City getting tax revenue from it.
That was not the only problem facing Belgrade’s citizens. Due to the conflict 
between the leaders of the SPO, Vuk Draskovic, and leader of the DS, Zoran 
Djindjic, the coalition ‘Together’ disintegrated. Djindjic, who was voted in as mayor 
on 21st February 1997 by the city assembly, was dismissed on 30th September 1997, 
after only six months. The Serbian Renewal Movement, supported by the Socialists 
and the Radical Party, voted in Vojislav Mihajlovic, the SPO’s member, as mayor 
(Table 11).
In this way, the opposition party created a coalition with ruling parties in order to 
fulfil its interests at the city level. Due to this exception made by the ruling regime 
towards the SPO and the informal coalition in the city government, it could be 
argued that the SPO was doing nothing to stop the elite, especially in Dedinje, from 
building illegally in order keep their support in the city assembly. Belgrade’s citizens 
reacted to this with demonstrations but these demonstrations were brutally stopped 
after only two days.
Table 11: Mayors of Belgrade and their party memberships
Mayor Party Year
Aleksandar Bakocevic Socialist Party of Serbia 1986 - 1990
Milorad Unkovic Socialist Party of Serbia 1990 - 1993
Slobodanka Gruden Socialist Party of Serbia 1993 - 1994
Nebojsa Covic Socialist Party of Serbia 1994 - 1997
Zoran Djindjic Democratic Party 21.2. 1997 - 30. 9. 1997
Vojislav Mihailovic Serbian Renewal 22.1. 1998-5. 10. 2000
Movement
Milan St. Protic DOS 5. 10. 2000 - 20. 3. 2001
Radmila Hrustanovic DOS 1. 6. 2001- 2004
Nenad Bogdanovic Democratic Party 2004 onwards
Personnel changes also occurred in all city institutions for the second time in six 
months. Immediately the members of parties that were in opposition to the SPO, 
which was now governing the city, were replaced by SPO members. Following this, 
city institutions were shaken again, and the new rules created were in accordance 
with the ruling politics. A special 3% tax, paid only by Belgrade residents, and which
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was removed by Djindjic, was re-imposed by Mihailovic’s government. The city was 
on the edge of collapse. All communal services, including public transport, were in 
poor condition. The SPO was not able to govern the city, and blamed the Socialists 
for its failure, arguing that they suffered constant blocking from the Republic 
institutions, particularly with regard to budget and legal support. However, the same 
SPS was enabling the SPO’s majority in the city assembly where they had an 
informal coalition. At the municipalities’ level, the SPO stayed in power together 
with Democrats.
The situation got worse after the failure of Vuk Draskovic to become president in 
elections in 1997. “....On the city level, the chaos was even bigger. Belgrade’s 
Public Transport Company was constantly on strike. The project for the renewal of 
Sava’s banks and city centre ‘Euro polis’ has never started but it was repeatedly 
misused for propaganda for elections. Living standards were at the bottom of Europe, 
and the young and educated were emigrating abroad, due to the failure of their hopes 
in the opposition and their ability to change the regime” (Stevanovic, 1998:30). All 
aspects of urban infrastructure were impoverished - housing, transport, public health, 
crime prevention, and overall planning regulation. Due to the lack of minimum 
information about civil society and political urban options, citizens were not reacting 
against the ruling regime on a broader scale. “The official media was mainly engaged 
in politically vulgar propaganda, disguising the real destruction occurring in urban 
economy and social life” (Prodanovic, 2000:279).
The change occurred in 2000, when Milosevic was removed from power. At the city 
level the DOS won 105 out of 110 seats in the City Hall, the Socialist party four and 
the Radicals only one. The SPO did not pass the minimum quota which resulted in 
their shift back to opposition, without any seats won at any level. It was explained as 
a punishment for the corruption and illegal building while they were ruling. The 
DOS took power in all sixteen of Belgrade’s municipalities
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5.5.3 Illegality and elections
On the subject of illegal building and politicians at the city level, in 1994 the Mayor 
of Belgrade, Slobodanka Gruden (SPS), was dismissed due to her involvement in 
scandal with Dafiment Bank (a pyramidal bank that defrauded thousands of savers in 
Serbia) and illegal building. This was the first official scandal about illegal building 
in Belgrade. The next Mayor was Nebojsa Covic, again a member of the SPS. When 
he became the major, Covic’s first promise to voters was that he would destroy the 
so-called ‘urbanistic’ mafia. This was the first public mention of the rapidly growing 
problem of illegal building in Belgrade. However, Covic never made much effort to 
stop the problem.
With the change of political parties on power in 1996, the number of illegally built 
objects increased to 200,000, at 15.95%, the highest ever increase over a three-year 
period (Andjelkovic, 2001). The city government as well as the municipalities 
realised that an alternative way of funding, not only for the city but also their parties 
and themselves personally, was to sell the most profitable resource of the city - 
building land. They did not block illegal building, the profits from which were 
enormous (Petovar, 2001). One could speculate that part of the bribe money for 
building permits was going to party funds. Many political parties were acquiring 
significant headquarters, offices and other assets for their parties. However, this is 
difficult to prove due to the lack of regulation of the financing of political parties at 
the time. The SPO together with the DS were controlling most of the local 
municipalities, which were responsible for the issuing of building permits for 
individual housing as well as for temporary objects including kiosks. Illegal 
residential construction and the boom in the number of kiosks were associated 
mostly with these parties. Additionally, the same increase in illegal developments 
characterised Zemun which was controlled by the Radical party. This implied that 
illegal building was not only associated with the elite but also with subelites.
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Furthermore, the ruling regime did not act to prevent this chaos and misuse of 
position in spite of having all the necessary instruments to do so. It was in the interest 
of the regime, apart from gaining properties themselves, to discredit the city 
government, private ownership and the market economy. It was in the regime’s 
political interest to allow opposition parties to break laws and show their corrupt 
behaviour, so one could have said to Belgrade’s citizens “ ...this is democracy, you 
got what you asked for. Look what local government and private builders do!” 
(Stevanovic, 1998:30). They deliberately organised out the question of blocking 
illegal building from politics. On the other side, as suggested by Petovar “for the 
parties in city government, building land was the golden mine. They were using it to 
the maximum, without taking future political and economic consequences into 
consideration” (2003: 29). The opposition parties also mobilised out the illegal 
building, but argued that they could not have stopped it due to the lack of support 
from the central government (Cotric, 2001).
5.6 The Housing Sector in Transition
The newly created political and economic systems resulted in a lack of housing 
provision and enabled privileges in housing for the ruling elite. The same elite whose 
action potential was the biggest in the deconstruction of institutional inheritance had 
contributed to the further institutional breakdown of the housing system by 
neglecting its deregulation and by a tolerant attitude towards illegal building. 
Together with the overall economic fall, it had resulted in an increased problem in 
terms of access to housing. Consequently, during the 1990s, “the population from all 
social levels got involved into illegal building but with different positions in terms of 
future ability and access to legalisation of the houses” (Petrovic, 2002:137). 
Furthermore, Petrovic argues that housing was absorbing the shocks of economic 
collapse to an even greater extent than was the case in other post-communist 
societies.
GDP decreased by 35% over the past decade and the construction sector’s 
contribution to GDP diminished by 65% (UN Habitat, 2001). Given the sudden
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decline in the building sector, combined with an annual growth of 50,000 persons per 
year (Federal Statistics Office, 2001), and with the influx of refugees, a huge housing 
deficit was created in Serbia. The slowdown was much bigger in the socially-owned 
housing sector than in the private sector (Table 12). New laws and procedures on 
housing were made to boost private sector production of housing, but the government 
additionally stopped the building of affordable housing for low-income households 
and vulnerable groups.
Table 12: Legal Collective and Individual building in Belgrade (1990-2000)
Total Individual Collective
1990 9084 3293 5791
1991 5188 1516 3672
1992 4926 2045 2881
1993 4202 1723 2479
1994 3850 1606 2244
1995 2448 1151 1297
1996 4134 2255 1879
1997 2739 1567 1172
1998 3139 1731 1408
1999 2196 817 1379
2000 1577 619 958
Source: The First Results o f2002 Census, Federal Statistics Office, 2001
The quantity of legally built individual housing decreased by 81%, and collective 
even more, by 83% (Table 12, Figure 3) in Belgrade over ten years.30
30 A discussion of changes in population and housing indices is given in Appendix 4.
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Figure 3: Decrease of legal construction in Belgrade (1990-2000)
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Although housing problems were largely ignored by the then government, “housing 
privatisation was one of the channels used by the political elite to transfer state 
owned capital into private hands” (Petrovic, 2002:139). The law on privatisation of 
state owned flats was passed in 1990, and the issue of de-nationalisation and
<5 i
restitution was not considered. The privatisation price of the flats was based on a 
calculation of the revalorised construction cost of the flat without taking the location 
value into consideration. Although the privatisation price of the flats was 
approximately 30% of their market value, the privatisation was not undertaken on a 
large scale because although undervalued, flats were still too expensive for the 
majority of citizens (Petrovic, 2002).
The next law on Privatisation of Housing was passed in 1992 and combined with 
hyperinflation it enabled 90% of socially owned housing to be privatised (Petrovic, 
2002).33 However it has to be added that neither of these laws specified or 
established the institutional body or necessary agency that would have been in charge
31 Law on Housing Issues published in Official Bulletin of Republic of Serbia 1990 (12) and 1992 
(50).
32 Petrovic (2002) emphasises that although she tried to get information on the numbers of flats 
privatised, no institution, including the Ministry for Construction, nor public enterprises, were able to 
provide any. This is an indicator of the institutional confusion under which privatisation was carried 
o u t .
33 60sq m property could have been bought from the state for approximately £35.00 in Belgrade in 
1993.
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for investing the resources collected from privatisation into new housing provision as 
was the case in other Eastern European countries. The law did not define the 
necessary goals of housing politics, and the role of the state was vaguely defined as 
supportive to new mechanisms for housing provision that would need to be 
established in the future. Another obligation of the state was to provide affordable 
housing for people on social benefits.
Nevertheless, Petovar argues that the law did not incorporate any new approaches in 
housing politics, since housing provision remained the obligation of public 
enterprises, which was in direct opposition with the definition of the role of the state 
in housing provision defined by the same law (2003). The enterprises kept the role of 
the main provider of housing, which meant that housing was again dependent on 
employment criteria, as was the case during the self-management period. Given that 
there was 50% unemployment, this raised the question of how unemployed residents 
without housing would solve their housing problems. Additionally, every enterprise 
had to participate in 15% of the building costs, which under the given economic 
circumstances became impossible for most public companies. Therefore, only 
employees that had monopolistic managerial positions had access to those affordable 
flats, or so-called flats of solidarity, but not the employees who really needed them 
(Petrovic, 2002). Petrovic adds that the principles used for distribution of the 
solidarity housing at the city level34 were not defined with social criteria. 
Additionally, the law allowed privatisation of the solidarity flats but the resources 
gained from this were not used for the provision of new solidarity flats for socially 
disadvantaged groups (2002).
In addition to the obligation of the enterprises to provide housing to their employees 
through solidarity flats, the local councils were responsible for providing social 
housing as they were during the self-management system where housing was 
provided by self-management communes. Local councils did not have necessary 
funds, and they were supposed to collect funds for it through privatisation of housing 
that had not been privatised. Most of the non-privatised flats were engaged by the
34 Official Bulletin of Belgrade 1996/ 1997.
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tenants with the legal right to live in them and those properties could not have been 
privatised or sold. Local municipalities were thus left without institutional support or 
the necessary resources to provide needed social housing. Furthermore, after the loss 
of power at the local level in elections in 1996, the Republic government centralised 
all funds and sources of income, leaving local councils almost without any income. 
The rents from non-privatised housing were very low, since they were determined on 
the same non-economic basis as was the case during self-management. Additionally, 
the city government did not have much income from local tax and communal charges 
since most of the citizens were not capable of paying it or were refusing to pay it as a 
way of civil protest against the government which was not providing them with jobs 
to earn incomes35.
The housing sector was not supported by a sound financial policy. Banks were not 
providing housing mortgages. The only exception was Beobanka, which provided 
very affordable mortgages not for the general public, but only to members of the 
ruling elite (Petrovic, 2002).
Political parties also did not include housing problems and possible solutions on their 
agendas, which was confirmed in interviews done with members of city ruling 
parties at the time (Interviews 11, 14, 15, 18, 2001), although some of them (the DS 
and the GSS) were using the ‘fight against illegal building’ as one of the arguments 
in their pre-election campaigns. The problem of housing was kept covert, and it was 
organised out from politics. The only political party that took into consideration 
economic difficulties that citizens had been meeting in providing housing was the 
SPS but only as a part of the 2000 election campaign propaganda, in which the SPS 
promised to build 10,000 new apartments for young couples. That promise was based 
on an assumption that banks would provide mortgages with a 5% annual interest rate 
(Jovicic, 2000). Although many economists and analysts were arguing that this 
program was economically unsustainable36 and that it was used as a part of political
35 The Democratic Party started this protest in 1996 that called on citizens to boycott all duties 
towards the state that was failing to provide them with basic needs.
36 The mortgage conditions were affordable and the calculated price of £259/sq m on average (based on 
building costs and state subsidised communal infrastructure) was also low. However, the monthly mortgage 
was predicted to be around £60, which was still not affordable for the majority of citizens under the given
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marketing, 25,000 young couples applied for the program, although it was not even 
specified at which locations housing would be built (Petrovic, 2002). Additionally, 
the SPS itself was aware of the program being too ambitious and subsequently gave 
an advantage for applications to couples who were able to pay for the whole 
apartment without taking mortgages. That would enable the SPS to get initial funds 
to start the program by finishing buildings that public enterprises started to build, but 
never finished due to lack of financial resources. However, there are no data on how 
many couples gave money for these apartments, although the first moving-ins were 
promised for 15th September 2000, a week before the elections, which did not happen.
5.7 Illegal building and Usurpation
As a result of the overall economic environment, lack of political response and lack 
of proper government intervention in housing provision in the 1990s, the housing 
shortage became critical in Belgrade. The residents had turned to various methods of 
housing provision, most of them being illegal. Additionally, a new layer of 
entrepreneurs and developers emerged. They realised that huge profits could be 
gained by housing provision in Belgrade and illegal building acquired another face, 
that of usurpation. Usurpation is illegal construction, but this time on publicly owned 
land and in public spaces. In the 1990s, public spaces like parks and public objects 
and parcels in private ownership had been ‘attacked’ by developers and investors 
building on another property, leading to them being legalised as private properties 
(Petovar, 2003). The most common examples of this are kiosks, built in parks, on 
riverbanks, in the backyards of public buildings and on pavements, which prevented 
safe passage for pedestrians.
Illegal construction and usurpation were constantly increasing in the 1990s. In 1995 
there was more than double the number of illegally built objects compared to legally 
built ones, and in 1996 the number was equal. Privatisation of the housing stock 
boosted illegal construction in the central areas, especially after 1997, when the City
economic circumstances. In order to overcome this obstacle, program initiators were considering including 
extended family members into the repayment scheme (Jovicic, 2000)
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government made a decision on the reconstruction of buildings. This decision 
allowed developers to build in common rooms of buildings, lofts or to make 
extensions if they got 51% of residents of the building to sign an approval. 
Consequently, illegal building, characteristic of suburban areas during communism, 
escalated in the central areas of Belgrade. Moreover, 90% of Belgrade’s building had 
not been registered in the cadastre which meant the sale of illegal objects was legal 
without obstacles. It had encouraged the creation of a secondary real estate market 
for illegally built objects and attracted developers to build and sell on an even larger 
scale. Additionally, the Law on Building was allowing the connection of built objects, 
without building permits, to the electricity network, water and sewage systems. It 
treated illegal building as a violation of law but not as a criminal violation. Therefore, 
illegal builders knew that the maximum penalty they could get was to pay fines 
which were also very low since hyperinflation was decreasing the value of money on 
an hourly basis.
Although illegal buildings are visible everywhere around Belgrade, it is very difficult 
to represent the extent of them statistically, especially for illegally built extensions. 
The Town Planning Institute collected statistics but these were mostly partial for the 
needs of the regulatory plans they were creating. As suggested by Petrovic, the 
creation of partial urban plans was forced, mostly for the purpose of legalising 
illegally built objects in elite areas of the city such as Dedinje (2002). The Secretariat 
for Property Rights and Construction Affairs also had its own internal statistics 
(Table 13). According to their data it can be seen that the highest number of illegal 
buildings was in the local council of Zemun, and the highest increase in illegal 
building was in Novi Beograd. On average, illegal building increased by 41.31% in 
urban local councils. The total number of illegal buildings was 96,410.
37 www.beograd.org.vu; www.beoland.co.yu
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Table 13: Increase of illegal building in Belgrade (1994 -  2000)
COUNCILS 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 %change
City Councils
Zemun 14,890 15,390 15,912 16,738 17,307 17,691 17,970 20.69
Cukarica 9,348 9,947 10,447 11,184 11,657 12,117 12,444 33.12
Palilula 8,561 9,399 10,124 10,983 11,405 11,631 12,491 45.91
Zvezdara 6,829 7,039 7,432 7,940 8,137 8,733 9,239 35.29
Vozdovac 4,647 5,723 6,434 6,982 7,338 7,555 7,881 69.59
Novi Beograd 2,441 3,011 3,594 4,288 4,583 4,730 4,983 104.14
Rakovica 2,233 2,544 2,939 3,329 3,536 3,243 3,448 54.41
Savski Venae 2,046 2,121 2,099 2,081 2,069 2,091 2,262 10.56
Stari Grad 828 951 1,107 1,204 1,345 1,422 1,604 93.72
Vracar 522 678 862 1,132 1,295 1,474 1,646 215.33
Total 52,345 56,798 60,950 65,861 68,672 70,687 73,968 41.31
Suburban Councils
Grocka 9,246 9,912 10,478 10,789 10,891 11,064 11,246 21.63
Barajevo 3,233 3,222 3,224 3,295 3,349 3,323 3,359 3.90
Sopot 2,237 2,304 2,365 2,401 2,426 2,430 2,487 11.18
Mladenovac 1,637 1,700 1,819 2,011 2,092 2,099 2,141 30.79
Obrenovac 1,431 1,644 1,597 1,711 1,774 1,893 2,018 41.02
Lazarevac 1,109 1,119 1,137 1,149 1,149 1,156 1,191 7.39
Total 18,893 19,901 20,620 21,356 21,681 21,965 22,442 18.78
Total 16 
Councils
71,238 76,699 81,570 87,217 92,652 92,652 96,410 35.34
Source: Internal data of Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs (2001)
The number of these objects is still unknown, but they are all around the city and 
have become a main feature of Belgrade’s identity. The extent of the illegal building 
is presented on Map 1 and Map 2, both made by the Town Planning Institute.
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Map 1: Illegally built areas in Belgrade -  Town Planning Institute (June 2001)
Source: Town Planning Institute, 2003
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Map 2: ‘Spontaneous’ building in Belgrade (November 2002)
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Source: Pre Master plan for Belgrade, Town Planning Institute, 2003
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If Map 1 and Map 2, both made by the Town Planning Institute, are compared, it 
turns out that the extent of illegal building is almost double on Map 2. Map 1 was 
made in 2001 and shows the much smaller extent of illegal building than Map 2 
which was created in 2002, on which illegal developments are represented as 
spontaneously developed housing. Such an increase did not happen in one year, but 
the Town Planning Institute had not mapped the situation on the ground regularly 
during previous years. Additionally, those maps do not include illegal extensions, 
due to their scales. Otherwise, if all illegal lofts and extensions were included, there 
was a danger that the whole map would represent mostly illegally built objects.
5.8 Conclusion
In the period from 1991-2000, which was used by other former communist countries 
to build and strengthen their economic systems and state institutions, Serbia passed 
through a 5-year civil war, international isolation and economic sanctions, 
hyperinflation, escalation of terrorism and secessionism in Kosovo and Metohia and 
NATO bombing. The new elite emerged during this period and it consisted mostly of 
the elite from the previous system that converted its previously privileged access to 
various sources into economic or political capital. It was also followed by the 
emergence of subelites who had taken the opposition parties’ positions. The elite was 
grouped around Milosevic and his Socialist party. The elite was characterised by a 
tendency towards familial power and dynastic succession, and there was no 
distinction between a state career and a personal relationship to the ruling regime. 
Furthermore, economic success depended on a personal relationship to Milosevic, 
and Milosevic acted only according to his own unchecked discretion and set up his 
own rules. Terminology and categories were taken from free economy systems but 
the meaning associated with them was in the service of the new elite. However, the 
features from the previous system that were functional for the new elite and lobbies, 
no matter from which party, were also kept. All those factors combined brought the 
state to the edge of economic collapse. The population in Serbia managed to survive 
thanks to a black economy and black market.
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The political institutional context was determined by the post-modern dictatorial 
system in which the elite controlled flows of information, allowing a surface freedom 
to marginalised independent media and fragmented groups of civil society that were 
simulating democratic practices through oral and direct face to face communication. 
The allowed visible oral communication in public space but without media coverage 
gave an impression of the existence of freedom of expression and speech and the 
regime acquired legitimacy. The control of media inherited from the previous system, 
and strengthened further, enabled the ruling regime to use instruments and 
institutions of the old ‘Party State’ apparatus, where legislative, executive and 
juridical powers were combined together to reinforce overall hegemony. By 
controlling the majority of the media, the elite were in a position to mobilise bias and 
to keep many latent interests from arising. The lack of democratic traditions, habits 
of public control, and the non-existence of civil control, which are part of every 
democratic society, also enabled this. The rule of the converted elite once known as 
‘the avant-garde of the working class’ and who became ‘the saviours of nation and 
avant-garde of the patriotic front’, actually involved the usurpers of power skilfully 
invoking nationalistic rhetoric to prepare for confrontation even with major national 
institutions (Prodanovic, 2000).38 Furthermore, the opposition or subelites had to 
oppose to the strong elite and employ a nationalistic agenda too in order to compete 
in elections. Due to the frequent inconsistencies in the political agendas and changes 
of direction as well as informal coalitions with the ruling elite as was the case in the 
1997, they kept failing to change the regime and Milosevic and the elite stayed on 
the power.
The elite controlled the Federal and Republic Parliaments, and the laws that were 
passed were in accordance with their needs. Consequently, they enforced new 
institutional rules that were primarily used for their own distributional benefits. For 
example, when the SPS lost power over local municipalities it passed competencies 
from them onto the city and changed the laws in order to improve and regain its 
position. Additionally, when the SPS lost power in the city in the next elections, they
38 In order to do this they also compromised the Yugoslav National Army, the Serbian Orthodox Church, 
major national media, intellectuals from the National Association of Writers, The Serbian Academy of 
Science and Arts, and even major football club supporters associations.
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transferred city competencies to the Republic level, which resulted in legal chaos in 
which it was difficult to know whose competency is whose, and thus left a lot of 
space for informal arrangements.
Moreover, frequent elections had shaken insitutions, since new people were 
constantly coming to run them and they were introducing different rules all over 
again. The changes of the parties' orientation from the right to the left and vice versa, 
also sent confusing messages to the already confused population. There were some 
attempts at a united approach of opposition parties against the regime but usually 
they failed due to the rivalry among party leaders. Furthermore, as a result of the new 
political institutional context and the rules imposed by the regime and Milosevic 
himself, the opposition parties failed and expressed almost the same degree of 
ignorance toward formal institutions and laws. When in power, the opposition also 
exercised corrupt behaviour and used informal links and structures to achieve 
political and economic goals. This produced chaos at the city institutional level.
Consequently, housing was not a priority for either the elite or subelite, and it was 
mobilised out from politics. The problems of housing were kept covert, and they had 
never been on the priority list of the problems that needed to be solved. Housing 
privatisation was used only for the transfer of capital in their hands. In addition to the 
inherited problems of rigid institutions, house shortage and existing illegal building, 
there were a few other inheritances from the previous system. First, housing was 
again dependent on employment, and enterprises stayed in charge for housing 
provision. In view of the fact that the unemployment rate reached 50%, it is obvious 
that housing was an unsolvable problem for most of the population. Second, the 
necessary financial support for housing from banks missed again. Illegal building 
boomed everywhere, including national parks, public spaces, preserved zones, and 
archaeological locations. According to Petovar, this was not a result of “pure 
violence and seizing by those who had occupied those spaces, but also the way for 
the local, city and republic governments to, through arrogation of the rent, fill their 
parties’ funds as well as their own” (2003:29). However, corruption was 
institutionalised and became both rule and routine in political institutions, and since 
everything was politicised, including the economy, it became the rule and routine for
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all institutions. The analysis of individual institutions and examples and practices of 
institutionalised corruption will be addressed in the following chapters.
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6 Chapter : Institutions and illegality
6.1 Introduction
Institutions derive a good deal of their structure of meaning and their logic of 
appropriateness from the society in which they are formed (March and Olsen, 1984). 
As suggested by Peters, routines appear to arise naturally once people begin to 
interact in an institutional setting (1999). Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to 
assess the direction in which institutions have shifted and what routines and rules 
they formed in the post-communist period. It is of crucial importance to analyse the 
mutual interaction between individuals and institutions as institutions are now 
perceived as being dynamic rather than static (March and Olsen, 1984).
A public interest is to be analysed first, and this chapter will assess how it has 
changed as a consequence of the overall political and economic changes. The next 
focus of the chapter is the planning system that represented a mere renovation of the 
previous system, effectively with old procedural rules applied to new problems. In 
general, appropriate planning institutions for a resolution of existing conflicts failed 
to develop. An overview of the city institutions involved in housing and building and 
their responsibilities is given as an explanatory context for the analysis of the 
interrelation between the city institutions and illegal building
Finally, the analysis of empirical research is introduced. The perception of 
interviewed informants of the interaction of central and city/local governance is 
presented, as well as analysis of the city institutions and their roles in illegal building. 
In addition, the meaning of term ‘urbanistic mafia’ is assessed from different angles.
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6.2 Public versus individual interests
The beginning of the transition period in Serbia was characterised by the collapse of 
many previous public interests and the escalation of the number of new legitimate 
and individual interests, very often mutually competitive. Most of them contended 
for the status of a public interest. Most of the social values and rules, widely 
accepted in the former ideological and political system, had lost their previous 
significance. “The newly emerging social values often do not reach a useful and 
effective consensus, as they are basically relevant only to specific interest groups and 
consequently cannot represent the public interest and a set of the key criteria upon 
which decisions are made” (Vujosevic, 2000:6). The following section will analyse 
how public interest, in terms of rules and values, has changed, especially in relation 
to building land.
As described in the previous chapter, at the national level, the public interest was 
defined through nationalistic politics. On the spatial level, it was determined by the 
Law on Expropriation, passed on 28th December 1995. According to this law, the 
public interest cannot be equated with public goods any longer, as was the case 
during the communist period, but was defined in relation to state ownership. The law 
did not define the relationship between individual ownership and the state, but 
became the instrument of compulsory purchase (Petovar, 1998). Through the 
institution of such a vaguely defined public interest, elite was able to satisfy its own 
interests (Petovar, 1998). Additionally the Law on Planning and Arrangement of 
Space used public interest as the basis for compulsory purchase for many reasons. 
For example, compulsory purchase can be used for acquiring land for building 
schools, hospitals, military objects, for protecting the environment, for building 
affordable houses and so on. Compulsory purchase can be undertaken by federal, 
republic or local governments, public and state foundations as well as by state 
companies.39 Such a definition of compulsory purchase caused two problems. First, 
‘private ownership’ was endangered because private property could be expropriated 
at any time by the state. Second, the mechanism for protection from jeopardising by
39 Law on Expropriation, point 8 (1995) published in the Official Bulletin of Republic of Serbia.
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law was not defined. The most frequent abuse of law was demonstrated in the change 
of ‘initial land use’, or in the use of the expropriated object after a short period of 
time (Petovar, 1998). For example, a private developer could get some expropriated 
land on a 99 year leasehold in an auction sale in order to build a school, but after 
some time the developer could decide to change its use and to build some other 
object from which he/she could profit more. Or, even more frequently, cases of 
jeopardising the law and private interests arise when the state-owned company 
obtains land and builds an object on it and then after a few years decides to privatise 
the object and sell it (Petovar, 1998). In this case, the law, based on public interest, 
acts as a mediator in transferring the properties under much more inexpensive 
circumstances than would be the case under free market conditions (Petovar, 1998). 
This was actually the quasi-legal way for the powerful state company managers, 
ministers and private developers close to the regime, through informal networks, to 
gain huge profits. In the state controlled media, compulsory purchase and public 
interest were represented and justified as being the priority for the development of 
the nation and the individual but private interests and ownership of the ordinary 
citizens did not have any importance.
Furthermore, under the circumstances of the absence of legitimate and 
unquestionable public interests to direct public policy and planning in the common 
interests of the society at large, many individual interests legitimised themselves 
almost exclusively by means of supremacy of the power they rested upon. It has long 
been recognised among commentators that many “new” individual interests, in effect, 
figured as mere “disguised” interests of that part of the old political and economic 
hierarchy which had taken on a leading role from the very beginning of the post­
communist transition period (Lazic, 1994, Vujosevic, 2000). In addition to the lack 
of a definition of individual interests of ordinary citizens due to the social control 
imposed by the ideological and political monopoly, a large number of real social 
conflicts had not been “accepted and approved” and they consequently stayed hidden 
(Vujosevic, 2000), as they were during the previous communist period.40 These
40 Conflict and power need to be addressed, especially in communist dominated societies, because a 
basic reason for their deterioration and loss of vitality may be in their suppressing of social conflict. 
“If societies that suppress conflict are oppressive, perhaps social, political and planning theories that
148
conflicts were ‘latent conflicts’ (Lukes, 1974) and the elite used their power to keep 
them from arising.
This change in the definition of the public interest and the lack of a definition of the 
private ones resulted in apathy among the deprived and disempowered (the true 
“losers” of the period), who have so far been neither organised enough, nor 
successful enough, in voicing and articulating their interests (Vujosevic, 2000). 
However, the final product of the change of the definition of the public interest was 
that the interests of the ruling elite were protected contrary to the individual interests 
and ownerships that stayed unprotected. Moreover, the change of the definition of 
the public interest also provoked change in other institutions and rules, initially in the 
planning sphere.
6.3 Urban Planning
Due to the change in the definition of the public interest in politics in general, 
planners lost their indisputable key legitimising base for decision-making. “A ‘cosy 
and comfortable carpet’ of the almost indisputable key legitimizing base of planning 
has been abruptly and crudely slipped beneath planners’ feet” (Vujosevic, 2000:5). 
At the beginning of the transition period, there were high expectations among 
planners that urban planning would be separated from the other instruments of social 
regulation and control. However this did not happen as “ ...the state was mainly 
focused on introducing of the more rigor into the over-regulated ‘p(l)andemonium’ 
self-management planning, and to searching for an appropriate theoretical ‘escape’ to 
that end” (Vujosevic, 1998: 7). Additionally, the planning system was re-centralised 
at the beginning of the 1990s. The structure of the new Act on Planning and 
Arrangement of Space passed in 1995 only confirmed this (Vujosevic, 2000; Petovar 
2003). Centralisation of planning consequently slowed down the speed with which
ignore or marginalize conflict are oppressive, too. And if conflict sustains, there is good reason to 
caution against an idealism that ignores conflict and power” (Flyvbjerg, 1998:209).
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plans were created and passed. Plans stayed as rigid and inflexible as they had been 
during the communist era.
At the beginning of the 1990s, federal and republic governments made many mid and 
long term socio- and macro-economic plans and documents, which have never been 
implemented or used in practice. The reason for this is that instead of focusing on 
solving real problems like the high rate of unemployment, the decline of the 
economy and the rapid worsening of citizens’ standard of living, creators of plans 
and documents concentrated on making ambitious and non-realistic proposals.41
In addition to non-realistic plans, Vujosevic (1998) argues that, parallel with the 
beginning of the transition, various forms of ‘quasi-planning’ started and dominated 
in urban planning . “Another hindering circumstance was that planners in the field of 
spatial, urban, and environmental planning started to advocate the interests of the 
emerging powerful groups. Consequently, as the majority of planners have not even 
attempted to constitute a new legitimization base for planning, many decisions in 
public policy and planning which were passed in the 1990s were simply missing a 
democratic and participative legitimacy” (Vujosevic, 2000:7). Thus, the key problem 
for most of the planners and other experts engaged in planning matters was how to 
mediate among the competing individual interests and to make them join together 
around certain common interests, as well as how to cope with the increasing 
influence of informal pressures on planning. Planning failed to develop as a positive 
response to the deviant institutional setting but rather, with its already heavy 
problems inherited from communism, fitted into new rules and values.
The city institutions that had a monopoly over building land and planning were 
inefficient and as corrupt as the rest of the society, which in combination with rigid 
centralised planning made very fertile ground for the development of informal 
networks and rules and consequently of illegal building.
41 The best example of the failure of planning plans is “Spatial Plan of the Republic of Serbia” (1995), 
whose decisions and proposals have never been implemented or applied.
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6.4 City Institutions
The aim of this section is to present briefly the institutional setting of Belgrade with 
regards to land regulation and planning, which gives a context for the empirical 
research of the values and rules that those institutions produced during the 1990s. A 
puzzling array of institutions shared responsibility for running Belgrade’s services 
but due to political changes, frequent elections and changes in parties’ orientations, 
as addressed in the previous chapter, these institutions have often been reshaped or 
even abolished and their responsibilities reshuffled and reformed. However, this did 
not result in increased efficiency of those institutions but rather their instability and 
the creation of a space for informal networking.
Apart from local municipalities which issue building permits, for individual building, 
there are many other city institutions that deal with the issues of planning, land 
management and building permits: the Secretariat for Urban Planning in the City 
Assembly, the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs, and two 
enterprises founded by the City Assembly of Belgrade, the Town Planning Institute 
of Belgrade and the Agency for City Building Land and Development of Belgrade 
(Agency). Additionally, the City Assembly has a Council for city planning, and the 
Executive Board has a Commission for Architecture and City Planning and a 
commission for property right issues and building land (Table 14). Due to the 
inherited complex bureaucratic organisation of the accounted institutions and laws, 
followed by the changes of political parties ruling the city, and the automatic changes 
of personnel running those institutions, those institutions lost their continuity and 
stability. The laws were very often misinterpreted, and those institutions became 
corrupt (Begovic and Mijatovic, 2001). The change in the ‘definition’ of public 
interest and planning also created a favourable environment for the elite rather than 
for the individual interests of the people.
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Table 14: Institutions of the City Government of Belgrade related to planning and building
City Assembly Executive board City Administration Local Public enterprises
Municipalities (Founded by City
(16) Assembly)
Council for city Commission for Secretariat for Urban Secretariat for city Town Planning
planning architecture and planning planning Institute
city planning
Commission for Secretariat for Property Building Agency for City
property right rights and Construction Inspections Building Land and
issues and building Affairs Development of
land Belgrade
Secretariat for
Inspection
The whole process of getting a building permit became less transparent and more 
complex than it was during the communist period (explained in section 4.6.3). 
Building permits for individual building were issued by local municipalities and the 
city government issued building permits for objects built by companies (commercial 
properties) and for infrastructure systems. However, if the object were very big and 
placed on a site of more than one council, then the Ministry would be in charge of 
issuing a permit. As urbanism was not under local governments’ authority since the 
imposition of the law on planning in 1995 and its centralisation, this resulted in an 
unclear distinction between the competencies of local, city and republic inspections, 
which made the legal context even more complex.
However, at the beginning of the transition it was realised by the city and local 
authorities in the 1990s that urban land was the most valuable and profitable resource 
of the city that was not deployed enough during the communism period. The same 
authorities had realised that complex and bureaucratic city governance with various 
institutions and organisations provided enough legal loopholes for corrupt behaviour. 
Obtaining building permits in a regular way became even more difficult than it used 
to be (a full explanation of this process is in Appendix 4). However, the elite and 
subelites did not show any intention of changing the legal requirements and making 
the process easier.
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In addition to the previously mentioned factors analysed in the previous chapter, the 
length and complexity of obtaining a permit had also led to an increase in illegal 
construction. Since the process could last up to 3 years (Figure 4), many developers 
skipped the permit obtaining and started to build either holding only urban consent or 
in most cases without any document or permit. The lengthy process for acquiring a 
building permit prompted developers and builders to start thinking how to avoid the 
institutions and the whole process. If the legal path was less time consuming and less 
complicated it can be assumed that many builders would follow the procedures but 
would still perhaps opt for bribery and disrespect of law.
Moreover, since the process was so multifaceted and bureaucratic, and all levels of 
power (Republic, City and Local) were included within it, there were many ways in 
which institutions could be involved in illegality and corruption. Beyond the local 
municipalities, which are the focus of the case studies, institutions that were covered 
by the empirical research with regard to illegal building are the Agency for Building 
Land and Construction of Belgrade, the Town Planning Institute and the Secretariat 
for Property Rights and Construction Affairs. The choice of these institutions was 
based on the several criteria. First, their legal competences with regard to illegal 
building. The second criterion was the intense competition among the parties who 
would run them. Finally, these institutions were often mentioned in the media with 
relation to illegal building.
6.4.1 Agency for Building Land and Construction of Belgrade
During the early 1990s, it was recognised that changes to the obsolete and inherited 
urban land management system were necessary. Previously, land was allocated in an 
administrative way, without recognising its location value. Investors were obliged to 
pay only the costs of preparing and servicing land (Babacic, 2005). In order to 
improve the land management system in Belgrade, the City Council founded the 
Agency for Building Land and Construction of Belgrade (Agency) in 1994. The 
Agency became active in the property development process in Belgrade in three
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different roles: as an agent of the City Government, as a developer and as an investor 
of all major public developments in the City of Belgrade.
Even though, according to the new Act on Building Land (1995) all urban building 
land stayed within the ownership of the state, changes in the concept of urban land 
management increased private investors’ interest for building land. The Agency was 
responsible for publishing a catalogue of available sites for development, and for 
organising the city’s supply of urban building land (Babacic, 2005). When there was 
any interest for a specific site, the Agency announced a public auction, in which all 
interested parties could participate. Details of the public auction and conditions for 
participation were published two weeks in advance in the local press.42
The land that could be offered at the auction could only be land owned by the state. It 
was not sold but only “given to use” (leased) to an investor or developer. As an agent, 
the Agency also determined the starting price of urban building land. Although there 
is a standard procedure for calculation, there are assumptions that the elite and 
people close to regime were getting building land for non-market prices (Interview 
16; Interview 20, 2001).
However, although founded in 1994, the Agency inherited the legal base for the 
making of the Program from the communist period - the Rules for Making the 
Annual Program of Arrangement of Urban Building Land, adopted in 1986. The 
main objective of producing the Program was to coordinate the development of 
urban areas, according to estimated needs (Babacic, 2005). In the transitional period, 
the Program was not only based on social estimations but was supposed to include 
market analysis and existing demand. However, in spite of the increase in population 
and the demand for individual housing and residential space, priority was given to 
investors and private enterprises, which due to the lack of the financial means to 
produce large quantities of residential space, invested in smaller properties, possibly
42 Details include: place, date and time of the auction, starting price, size of the property and the type 
of use, investors’ obligations considering the site preparation and servicing.
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for business use, for which there is market demand (Babacic, 2005). This further 
increased the shortage in the housing market.
In the late 1990s the Agency was gaining income from many sources such as 
building land arrangement costs compensated by investors and developers, from 
transactions on residential or business properties, constmcted by the Agency, and 
also from profits from selling building materials when the site was cleared. 
Additionally, the financial means were given to the Agency as part of the city’s 
budget.
Analysis of the competencies shows that the Agency had a monopoly on building 
land in Belgrade in the late 1990s. With the political changes in 1997, when the SPO 
took power in the city, they appointed its members to run the agency. In that period, 
the Agency became the most powerful financial institution in the city, which can be 
associated with its political links to the city government and by its monopolistic 
position in the market. It became so powerful that at one moment it was owed money 
by the city of Belgrade (Interview 20, 2001). That power was associated with money 
received from auctions of building land that many characterised as being set up and 
based on informal political connections (Interview 20, 2001).
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Figure 4: Institutions and docum entation related to building permit
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6.4.2 Town Planning Institute
The Town Planning Institute is another city institution, established in 1948. By a 
decision of the City Assembly of Belgrade in October 1999 it became a public 
enterprise. Contrary to the Agency, the Institute does not have such array of 
responsibilities. The main activity of the Institute is making urban development plans 
at different levels and it includes: general plans for the territory of Belgrade, plans 
for regulation of particular parts of the city's territory - regulation plans and urban 
development projects (mostly reconstruction of already built areas, restoration and 
legalisation, specific-purpose plans, development plans for traffic and public utility 
infrastructure).
A large part of the activity of the Institute is defining urban-planning and technical 
conditions for the construction of individual buildings, as well as expert studies and 
research, urban development analyses, location analyses and opinions on individual 
requests. The latter activity, in addition to defining the urban-planning and technical 
conditions for individual building, used informal links in some cases. But the slowly 
passed plans and their rigidity actually became one of the pillars of illegal building.
6.4.3 Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs
The Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs consists of five main 
offices. The Property Rights Office is in charge of management, arrangement and use 
of building land and other rights on that land as well as determining legal and 
urbanistic elements for land allotment for the construction of buildings for which the 
city issues building permits. Additionally, it is obligatory to prepare a proposal for 
the Executive Board of the City Assembly of Belgrade on city building land 
allotment, the termination of the right to use city building land, and the change of 
previously made decisions on land allotment. The Property Rights Office is also in 
charge of record keeping of the city's real estate and settling property rights relations
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regarding utilisation of the city's real estate and real estate registration in favour of 
the City of Belgrade. The Construction Affairs Office is responsible for issuing 
Building and Utilisation Permits for Infrastructural Facilities and for issuing Building 
and Utilisation Permits for Residential and Business Facilities.
Additionally, the Secretariat also has a Building Inspection Sector and an Illegal 
Building Prevention Office. Their responsibility is to find illegal buildings and to 
keep records of illegal buildings for all 16 municipalities in cooperation with 
competent municipal bodies. Additionally they are also involved in checking 
legalisation requests for built structures and for submitting filed charges for illegally 
finished or started buildings to the Building Inspection Sector or the competent 
municipal body, depending on the territorial or real competence of that body. 
Moreover, they are accountable for the evaluation and determination as to whether 
legalisation conditions are met. Finally, the office for Administrative Law Affairs 
undertakes activities of the second-instance administrative body on the city's territory 
in proceedings against decisions and resolutions on permission of execution made by 
municipal administrative bodies competent for building affairs, building inspection 
affairs, and prevention of illegal building (www.beograd.org.vu).
Following the description of the responsibilities of the major city institutions, 
empirical material collected during the research is analysed in order to find the rules 
and practices that were functioning in those institutions with regard to illegal 
building. The following sections deal with the examination of the responsibilities and 
involvement of the accounted institutions in illegal building, and try to establish the 
relevance of the elite, subelites, informal networks and corruption in the whole 
process.
6.5 Central, City or Local Government?
Following the elitist approach developed by Hunter (1953) that assumes power 
concentrated in the hands of groups of politically and economically powerful people
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as well as the existence of several pyramids of power, the empirical research 
attempted to identify those pyramids in Belgrade. Semi structured, open-ended 
interviews with local authority officials from different political parties, city level 
officials, representatives of various local level and city level institutions, key 
planning actors and academics were conducted in order to draw together a range of 
perspectives on power, institutions and illegal building. Validity in this research was 
achieved by asking multiple interviewees to consider the same issues which enabled 
problems to be explored from different perspectives.
The first question was related to the assessment of the responsibility of various levels 
of government for illegal building. The answers varied, depending mostly on the 
political or institutional membership of the informant. A significant number of the 
informants denied the involvement of the organisations they belonged to but accused 
all others. Some of the respondents argued that the local level governments and the 
parties that ran them were the most responsible for the development of illegal 
building. In contrast, some blamed higher instances of government.
Slobodanka Prekajski, who works in the Agency, stated that many citizens who were
coming to the Agency to legalise objects in the early 1990s claimed that all ‘business
can be finished’ in local municipalities. According to Prekajski, citizens argued that
they made an ‘agreement’ with local municipalities not to send inspectors and not to
demolish their objects.
“Many witnesses confirmed to me that it has been told to them in local 
municipalities to ‘go and finish building, anyway everyone does it’” 
(Interview 9, 2001).
Zoran Zegarac, Vice Director of the Town Planning Institute, also suggested that the
responsibility is on inspections of local municipalities but explained their failure by
the political war context and the eruption of the black economy.
“In the environment o f the bordello, you cannot establish individual 
responsibility...it is easiest to attack local inspections when the higher 
levels o f power created overall corrupt environment... Politicians did not 
allow the demolition o f those objects. We had had very frequent elections 
and no party wanted to lose an electoral body o f around 100,000 illegal 
builders in Belgrade alone” (Interview 6, 2001).
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The mechanism on the ground was as follows. When a building inspection caught 
investors or developers building illegally, they first had to issue them a warning and 
demand that they provide the necessary documentation and permits in a month’s time. 
However, everyone was aware that it would not be possible to provide this in such a 
short period due to the complexity of the procedure. In the meantime, the investors 
kept building and finished the object. The finished objects were usually not 
demolished. As a result, finished illegal objects went on the market and people were 
buying them, relying on the lack of the state intervention with a strong belief that the 
objects would be legalised one day (Interview 11, 2001).
Saveski, the vice president of the Savski Venae council and member of the DS also 
agreed that it is the responsibility of local inspections but added that inspectors were 
working as they were told to work either by the president of the local council or by 
the executive board.
“There was a directive from the authorities to leave illegal builders to
build apart from those who had not ‘paid’ corruption fees” (Interview 15,
2001).
Zoran Nikezic, (ex Director of the City Secretariat for Urban Planning, 1996-2000, 
and member of the SPO) explained the involvement of local municipalities and 
inspectors in illegal building by several factors. The first reason was the rooted 
corruption, due to the lack of financial incentive to employees in the local 
municipalities. The second reason was the pressure on local governments not to 
intervene since there was big money involved (Interview 11, 2001). Additionally, 
Saveski argued that illegal building in local municipalities occurred due to the 
informal coalitions among parties. Saveski argued that he personally witnessed, as a 
councillor, an informal coalition between the SPO and the SPS in the Savski Venae 
council regarding its elite area Dedinje, with the aim of gaining enormous profits 
(Interview 15, 2001).
Even though the SPO was considered the party which profited most from illegal 
building, the informants from this party reject any responsibility by the SPO, arguing 
that all levels of power are equally responsible due to the lack of general consensus
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on illegal building. Furthermore, Nikezic (2001) argued that when the SPO was in 
the power in Belgrade and tried to demolish some of the illegal building, they did not 
have the necessary support from the Republic level ruled by the SPS. All the SPO’s 
attempts to stop illegal building were useless. The same view was represented by 
Sasa Cotric from the SPO and also a member of Belgrade’s government from 1996 
to 2000. Cotric defended the SPO arguing that when it took power in 1997 the 
problem of illegal building already existed. In spite of their attempts to demolish 
existing developments and stop further illegal ones, the SPO did not have any 
assistance from the police, which was controlled by the SPS who deliberately 
obstructed them by not providing them with needed support.
“Some o f our communal inspectors tried to do something but some o f 
those objects were built by criminals, who were threatening them... we 
were confronting people who were organised, close to the regime and we 
could not do anything to them ” (2001).
In addition, Nikezic admitted the lack of consensus also on local and city levels:
“There was also a silent agreement on not intervening between local 
municipalities and the city, although the city had the right to intervene. I f  
a local council was not asking for help, the city was not reacting...the 
level o f corruption was extremely high. From one side corruption and 
from the other indifference o f politicians towards illegality... ” (Interview 
11, 2001).
Furthemore, both informants argued that it was not only the SPO who was running 
the local council. The DS and the GSS were in coalition with them, and thus as 
responsible for illegality as the SPO was (Interviews 11 and 15, 2001).
Ljubisav Djuricic, a Director of the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction 
Affairs in Belgrade 2000-2002 and a DSS member, blamed the SPS for illegal 
developments. When the SPS lost power over local municipalities, it passed their 
competencies to the city level, and when it lost power in the city, it passed 
competencies to the Republic. The result was legal chaos in which it was difficult to 
know what is whose competency -  legal, economic or political. Additionally, 
Republic authorities passed the Law on Assets in the Republic’s ownership in 1997 
and changed the mles in accordance with the regime’s own interests. Republic
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authorities took the whole city’s property and legal documentation out from the
Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs.
“As soon as that documentation was taken, the space for  ‘combinations' 
with properties and assets was open... ” (Interview 1, 2001).
What’s more, Ljubicic argues that city and republic powers had some kind of
compromise at the same time. According to him the city was obliged to ask the
Republic for agreement on every legal issue, which the city was not doing when it
knew that the request would be rejected, intentionally breaking the law. The
Republic again reacted only if it had a direct interest. If not, it turned a blind eye to
the city’s illegal decisions (Interview 1, 2001).
“...It is all connected with the centres o f power that established this 
voluntaristic approach to everything. And when you have situation that 
there is something you can or you don't have to do, the result is perfect 
fertile ground for corruption” (Interview 1, 2001).
Tanja Jaksic, architect and member of the Secretariat for Urban Planning of
Belgrade, also agreed that the trade was taking place at all levels of government:
“...We cannot say that illegal builders were entrepreneurial and brave, 
but that they had ‘the deal’ with everyone: inspection, administration on 
different levels, communal public enterprises, and Secretariats on the city 
level... ” (Interview 2, 2001).
Responsibility for illegal building cannot be ascribed to only one level of 
government, either at the top or bottom of the hierarchy. On the contrary, all parties 
took part in a different ways but tried to shift the responsibility either to other parties 
or to different levels of government. There was a lack of consensus over illegal 
building among all levels of power as well as among all political parties. It is implied 
that this was the result of the big capital involved in illegal building as well as 
frequent elections, and neither of the parties was willing to tackle the problem of 
illegal building in order to keep its electoral body.
“Political parties on all levels did not want to oppose the electoral body, 
and illegal builders were representing a significant electoral body” 
(Interview 9, 2001).
Although the parties had a right to block the illegality on their level of governance, 
they did not use it. There was informal political bargaining between them based on
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keeping illegal building out of decision-making, and parties were focused only on 
safe issues by manipulating the dominant community values and political institutions 
and procedures. As a result, political exclusion was occurring not only through 
individuals’ decisions, but also through the operation of social forces and 
institutional practices. Although the central level of government had the most power 
to stop illegal building, it never used it. However, other levels of government - city 
and local - expressed the same ignorance and kept problem covert, while at the same 
time made informal coalitions and traded around the issue. However, although there 
was a lack of consensus over illegal building by all levels of government and city 
institutions, new rules and regulations were passed. There are different views on the 
intentions and impacts of the laws passed.
The Law on Special Conditions for Building which was passed in 1997 was marked 
by being more of an initiator of illegal building than prevention of it. Aleksandra 
Tilinger, a planner in the Town Planning Institute, described its effect in the 
following way:
“That Law had effect like that somebody blew into a whistle for illegal 
building ” (Interview 4, 2001).
Slobodanka Prekajski, from the Agency, described the effects in a similar way to 
Tilinger:
“That law was a green light for illegal building” (Interview 9, 2001).
The reason this Law created a worse situation was that it made people expect that
one day they would be allowed to legalise illegal buildings, as was the case with the
object that got the right to legalise with this law. It influenced people
psychologically. As Zoran Nikezic, described, the law did not only initiate new
illegal building but
“...many people built houses after this law was passed and then fraud 
papers that they had objects before the law was passed gaining the right 
to legalise objects ” (Interview 11, 2001)
This law was made by politicians to allow all illegal builders who did not have any 
permits, to be legally and geodetically registered, to pay necessary location fees and 
get either a status of temporary objects or a building permit if they fit into existing
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planning documentation. Every illegal builder was supposed to pay fees, but most of 
them were avoiding them. The law was misinterpreted as being a legalisation law 
and actually boosted illegal building even more. Plans were created additionally to 
cover illegal building. People were aware that they had the opportunity to pay less or 
to get loan to pay legalisation, contrary to those who were building legally and who 
had not had any alleviation.
However, Djuricic (Secreteriat) argued that the law was just the official recognition 
of the state that they could not do anything against illegal building and that they just 
decided to let it take place. The state thought that it would be able to control and put 
illegal building into a legal framework, and earn money from legalisation, but they 
failed to regulate mechanisms and financial means that would enforce the law 
(Interview 1, 2001). Additionally the biggest problem that was related to the Law on 
legalisation was:
“ a lack o f mechanism that would resolve practically which objects could 
be legalised, which could get a temporary status” (Interview 1, 2001)
that resulted in the opening of even more space in city institutions for corruptive 
behaviour.
Another law that was considered as an enhancer of illegal building was a Law on the 
Maintenance of Buildings, especially Articles 26 and 27 .43 The law gave an 
opportunity for maintenance works to be done, provided 51% of residents in the 
building agreed, which left 49% of residents without any rights. These maintenance 
works very often included building extensions and construction of new lofts that 
were illegal. According to Tanja Jaksic, the Law was passed by the then Minister for 
Building and Urbanism, Branislav Ivkovic, from the ruling SPS, in order to legalise 
his own illegal works and those of his party members. However, it was later misused 
by every illegal builder in Belgrade. Tanja described the effects of the law:
“You only needed to know somebody either in local council or in the 
Secretariat fo r Urban Planning, and you could build...” (Interview 2, 
2001).
43 Published in Official Bulletin of Republic of Serbia 44/1995.
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Cotric, who at the time was a member of the city government and an SPO member, 
welcomed this Law and had a different view on it:
“We just wanted to help people to legalise their objects and to prevent 
further illegal building ” (Interview 12, 2001)
He rejected any possibility that his party just wanted to earn some profits for itself 
and the city. However, by looking at the statistics, it is noticeable that after this law 
the intensity of illegal building increased rapidly. Regarding its effects, all 
informants agreed that they enhanced illegal buildings. Regarding the motivations for 
passing the laws, there was a consensus among the majority of the informants that 
these motivations were financial rather than as a solution of illegal building. In spite 
of the motivation for passing those laws, the outcome was new rules under which 
people started building illegally even more.
6.6 City Institutions and Illegal Building
In addition to central, city and local governments that have all been perceived as 
advancers of illegal building, the institutions that were highlighted the most in 
interviews as well as in the press were local municipalities, the Agency, the 
Secretariat and the Town Planning Institute. However, most of those interviewed 
expressed a reluctance to talk about those institutions in detail and only a few 
expressed their view.
The Agency was mentioned in the interviews most frequently with regard to public
auctions for locations. It was argued that
"...maybe 10% o f locations are publicly announced fo r  auction, the rest 
is not... ” (Interview 20, 2001)
According to the same informant, this was not the result of the left or right coalition, 
but of an informal coalition that was based on money. The Agency became an 
institution that had more money than any other in the city since it was the only one 
that collected money as compensation for the use of urban building land, and
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everyone who wanted to build had to go to the Agency. The allocation of the
locations for building was based purely on money rather than the interest of the city
(Interview 20, 2001). Djuricic agreed that the Agency became the most powerful
financial centre in Belgrade thanks to the resources they were getting from investors
for locations and due to that power it become a very influential factor in the city
structures, adding that
“...then they started allocating locations using a method which I  would 
not be able to characterise as legally correct” (Interview 1, 2001).
However, the Director of the Department for Building Land in the Agency, Ljubica 
Zivotic, and the Chief of the Department for Marketing, Slobodanka Prekajski, 
argued that everything done in the Agency was in accordance with the law. However, 
although Prekajski denied the Agency’s responsibility as a whole institution, she 
stated that there might have been some individuals who were using ‘different paths 
from the legal one’ declaring that she had heard about it from the daily press writing:
“...everything that was assigned to Agency should be maybe assigned to 
some individuals and their deals with the city government because things 
were going on that level, starting from the 700 flats Agency had to give 
up on and give them to the City. That happened due to the orders from  
politicians ...People employed in Agency were finding out about these 
affairs from the newspapers” (Interview 9, 2001)
Prekajski fully rejected comments that auctions of building land were usually ‘set up’ 
arguing that everything was done in accordance with the law. However, she implied 
that, due to the country being poor, there were not many investors. Consequently, 
when there was an interested investor asking for a location, the Agency found 
appropriate locations and organised auctions (Interview 9, 2001) which might lead to 
a conclusion that the Agency was doing what was requested by the investors, and 
auctions were not held at the competitive environment, but were a pure deal between 
the Agency and certain investors.
With regards to the work of the Secretariat, an interview was conducted with the then 
Director Ljubisav Djuricic. Djuricic argued that coalitions based on illegal building 
existed on all levels. The mechanism that was used in the Secretariat was the
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following. The administration clogged the process first, creating delays. Some 
applications were intentionally considered more slowly compared to others, which 
opened the space for corruption:
“...to speed up or slow down the process was the main instrument o f 
bureaucratic administration. Putting the documents on the bottom o f the 
pile creates a perfect opportunity for corruption... and in this Secretariat 
administration was influenced by political pressure” (Interview 1, 2001).
The investors and developers were forced to use bribes in order to get their
applications approved. The bribery payment for the service became a non-official
rule when applied to building documents and approvals. Regarding the informal 
prices for getting permits, Djuricic suggested that it depended on the object size and 
it was not the same price for houses and for gas stations. Additionally he described 
his personal experience regarding the bribery and building permits:
“ When I  got this position o f director here in the Secretariat, I  found a 
pile o f dossiers in my office. I  looked at them and asked my deputies and
assistants why they are there when they fulfil all conditions and
procedures. It was said to me that those dossiers had been waiting fo r  the 
last six months to be approved by my predecessor who did not want to 
sign them until she was ‘paid’... certain investors had to bribe to get 
permits which they would otherwise not get” (Interview 1, 2001).
When an informant from SPO, Sasa Cotric, was asked his opinion on the Secretariat, 
he accused it directly of boosting illegal building. On the suggestion that a member 
of his party was running that institution, he said that she was assigned to that position 
by the city government and not the SPO, and that the party did not have anything 
with it (Cotric, 2001). Ironically, the SPO was running the city government at the 
time which meant that her party colleagues appointed her to the position. Moreover, 
they had the authority to call her off from the position, but never used it, which 
meant that her work was approved.
Concerning the Town Planning Institute, Zoran Zegarac, vice director, argued that 
due to the massive scale of illegal building, the Institute was forced to make plans for 
legalisation of illegal building instead of plans for the future development of the city. 
However, some informants such as Prekajski blamed the planning system:
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“Plans have not reacted quickly enough according to needs that were 
changing from second to second due to all the things that have happened 
here in last decade and the massive number o f refugees that came...I 
think that, in order to buy a social peace everyone was keeping their eyes 
shut...” (Interview 9, 2001)
However, regarding the suggestions that rigid planning and informal networks 
boosted illegal construction, Zegarac responded by blaming the legal context, the 
Law on Expropriation, and the general political and economic situation. Contrary to 
Zegarac, Alexandra Tilinger, a planner from the same Town Planning Institute 
agreed with the suggestions and noted that:
“...there were pressures through directors from higher instances how to 
do some things in plans that should not have been done in such a way” 
(2001).
Similarly to the politicians who were mostly passing the buck to the other levels of 
the government they in which they were not involved, the informants from the city 
institutions showed the same tendency regarding the institutions they worked for. 
Most of the informants rejected the existence of illegal operations in their institutions 
on a broad scale, although did not reject the existence of individual cases. However, 
reluctance to speak about the organisations they worked for is understandable due to 
the fear of losing jobs as expressed by the informant in Interview 20.
Nevertheless, all informants suggested that informal networks and rules were a 
general characteristic of all institutions apart the ones in which they worked. 
Furthermore, there was not an organised attempt made in the fight against the illegal 
building from these institutions. Additionally, neither the Republic nor the City 
government had reacted or tried to block the work of these city institutions. Political 
parties were competing to run them, and each of them was embodying its values with 
respect to different individuals and groups. City institutions were a reflection of the 
overall political and economic system, non-transparent and inefficient and with high 
levels of corruption.
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6.7 ‘Urbanistic Mafia’
The aim of this section is to incorporate all previously analysed views on illegal 
building together and to try to narrow down even more the responsibility for illegal 
building through the examination of the meaning of the term ‘urbanistic mafia’. 
Major Nebojsa Covic who ran Belgrade in the period 1994 to 1997 first introduced 
that term. However, although very frequently used in the media later on, there was 
not a clear definition of the term and the views and perceptions of the ‘urbanistic 
mafia’ differed among different parties and different professions. The views of 
informants were also diverse. Some of them agreed that is related to urbanists, 
architects and planners, and some related it to local government administration, 
politicians and investors.
One of the informants who was involved in the work of the city government during 
the Mayor’s Covic mandate argued that Covic meant by the term urbanistic mafia 
bureaucratic planning institutions with poor trained stuff.
“Unfortunately planning has not been a profession above the institutions 
o f administration but the institution o f administration. Due to the weak 
state organisation, planners were able to misuse information they had 
access to and to help in some quasi-legal operations and get involved in 
corruption ” (Interview 20, 2001).
Ljubica Zivkovic, Director in the Agency, pointed to planners as being the mafia 
since they were doing their jobs unethically in an arrogant way (Interview 8, 2001). 
Djuricic also suggests that planners were responsible for the chaos. According to him, 
the plan-making process was slow and by the time the planners passed a plan, the 
building on the ground was already finished. However, he suggested that some 
builders knew what would be in the plan and they built before it was passed which 
implied some teamwork between some planners and illegal builders. He used the 
case of Mirijevo for example, where the plan had not yet passed but everything had 
already been built as set out by the plan. Moreover, those builders pushed those 
objects that were not planned to be incorporated and planners accepted this. Djuricic
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also suggested that attention should be paid on the secret manner of passing plans 
and on certain zones. As an example, he stated it had taken five years for the 
regulatory Plan for Dedinje to be passed because it waited for everyone who built 
illegally to fit somehow (Interview 1, 2001).
Tanja Jaksic, an architect by profession, added that architects should be treated as a 
part of the ‘urbanistic mafia’ arguing that all those illegal projects were signed off by 
some architect or another. In addition, she stated that there were actually many such 
architects who were proposing to developers methods for illegal building and 
everyone was hiding behind the overall social and political situation, even the highly 
recognised architects. Additionally, she found the silence of architects unacceptable 
because it implied approval for illegal building.
“However, there are many politicians who were asking for some 
irregular things. Some o f them were more perfidious and they were 
sending representatives who would discreetly warn you to do what is 
asked for you., fo r  example one lawyer who came with his bodyguard, to 
ask something that was against the law, visited me once. When I refused 
to break the law the bodyguard warned me to do what I  was said, and I 
made a big scene, called the police and they left. But I  was really scared” 
(Interview 2, 2001).
Contrary to these views, some informants were arguing that urbanists were unfairly 
marked as ‘mafia’. For example, Predrag Zdravkovic, leader of the local community 
association for protection against illegal building, argued that the regulatory plan for 
Dedinje was a well created plan until it had to be changed because higher political 
positions required it from planners (Interview 16, 2001). Similarly to Zdravkovic, 
Tilinger, a planner, argued that the term was related not to people in urbanism but to 
politicians (Interview 4, 2001). Furthermore, Jelena Stojanovic, a chief planner from 
the Town Planning Institute, said that the urbanistic mafia constitute a powerful 
business and political elite:
“Investors and builders who illegally build huge objects do so because 
they had an approval from somebody and because they paid a lot for  
that...there are rumours that there were information desks on which you 
can pay to forego the whole procedure and to get building permits 
immediately... ” (2001).
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However, when Sasa Cotric and Miodrag Jaksic, both from the SPO, were asked to 
explain why so many people related the ‘urbanistic mafia’ to their party they replied 
that those are lies spread by their ex-coalition partners, the DS and the GSS. 
However, when asked to explain how his party was not involved in the illegal 
building when they were controlling the city and there was a boom in illegal objects, 
Cotric blamed local municipalities and the DS and the GSS who were sharing power 
within those municipalities - for example Savski Venae, Vracar, Stari grad (Interview 
12, 2001). Another SPO member in Interview 21 also rejected any responsibility by 
his party arguing that:
“None o f the permits could not have been issued in the local councils 
without agreement from all ruling parties in the coalition. The city did 
not have anything with local municipalities” (Interview 21).
However, an attempt to define clearly who exactly the urbanistic mafia were had 
failed. Many of informants refused to talk about it arguing that they did not know. 
Those who did talk about it were very general. Some of them like Zoran Zegarac, 
vice director of the Town Planning Institute, and Slobodanka Prekajski, from the 
Agency, suggested that the term is too strong since the illegal builders were not 
mutually organised. It cannot be clearly defined nor individually specified who were 
the actual urbanistic mafia, and the concept sounds more like a conspiracy theory.
Nonetheless, it is evident that there were people behind the scenes who were 
involved in illegal building. Most of the statements led to the ruling elite and 
subelites who were running the city and local municipalities. However, it is also 
evident that informal networks existed, including planners, architects, politicians and 
illegal builders.
6.8 Conclusion
In this chapter it was established, through an analysis of changes in the definition of 
the public interest, planning and empirical research, that all levels of government had 
their share of responsibility for illegal building, both the ruling SPS that initially set
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up such an institutional context, and opposition parties which accepted and followed 
the same rules. Additionally the same pattern and rules were found in city institutions. 
Furthermore, if the hidden face of power is revealed when actors create or reinforce 
social and political values and institutional practices which limit the scope of the 
political process to issues innocuous to themselves, then the institutional response to 
illegal building implies that the elite and subelites, and the rules they created, were 
its principle drivers.
At the beginning of the 1990s in Serbia, the rising numbers of newly created 
individual interests were not channelled through the legal and institutional 
framework. The one party system was replaced by a multiparty system of 
cohabitation and cooperation in which the interests and goals of the new hierarchy 
were quickly reconciled, especially in jobs related to sale of the city’s resources and 
spaces (pavements, parks, public spaces, recreational areas etc). It brought new 
practices and arrangements into cities that had different names such as ‘urbanistic 
chaos’, ‘work of the urbanistic mafia’, ‘illegal building’. The actors of that 
destruction were members of the corrupt government at all levels, which was 
mercilessly selling all public goods and issuing illegal and quasi legal permits for 
reconstructions and extensions and usurpers, that used the greed of the ruling elite to 
grab properties which they would not be able to if there were a rule of law and urban 
regulations. “Flirting with democracy and opening to a private ownership that was 
treated more like para-state than free market category resulted in ‘programmed 
chaotic situation’ created for the purpose of legitimating many newly created illegal 
interests” (Petovar, 2003:28-29).44
Urban Planning, which came into transition as an obsolete and inefficient institution, 
was blocked and centralised in such a way that it started producing inflexible, rigid 
and very slow plans and rules that did not have enough power and capability to keep 
rising problems under control. Additionally, planning was under constant pressure 
from the ruling elite and subelites, who tried to legalise its activities through this 
institution.
44“ Big business empires were made only by those who were behind the regime’s skirt” (Petovar, 2003: 29)
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According to most of the informants, the elite and subelites, although in political 
opposition to each other, had some kind of compromise over illegal building at the 
same time. Therefore, responsibility for illegal building cannot be ascribed to only 
one level of government, either at the top or the bottom of the hierarchy. All parties 
took part in different ways but tried to shift the responsibility either to other parties 
or to different levels of government. There was a lack of consensus over illegal 
building among all levels of power as well as among all political parties and housing 
problems were kept covert. There are many underlying reasons for this, such as the 
lack of political will among all parties to tackle the problem of illegal building in 
order to keep the electoral body and maintain social peace. Additionally, it was 
argued that big capital was involved in illegal building.
As a result, structures like legislature, administration and rules and values were 
reshaped by the elite and subelites and started working more on an informal rather 
than a formal basis. Informal pressures shaped decision-making, rather than formal 
structures, and the elite and subelites had a leading role in defining that environment. 
Even the laws passed that were supposed to prevent the further rise of illegal 
building were the exercise of power of the elites with the prime aim of protecting 
their interests.
The resulting logic of appropriateness, which was strongly manifested through 
various activities in institutions, was engaging in corruption on the job. Most of the 
informants confirmed that corruption existed at all levels of government and all 
institutions, apart from the one to which the interviewed belonged. Additionally, the 
same ‘passing the buck’ occurred when informants were asked about the ‘urbanistic 
mafia’. All those interviewed blamed all the other professions apart from their own 
and they generally rejected involvement of the institutions for which they worked. 
Although the term ‘urbanistic mafia’ is too strong to describe illegality in Serbia, the 
informants’ claims revealed the existence of informal networks that involved all 
professions and institutions boosting illegal building as a result of both the pressure 
from the top and of a general acceptance of the new institution -  corruption. 
Therefore, in the continuation of the work, the term ‘urbanistic mafia’ relates to
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informal networks that were involved in gaining profits from either allowing illegal 
building or by actually building illegally.
The next two chapters document the empirical case studies. In these case studies the 
political elite, subelites and their exercise of power through their breaking the formal 
rules is addressed. Furthermore, these case studies analyse the way the new rules and 
informal institutions were created by the political elite and subelites, and how they 
helped them fulfil their interests, both financial and political. In addition, the 
following two chapters address the way the elite and subelites further encouraged 
illegal building for the rest of society.
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7 Chapter : Illegality for the Elite: the Dedinje case study
7.1 Introduction
After a careful consideration of the political, economic, housing and institutional 
context of Serbia, and Belgrade in particular, this chapter presents some empirical 
material on the impact the context had on illegal building on the ground. This chapter 
is also used for an analysis of the elite. The area chosen for analysis is Dedinje, the 
most elite residential area in Belgrade. The purpose of this case study is to analyse 
how the political elite exercised power and created a corrupt environment, changing 
rules and institutions and adapting them to suit their own interests. There are many 
examples of illegal building, but this chapter focuses on the cases of Slobodan 
Milosevic’s house, the Karic family houses and the PINK Television building, to 
analyse the patterns of illegal building among the elite. This chapter uses these 
examples to look at how changes were made to institutional frameworks (building 
rules and regulations) and decision-making systems to render them the most 
advantageous for the most powerful and the most disadvantageous for the least 
powerful in the Belgrade area of Dedinje run by the SPS in early 1990s, and by the 
SPO and the DS in the mid and late 1990s. The following chapter is a case study of a 
contrasting area and considers how illegal building spread to the rest of the city, 
particularly in Zemun, which was run by another political party -  the SRS.
The chapter uses data drawn from interviews with expert informants and witnesses, 
combined with an analysis of controversial decisions by local governments and of 
the Regulatory Plan and the way it was used by the City Government. Since 
corruption is very difficult to prove, the validity of the research is achieved through 
open-ended interviews that were carried out with various actors (local government 
representatives, plan-makers, inspectors, local activists and community 
representatives as well as with illegal builders themselves), so that different 
perspectives and views were obtained for analysis. Additionally, primary and 
secondary documentation is carefully considered, and used as support or refutation of
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certain arguments presented by some of the informants. Cross-examination of both 
case studies is carried out in the conclusions of the thesis.
7.2 Savski Venae -  Dedinje
The local council of Savski Venae45 is located on the southeast side of Belgrade and 
covers an area of 1,400 ha, with a population of 47,682 (Census 2002). In the post- 
World War II period this area belonged to the city areas HI and VII. In the period 
1952-1957 the territory of the local council consisted of three former municipalities: 
Topcidersko brdo, Savski Venae and Zapadni Vracar. The local municipality of 
Savski Venae was formed in 1957. Today it consists of four local communities: 
Dedinje, Topcidersko brdo, Senjak and Lisiciji Potok (www.beograd.org).
The municipality of Dedinje is historically the most prestigious and expensive 
residential area in Belgrade. Those of high social, economic or political status in 
Serbian society have traditionally tended to live in Dedinje. This development started 
at the end of the nineteenth century, when Dedinje was mostly a wooded area with 
only a few residences. A number of politicians, officials, industrialists, bankers, 
diplomats and others of high status built their summer houses in this area. The King 
of Serbia, Alexander Karadjordejvic, and Prince Pavle Karadjordjevic, built their 
residences there, acting as a further draw for the rest of the elite of Belgrade to start 
settling there.
After the Second World War, and with the imposition of communism, the owners of 
these villas were declared traitors and bourgeoisie and were removed. Following this 
the houses were nationalised and the Partisan winners of the war moved in. Under 
the slogan ‘In the name of the people’ Tito, the communist leader of Yugoslavia, and 
the politicians and officials from the Communist Party and the Army - who formed 
the new political class (Djilas, 1963) - moved into these nationalised villas. So during
45 The name of the Local Council symbolises a wreath, settled next to the riverbank of the Sava 
(Savski Venae = Sava Wreath) (www.beograd.org).
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the communist period, Dedinje remained the symbol of prestige and position from 
earlier times.
This trend continued with later regimes. When Milosevic came to power in 1989, he 
immediately moved into one of the most prestigious villas in Dedinje. Other high 
ranking officials from Milosevic’s and his wife’s party and people close to them 
followed their example and started moving to Dedinje. Besides the politicians, newly 
rich people, mostly entertainers but also many young entrepreneurs who gained 
enormous wealth through suspicious ways such as dealing oil and smuggling 
cigarettes, wanted to buy their way up the social ladder, so they also moved into the 
area.
Since Savski Venae, including Dedinje, was protected for years from individual 
building (Table 15) but also from any kind of intervention including the building of 
extensions and balconies, it was not very easy for interested parties to find available 
houses or flats and demand had exceeded supply. Despite these restrictions, certain 
developers realised that if they were to build new flats and houses in the area they 
could earn huge profits, and some of the most powerful people decided to build 
houses for themselves. Since, due to the rigid regulations and plans, this was 
impossible to do legally, most of them decided to take the illegal path.
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Table 15: Number of residential units (in flats) completed from 1974 to 2000 in Savski Venae
Number of residential units (in flats) completed during the 
year
1974
Individual sector 
0
Collective sector 
150
Total
150
1975 0 0 0
1976 0 53 53
1977 0 4 4
1978 0 0 0
1979 0 1 1
1980 0 0 0
1981 0 1 1
1982 0 12 12
1983 0 130 130
1984 0 3 3
1985 0 178 178
1986 47 73 120
1987 0 23 23
1988 20 54 74
1989 80 57 137
1990 66 214 280
1991 0 207 207
1992 0 199 199
1993 36 0 36
1994 0 365 365
1995 0 0 0
1996 0 47 47
1997 0 0 0
1998 15 41 56
1999 12 26 38
2000 2 52 54
Total 278 1890 2168
Source: The First Results o f2002 Census, Federal Statistics Office, 2001
If we consider the fact that collective housing actually consisted of flats built up in 
the mass housing blocks, there were only 278 legally built individual objects in the 
past twenty-seven years. Actually, individual objects were allowed to be built for 
only eight out of twenty-seven years. However, the table has limitations since it 
relates to the whole of Savski Venae, and there is no separate data on Dedinje. Still, 
the whole of the municipality is residential and has very similar housing, mostly with 
family houses and villas, with very few scattered collective buildings. The all- 
inclusive table gives the general picture for the pace of development of Dedinje.
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Table 16: Total number of illegally built objects
Up to 31.12.2000 01.01.2000-31.12.2001 Total up to 31.12.2001
Savski Venae 2091 171 2262
Source: Internal data of Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs (2001)
Due to a lack of statistics, illegal objects have not been properly categorised into 
residential units, extensions, auxiliary objects, garages and balconies. Furthermore, 
since the number of residential units is not comparable with the total number of 
objects, it is not possible to quantify illegal building, even though it is very visible on 
the ground. If we compare the 278 individually built houses (Table 15) with the 277 
individually built villas (Saveski, 2001), we can deduce that there was an equal 
number of illegal and legal individual objects built in the last 27 years in Savski 
Venae.
The main difference between the illegal building that flooded the whole of Belgrade, 
and the illegal building in Savski Venae and in Dedinje in particular, is the quality of 
building and the purpose of building. Considering that Dedinje has traditionally been 
a settlement for the very rich and powerful, new construction in the last decade 
reflected status rather than shelter requirements.46 According to Bransilav Belie, the 
president of the Savski Venae council in the period 2000 to 2004, the Dedinje area 
was kept for powerful politicians who built beautiful and grandiose villas (2001).
7.3 Mechanisms of corruption
This section examines the different informal mechanisms used by the elite for 
obtaining properties in Dedinje and the failure of institutions to prevent this. Analysis 
of mechanisms (such as annexation - often a precursor to illegal building) in Dedinje 
is is important since it also shows that only politicians and privileged business people
46 Due to the hyperinflation, the existing statistics are not reliable indicators of income structure across 
municipalities in Belgrade. Furthermore, there was a lack of transparent reporting of real income 
especially by politicians and rich businessman.
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close to them were able both to break the formal rules, to create new ones and to 
access the area. Reconstruction and invasion mechanisms confirmed this, and even 
the regular purchase of a house or flat which was the rare but only legal way of 
obtaining a property can be related to corruption and fraud in some cases. If the 
source and legality of the money used for buying properties could be analysed 
(considering that the wage levels during the communist period, and especially during 
the 1990s, were kept low by constant hyperinflation and a generally poor economic 
situation) then much evidence for corruption and fraud would be found (Zdravkovic, 
2001; Ilic, 2001).
7.3.1 ‘Invasion, of properties and land
Obtaining “the right to use” a property is a very common way that politicians and 
officials from the Republic and Federal establishments get access to state-owned 
properties. An investigation organised by the new government showed that many ex- 
officials misused their positions and used fraudulent actions in order to get properties 
and to make a profit by changing their ownership status and selling them. A number 
of them expanded or demolished houses and replaced them with new buildings. 
Since this occurred without a permit it could be categorised as illegal building as 
well. Some are in Dedinje and have been listed as extra profit tax payers; therefore 
they are of interest to this study.
The Federal Ministry for Justice, in coordination with building inspectors, launched 
an investigation into the missing properties and the work of the Federal Committee 
for Housing Issues. As a result of the investigation, a report47 showed that in the last 
ten years, since the disintegration of the SFRY to the present day, around 12,000 
properties ‘disappeared’ from the federal fund. The SFRY used to possess 12,500 
properties in Serbia in 1989. There were only 277 flats and houses left in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 2001. Officials from the former regime as well as some 
Montenegrin politicians and officials, who were in the coalition with the DOS after
47 Report no 030-01/2001 is signed by following inspectors: Miroslava Djurovic, Biserka Markovic, 
Dragana Radovanovic and Slobodan Macura (Jakovljevic, 2003);
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the removal of Milosevic, cost the state 1.5 billion euros (Danica Die, 2002) in lost 
properties.
Additionally, despite a regime change, the report was treated as top secret, with only 
a few copies in circulation and its authors avoided giving any statements. 
Nevertheless, fragments of the report were published in various newspapers, 
although the journalists who wrote about it faced pressure from those involved in the 
frauds. Charges were brought against a journalist from Glas Javnosti because of 
information he published (M.D., 2003). Two years after it was written (November
2000), the whole report was presented publicly in February 2003, by the television 
channel B92 which produced a documentary based on it.
According to this report, many flats and houses that used to be federally owned 
changed their status to family-owned properties and were used as gifts to ‘friends’, 
relatives, or party members. Some of these new owners sold their properties later at 
market value and earned huge profits. All profiteers whose names have been 
published so far are, or used to be, members of the SPS, the JUL, the SRS or their 
coalition party from Montenegro and were high officials of that time. For example, 
Borisa Vukovic (SPS member, ex Federal Minister for external trade and ex 
President of the Federal Commission for Housing that was responsible for the 
properties allocation and management), Goran Percevic (ex-SPS vice president and 
representative in Federal parliament) and Margit Savovic (JUL member and ex- 
Federal minister for sport) were involved in property annexation (Report no 030- 
01/2001).
Dragisa Pesic (Montenegrin official, who was Federal Prime Minister until March 
2003) and Jugoslav Kostic (SPS member at the time and ex-Federal Minister) 
purchased federal properties for very low, almost ridiculous, prices. Dojcilo 
Radojevic (JUL member and ex-Federal Minister for telecommunications) made a 
contract for the exchange of his flat for a state-owned one. One year later it was 
discovered that he could not fulfil contractual conditions since the flat he offered for 
exchange was not his own but his son’s. A similar example is of ex-Yugoslav
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President and SPS member Zoran Lilic who somehow “exchanged” two flats of 74 
sq m and 21 sq m for a house of 231 sq m in Dedinje, while managing to retain 
ownership of the state properties (Ilic, 2002). The accounted examples are only few. 
Nonetheless they show the involvement of the politicians, and in particular from the 
ruling parties in the corruption.
7.3.2 “DIPOS”
However, the biggest enigma about the ‘disappearance’ of properties is related to the 
Diplomatic Housing Enterprise, Dipos. Dipos dealt exclusively with the renting of 
real estate which was state property and had a licence from the Federal Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Belgrade. The fund of Dipos consisted of residences, villas, 
buildings, apartments and offices. These properties were used by diplomatic and 
council branch offices from all over the world, as well as European and international 
organisations such as the OSCE Mission, the United Nations office and the World 
Bank office in Belgrade. This section, as with the previous one, examines the 
methods used by the powerful to gain access to properties via breaking the existing 
formal rules.
According to the Report no 030-01/2001 mentioned before, 27 villas, 90 flats and 5 
garages that belonged to the Federal state, in addition to 25 villas, 106 flats and a few 
dozen garages that belonged to the Republic of Serbia, had vanished from state 
ownership between September 1996 until the end of 2000 (M.D., 2003) at a cost of 
32,000 sq m or 60 million euros (Zivkovic quoted in Vasic, 2003).
In 1996, Milena Arezina, the ex-president of the Court in charge of economic and 
corporate fraud, argued that the Court was under huge pressure from the ex-president 
of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, not to react when the diplomatic housing enterprise 
was transferred to the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and was soon liquidated
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ASdespite being very profitable. Zoran Loncar, President Milutinovic’s cousin, was 
nominated as a liquidation manager and later on as a director of Dipos. Arezina 
called this a typical ‘corruption happening’ in which fraud by individuals from the 
political world was rationalised in the Court (Ast, 2003). Arezina also stated that 
when she began dealing with the case, her office was burgled and all documentation 
was stolen (Arezina quoted in Ast, 2003: 26). According to her, the process involved 
many judges as well including ex-Minister for Justice Jankovic, a JUL member.
However, another reason for the liquidation of the enterprise was to avoid the 
claiming of properties by former Yugoslav countries. If any seceding country claims 
properties now, it is going to be very difficult to get them back due to the change in 
ownership status. Most of the properties are now privately owned and the process of 
restitution would not be easy. Dipos was created in order to avoid the perils of 
secession since it was not responsible for the obligations of the liquidated properties 
or the management of the remaining properties.
Although there are strictly defined rules and conditions under which properties 
managed by Dipos can be used and rented, members of the old regime found a way 
to skip those rules and procedures. By creating fake contracts in which properties 
were given to ‘unknown’ or ‘non-existing’ people who were ‘intermediates’ who 
would later sell those ones to the actual owners, they ensured that these names would 
never appear publicly (Ast, 2003). Government officials also used this method. A 
certain number of properties were set apart and transferred to Federal or Republic 
ownership in order to make annexing very easy. Milos Loncar, ex-director of Dipos, 
who was recently indicted for fraud, argued how he was pressurised to exempt some 
properties from Dipos and to allocate them to the Federal or Republic government. 
He directly accused ex-presidents of the Housing Committee of the Federal 
Government Vuk Ognjenovic, Jugoslav Kostic and Zoran Vujovic who forced him to 
do it (Loncar quoted in Vasic, 2003).
48 Although in this case she may have tried to improve the situation, one has to be sceptical about 
Arezina’s intentions and not take her statements at face value, since she was accused for of fraud and 
dismissed from office last year (Republika, 247,16-31.10.2000)
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Government officials furthemore exercised power over institutions and changed rules 
by renting those exempted villas as though they were ordinary flats. The underlying 
reason was the rule that tenants who rented the flats had a right to buy them, whereas 
this was not allowed in the case of villas. The easiest way to ignore that rule was 
through buying houses as flats. This practically meant that when the values of houses 
were calculated, basements, lofts and gardens were not taken into account, and 
officials were buying them for very low prices. Moreover, when they sold these 
houses later, they sold them at market prices and therefore made large profits.
Fraud with flats was even easier. They were simply transferred from state ownership 
to private ownership. The President of the Housing Committee of the Federal 
Government, ex-Federal Minister and a member of the executive board of the SPS at 
the time, Zoran Vujovic, annexed a five bedroom flat in this way and also allocated 
one flat for his driver in central Belgrade. This was against regulations as the driver 
already possessed a flat (Vasic, 2003). These politicians were so confident in their 
positions and the duration of their power that they ceased concealing their fraud from 
the public.
Those involved in house takeovers were members of the ruling political elite, mostly 
members of the SPS and JUL, including (Vasic, 2003):
■ Zlatan Perucic (SPS member and ex-Director of Beobanka, 400 sq m);
■ Zoran Lilic (SPS member, and ex-Federal President, 309 sq m);
■ Zoran Andjelkovic (SPS member, 232 sq m);
■ Borislav Milosevic (brother of Slobodan Milosevic, SPS member and ex­
ambassador in Russia, 299.5 sq m);
■ Zivadin Jovanovic (SPS member, ex-Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
374 sq m);
■ Dragan Tomic (SPS member, ex-Serbian Prime Minister, 160sq m);
■ Milovan Bojic (JUL member and ex-Federal Minister for health), etc.
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Even greater detail is possible given the lack of concealment practised. For example, 
Zivadin Jovanovic, ex-Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs and SPS member, 
‘exchanged’ his flat first for a villa of 374 sq m in Generala Save Gmjica street in 
Dedinje, than later did so again for another, bigger one in Cakorska street. Both villas 
used to be owned by DIPOS, but according to a decision made by the Housing 
Committee of the Federal Government on 6th August 1998, the second villa was 
allocated to an unnamed person, in exchange for three other flats. However, there is 
no evidence that these flats had ever been given to DIPOS (Vasic, 2003).
Villas and properties were given not only to individuals but also to companies run by 
people close to the regime. Among others, Karic Bank, owned by the Karic family, 
got 416 sq m; Asi Bank owned by Nebojsa Maljkovic, a high ranking official from 
the JUL, acquired 506 sq m and so on (M.D., 2003). This type of behaviour was not 
restricted to Dedinje, but also other very central and expensive locations in Belgrade.
Unfortunately, there is no evidence of all the properties that disappeared and those 
accounted for are only a small drop in the ocean. So far, detected fraud and 
corruption have involved ex or current SPS, JUL, SRS and SNP members from the 
coalition parties that ruled the country from 1989 to 2000, which does not necessarily 
mean that all of them were committed only to these political parties. However, it is a 
clear indication of the group that initiated the change of the formal rules in the field 
of property ownership regulation. This was also a message sent to the whole of 
society that rules could be disrespected and replaced by new practices that 
conformed more to private interests. Politicians, who illegaly used their social 
positions and power for personal gain, created a new perceptive role of the property 
related institutions among the society.
7.3.3 ‘Reconstruction’
Takeover was not the only new practice used in this area. Vesna Ilic, an activist from 
the “Association for the Protection of the Environment of Senjak, Dedinje and
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Topcider Hill” and Nikola Saveski, vice president of the Savski Venae council, 
argued that the most common mechanism for obtaining land was the reconstruction 
mechanism. As described by Ilic, the investor would first find a house owner who 
does not have any money and then make a deal with him. The house owner would 
get a permit and officially start reconstruction and reparation of the object in order to 
improve living conditions. After this, on that plot, for example of a size of 10 acres, 
an object with at least 10 residential units and a few thousand square metres would 
appear. The formal house owner would receive two new flats from the developer, 
and the rest would be sold on the market. “If we take into consideration that the 
building of 1 sq m costs around £250, and the market price when you buy in that area 
is approximately £1000, you can easily calculate that millions would have been 
earned this way” (Ilic, 2001). However, it was not always the case that owners were 
willing to co-operate with developers. “There were cases when investors used to 
come and threaten the elderly and poor house owners who refused to make deals 
with them. People were frightened” (Saveski, 2001).
Belie, president of Savski Venae council, also confirmed this mechanism. According 
to him, investors would ask for a permit to reconstruct the existing building on the 
plot and then as soon as they got it, they would demolish the building and build a 
new object, sometimes ten to twenty times bigger than former one. Urban plans were 
not considered or respected by these people and even areas where building and 
restructuring were strictly forbidden by law were changed and built upon. Belie also 
accused the SPO party as being ‘the biggest accident for this area and the whole city 
because they allowed and even promoted urban chaos in the whole of Belgrade 
including Savski Venae’ (Belie, 2001).
Zdravkovic, President of the Association for the Protection of the Environment of 
Senjak, Dedinje and Topcider Hill also argued that it was not only the SPS, but also 
the SPO and their corrupt behaviour at the city and local council level that 
contributed to illegal building in area. As indicated by him, another mechanism for 
illegal building was ‘competence confusion’. According to Zdravkovic, an investor 
would spot a plot and start to build on it. Surrounding neighbours reacted and went to 
the local council to appeal. The local council controlled by the SPO sent them to the
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city council, arguing that the case was not under their competence. The city council 
sent them back to council also arguing that is not their competence, and while this 
‘ping-pong’ went on, the object was finished, and then nobody wanted to demolish it.
“or in other case scenarios, the investor goes directly to Savski Venae 
where he pays the required amount o f money, and inspectors do not come 
fo r site seeing and checking” (Interview 16, 2001).
Interviewed illegal builders in this area also confirmed this mechanism. Interviewees 
A and B both said that the time necessary for legally obtaining a permit was too long, 
and that they did not have that much time (Interview A, 2001; Interview B, 2001). 
Interviewee D confirmed that he paid certain officials the necessary ‘corruption fee’ 
so he was unofficially allowed to finish the objects (Interview D, 2001). They 
explained that the profit they were gaining by selling flats was covering all the costs 
of building, including the corruption fees that were counted as a ‘normal’ building 
cost, an indication of the extent to which corruption became accepted and part of 
normal culture in Serbian society (Interview C, 2001; Interview E, 2001). One of the 
respondents was offended when asked why he did not use the legal path. He 
responded:
“I am not stupid. Why should I do it when the whole city builds 
illegally ?” (Interview D, 2001)
This statement represents the attitude of illegal builders that emerged from the new 
rules and values developing in the society. It shows that it became widely accepted to 
build illegally without fear of consequences. Additionally, once developers had sold 
their flats, they did not have anything to do with the buildings and the new owners 
would have to pay all legalisation and other fees (Interview A, 2001; Interview B,
2001). This left them clean in the eyes of the law. In addition to informal networks, 
investors were heavily relying on this institutional weakness. The non-functioning 
institutions of the system failed to prevent corruption, but enabled it to expand in 
every segment of society and the corruptive rules became the normal ones. 
According to those interviewed, all city institutions, including urban planning and 
building permit issues, were corrupt with their own interests clearly defined.
“But everyone was silent about it either because o f the money they were 
getting or in order to maintain a holding position” (Interview 16, 2001).
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Zoran Nikezic also confirmed this in his interview, while simultaneously rejecting 
any responsibility of his party, the SPO. Nikezic implied that all levels and people 
involved in corruption and fraud could be easily detected by analysing documents. If 
somebody built more than was allowed by the permit, the inspector who was in 
charge for that territory was guilty. If inspectors made a decision about demolishing, 
and the object was still there, then it was the police’s fault because they did not help 
to prevent further building. If somebody built on the plot where it was not allowed by 
the plan, and he/she had an urban permit, then it should have been checked by 
whoever issued that paper.
“It could be detected who was in charge in most cases. However, when 
you found out who signed the permit, you could not do much but to fine 
them with 5,000 dinars (£50). I f  some procedure has not been followed 
properly it could not be because somebody did not know their own job, 
but because they gained some material benefit. ” (Interview 11, 2001).
Petovar, who is a local representative in Savski Venae, also underlined the necessity 
of analysing quasi-legal permits and deducing responsibility (Interview 18, 2001). 
The huge problem was that the law did not treat those cases as criminal offences, 
which left a lot of maneuvering space for corruption and fraud.
“Corrupt services were issuing fake and quas-legal permits and the 
government on every level was tolerating this practice since the majority 
o f illegal builders were either voters or their protected clients” 
(Interview 18, 2001).
The political elite and subelites were the major perpetrators of illegal activities in 
Savski Venae and their corrupt behaviour gave the green light to ordinary citizens to 
do the same. In spite of a corrupt environment, oppressive circumstances and the 
non-existence of local community involvement in urban development of the city 
since 1994, the Association for Protection of the Environment of Dedinje, 
Topcidrsko brdo and Senjak emerged and tried to oppose the illegal building. This 
association of around 150 members and even more supporters was the only one of its 
kind in the whole city. Among many organised actions against illegal building, the 
biggest resistance they showed was in the case of the Regulatory Plan and its 
implementation. The Regulatory Plan was the most obvious exercise of the power of 
the elite and subelites who reinforced social and political values and institutional 
practices which limited the scope of the political process related to illegal building,
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to issues innocuous to themselves. Although the plan was partially implemented, 
members of the association questioned the legality of the plan in the Constitutional 
Court in 2001.
7.4 Regulatory Plan
The creation of the Regulatory Plan for Dedinje (RPD) was surrounded by 
interesting circumstances from the very beginning. Decisions about the plan were 
made in 1995 by the SPS, which was then in power. In 1997, the coalition ‘Together’ 
(Zajedno) took control over Belgrade and the mayor was from the DS. However, the 
Plan was finally adopted in 1999, when the structure of the City Parliament was 
completely changed for the third time49.
7.4.1 Political arrangement
There is a hypothesis that the regulatory plan for Dedinje was the legal basis for the 
legalisation of houses built by powerful people and politicians. The way it was 
passed in the City Council and the controversy surrounding Act 43 have raised many 
public debates about the legality of this document.
The Regulatory plan for Dedinje was passed in the City Council under very dubious 
circumstances. Planners from the Town Planning Institute, the creators of the plan, 
argued that production was in accordance with law and regulations. The initial 
proposal they made was sent to all city institutions and commissions, for analysis, as 
well as for public consultation. Around 200 public comments made by local citizens 
and businessmen were taken into consideration (Belos, 2001). The next step was to 
pass the RPD for an adoption procedure to the City Government. Until that moment 
the controversial Act 43 was not in the plan and it was actually added by the 
Secretariat for Urban Planning of the City Government.
49 The coalition between the SPO and the DS had collapsed, and the SPO took over city governance 
due to their majority in the City Parliament.
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The first attempt to adopt the RDP was made on 8th October 1999, but it failed since 
SPS, SRS and JUL representatives left the City Council meeting without the 
necessary quorum. The reason for this was Act 43, which they did not want to accept 
because it would legalise all illegal objects. This was a somewhat paradoxical 
situation since their party members or supporters built most of the objects. However, 
it is possible to speculate that they refused to support it not because of any benefit to 
citizens and the area but for purely political reasons, in order to challenge the 
opposition parties. DS representatives refused to stay and vote due to the rejection of 
all 12 amendments on the RPD which they proposed, and they left the meeting.
One month after December 1999, all the representatives were informed that they had 
to meet urgently and adopt the plan in order to make the city function normally. On 
31st December, a meeting was held and the members of the SPO, the DS and the DSS 
voted for the Plan. The SPS, the JUL and the SRS refused to vote for it. A 
paradoxical change of stance came from the DS. Immediately before the meeting 
started, Aleksandar Bukumirovic, representative of the DS, said that his party 
decided to accept the Plan because “the existence of any plan is much better than 
having none”. At the same time, representatives of the Association for Protection of 
the Environment of Dedinje, Topcidersko Brdo and Senjak were promised by the 
president of the DS city representative group, Radoje Prica, that his party would not 
vote for it (Zdravkovic, 2001), but in spite of this the DS did vote for it. He justified 
this later stating that it was the only way for the DS to get the budget for the 
following year. One year later, when asked about that meeting again, he said that he 
remembered that there was some problem between the city government and the DS, 
and that there was a lot of pressure on the DS to vote for the plan, but he did not 
remember any details. “There was some Act 43, I remember....” (Prica quoted in 
Skrozza, 2001:31).
The way the Plan was passed was a big surprise to many, including Ljiljana Belos, 
Chief Planner for the Regulatory Plan for Dedinje. “For me the most interesting fact 
is that at that meeting when the plan was passed, the representatives of the SPS did
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not vote for it although many of their party members have illegally built villas there. 
It is unbelievable that the SPO and the DS are the ones who voted for it. After three 
unsuccessful meetings and a lack of a quomm, they managed to pass it. What kind of 
arrangement it was among them, I don’t know!” (Belos, 2001)
The only conclusion is that some agreement was made among the SPO, the DS and 
the GSS, but it is very hard to know what the truth behind it was. There was some 
speculation in local newspapers that the DS accepted the Plan in exchange for more 
space on the city TV Studio B. Despite huge resistance from local communities 
expressed through written complaints (Ilic, 2001), the plan was adopted.
7.4.2 Act 43
Act 43 was a controversial aspect of the Plan, concerned with allowing the issuing of 
building permits to any object ‘which with its characteristics did not essentially 
disrupt the urbanistic standards and parameters’. In practice, this meant that the 
issuing of building permits depended on how and by whom the ‘essential disruption 
of standards’ would be interpreted. Since it was not clearly specified who and which 
criteria would be used, a huge space for corruption and misuse of position was 
created.
Another problematic rule imposed by this plan was that it anticipated that everyone 
who built an object without a building permit before the plan was passed, meaning 
before 1st January 2000, had the right to get it retrospectively. Therefore, this act was 
in complete contradiction with the Law on Special Circumstances of the Republic of 
Serbia under which building permits could be issued retrospectively only for the 
objects built before 4th November 1995.
Practically, this rule, combined with Act 43, allowed all illegal builders who had 
built in the meantime to legalise their objects without paying any penalties and 
without any legal consequences. Act 43 meant the abolition of every illegal builder
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in the period from 4th November 1995 until 1st January 2000, and even for the period 
before 4th November 1995.
The most famous example of the implementation of Act 43 in practice, 
demonstrating how it could be misused, is related to a 4,221 sq m object in 34 Sanja 
Zivanovic Street built by the Eurotrend Company. After a few unsuccessful attempts 
by the Savski Venae council to demolish this object, the owner of the company, 
Milan Ljumovic, appealed to the Ministry for Urbanism and Building of the Republic 
of Serbia. The Ministry redirected his appeal to the Secretariat for City Planning and 
the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs to establish if the object 
essentially disrupted the urban standards. The Secretariat for Property Rights and 
Construction Affairs refused to do that, arguing that as Eurotrend did not have any 
documents and that furthermore they had questionable ownership status, the problem 
was not under their competency but under that of the Ministry, to whom they 
returned the case. Minister Sumarac replied that the implementation of Act 43 was 
under the City’s competency (Skrozza, 2001). In the meantime, the local council’s 
teams for demolishing gave up and Eurotrend managed to finish their building.
This example, among many others, just confirmed how Act 43 created a vicious 
circle of passing responsibility to the other side among officials. Instead of 
preventing illegality, the RPD helped illegal builders to keep building and legalising 
their objects later on.
“From very beginning, the attitude of my team was that we should not allow the 
Regulatory Plan to become the plan for legalisation of illegal objects. All objects that 
fit in the standards can be legalised but not the rest. That was related to the objects 
built before the Plan was brought, because we wanted to cut this illegal builders’ 
attitude of ‘I will legalise that later’” Ljiljana Belos, Chief Planner for Regulatory 
Plan for Dedinje (Skrozza, 2001). Unfortunately, she failed to achieve this.
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7.4.3 Building coefficient
The third problematic rule that was brought about by the Plan was a change to the 
‘building coefficient’. The building coefficient determines the size of the built object 
on the plot. For example, if it is 0.8 that means for a plot of 1000 sq m the maximum 
size of the object can be 800 sq m (1000 x 0.8). According to the General Urban Plan 
for Belgrade (GUP), the building coefficient for Dedinje was 0.8, and an object could 
consist of the ground floor plus a first floor. However, the new plan allowed an office 
building to have a building coefficient of 1.2 which meant that the built-up area 
could be 20% bigger than the area of the plot. Additionally, instead of a ground and 
first floor, the plan allowed a ground floor, first floor plus a loft. In reality, this meant 
that those investors could double the size of the object if they stated that they had 
built the object for business purposes. If these excess numbers of square metres were 
multiplied by £1,000 per square metre (which was the price at the time), it is clear 
that huge amounts of money could be made in this way.
Contrary to the position adopted by members of the Association for Protection of the 
Environment, Ljiljana Belos, Chief Planner for the RPD, argued that the plan was not 
in contradiction to the law or the General Urban Plan (GUP) for Belgrade (Vreme, 
17.05.2001). The building coefficient for Dedinje in the GUP was 0.8 and while the 
number of floors was not clearly defined it depended on the purpose of the building. 
According to Belos, it meant that two floors allowed by the plan for business 
purposes were of a reasonable parameter and in harmony with the GUP. She accused 
investors of breaking the law by not respecting the given parameters and the Plan by 
building areas two to three times bigger than was allowed by the Plan.
In spite of the fact that the change of building coefficient and the allowed number of 
floors was in harmony with the GUP, this change in practice meant that investors, 
who built objects bigger than was allowed at the time they were built, and if the 
parameters were close to those determined by the new Plan, automatically got the 
right to start with the legalisation of their objects. This was another method of 
abolishing the illegal builders.
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The Plan was considered advantageous in that it was very flexible and simplified, 
based on digital technology, compared to the former rigid and cumbersome plans it 
replaced, and the team won an award at the Annual Urban Exhibition in Nis in 2000. 
However, the main creator, Ljiljana Belos, was fired from the position of team leader 
with no explanation. “I did not leave the position of Team Leader as everyone said. 
The director fired me with no explanation, although the Plan received an award. I 
was fired on 2nd of February 2000, one month after the plan was passed, I was really 
shocked” (Interview 7, 2001). According to Belos, the director’s justification was 
that City committee for public consultation confirmed some of their suggestions, but 
public comments and complaints that they accepted in TPI by Directors’ committee 
were rejected by them. The Committee had supported some of TPI proposals and 
supported it even when TPI got involved in ownership problems, however ‘some 
influences’ were occurring then.
“At the end there was a situation where some o f our proposals which the 
City committee knew, were unknown to the Institute and Directors. I  think 
that is a lie. First, the City Committee was working without us. Only on 
the last day they asked us to clarify a few issues from those 200 public 
comments. Second, the material about public comments was very clear 
and the Director o f our department had it, which means that it was not 
anonymous to our company. The meeting and passing o f the plan had 
been delayed fo r  three months, they had enough time to analyse the plan 
many times. The problem actually was in our hard attitude that we have 
to protect public interests by this plan. It did not mean that we would 
deny or not consider private interests, but we did not allow private 
interests, especially those suspicious ones, to be held over public 
interests! Therefore, I  was fired. ” (Interview 7, 2001).
Belos clearly argued that there was political pressure coming from the top, through 
informal channels which she resisted and consequently lost the position (2001). 
According to others interviewed, Belos should not have been fired. Her initial plan 
was very good, but it had since been changed due to the huge political pressures on 
her and she should not be fully blamed (Saveski, 2001; Die, 2001; Zdravkovic, 2001; 
Petovar, 2001).
Analysis of the passing of the plan in the City Hall and how it was changed over time 
shows how the elite and subelites exercised power and changed the rules in
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accordance with their needs. Although the building coefficient was in opposition to 
other laws, it was changed reflecting how the institutions were neglected. The elite 
created new rules and embodied new power relationships through Act 43 for the 
purpose of legalising their own properties. New rules, based on power and money 
resulting from informal networks between parties that were supposedly in opposition 
to each other, prevailed in the political life of Belgrade.
7.5 Extra profit tax -punishment or abolition?
As soon as the new government came into power on 5th October 2000, the promises 
about stopping further illegal building as well as the demolition of existing illegal 
objects were raised almost every day by politicians at all levels of power. They were 
claiming that they should start sorting out the problem as soon as they established 
governance at every level of power. However, as time passed, building in Dedinje 
had not stopped, but continued on the same scale as before (Ilic, 2001).
After a few months, the term ‘demolition’ was substituted with ‘legalisation’ and 
‘harmonisation of illegally built objects with the Regulatory Plan for Dedinje’ in 
political addresses, and additionally a law on extra profit tax was imposed. This law 
divided public opinion. Although it had many supporters because it would increase 
revenue and correct injustice to some extent, there were many publically opposed to 
this law arguing that the payment of extra profit tax would actually legalise 
businesses and properties gained in a suspicious way.
The following section will analyse this extra profit tax and use it to determine who 
the people were who had to pay it, in order to prove that they were in fact members 
of the elite and subelites. The section is based on an analysis of the extra profit tax 
payers from Dedinje and it examines how they got onto the list. A few of the more 
controversial examples will be explained in detail in order to identify the different 
modes of corruption and the neglect of law and institutions.
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As mentioned before, during President Milosevic’s years of rule corruption was one 
of the main pillars of the regime. The rule of law was suspended and tax legislation 
was not applied equally to all taxpayers. Isolation of the country from the 
international community and subsequent trade embargos imposed on Serbia, non­
transparent public procurement as well as the largest hyperinflation in Europe ever 
recorded (which occurred in late 1993) were all seen as fortunate circumstances for a 
small circle (estimated number of around 200 families) around President Milosevic 
and his ruling elite, to accumulate wealth illegally using their privileged positions.
The new Government of Serbia, elected in late December 2000, took fiscal reform 
and the fight against corruption as its primary goals. Therefore, underlying the 
principles of the rule of law and fiscal justice, the Parliament of Serbia adopted on 
June 22, 2001 a “Law on one-time taxation of extra income and extra property 
acquired by using special privileges”. The tax was aimed at extra income and extra 
property acquired from January 1st 1989 up to June 23, 2001 (the day of the 
implementation of the Law), which was generated by use of special privileges 
defined by the Law. The taxpayers were those legal and physical entities which had 
access to special privileges during the time span specified by the Law.
There have been certain concerns that newly enriched individuals and companies, 
which made their fortunes during the Milosevic reign, would try to take their capital 
out of the country. Therefore the Law had built-in provisions extending the tax 
liability to persons to whom the taxpayer has transferred capital, in the form of gifts, 
the rights (parts of the property), acquired through the transactions.
The Law specified transactions which fell under the concept of special privileges 
accessible to particular persons. Some of these transactions were peculiar and 
occurred under the circumstances of a closed economy, a suspended rule of law and 
highly non-transparent public finances. Being described as such in the new Serbian 
Law, they created a quite unique case in the post World War II tax history of Europe. 
There were 22 different tax bases, but the following one is of interest in this work: 
‘Construction of the representative residential or business facility (i.e. value of more
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than 500.000 DEM~£150.000) with a surface larger than the one allowed by the 
applicable construction regulations. In this situation, we find a description of the case 
where privileged persons were able, irrespective of the Law, to build large size 
facilities such as villas and office buildings. For this type of transaction, the taxable 
base is defined as the market value of the surplus surface of the constructed facility 
above the one allowed by the regulations’.50 The tax assessment could be initiated by 
the Anti Corruption Commission established in 2001, as well as by the Inland 
Revenue Service of Serbia which is obliged to submit monthly reports to the 
Parliament of Serbia about the progress on the proceedings initiated in tax collection 
under this Law. By passing the “Law on taxation of extra income and extra property 
acquired by using the special privileges” the new Government of Serbia has 
identified sources of wealth creation through the corrupt behaviour of members and 
allies of the former regime. Through this legal act, the government intended to tax 
those individuals and companies that held a privileged position during the rule of 
Slobodan Milosevic. Soon after the enforcement of this law, Savski Venae published 
the list of individuals (Table 17) and companies that were categorised as extra profit 
payers (Table 18).
Tables 17 and 18 show the years in which the objects were built, their sizes, the area 
illegally built in as well as the sizes of the houses for which there was a building 
permit if granted. Additionally, in Table 17, in which the residential objects that 
needed to pay extra profit tax are presented, there is a comment on the type of permit 
for the object if it existed.
50 Government of Serbia, www.vlada.gov.org.yu/extraprofit
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Table 17: The list of extra profit tax payers-residential buildings
I  !  I  !  i  i
Investo r j  year! object size (sq m) building permit granted for sq m [illegally bu ilt(sq  m) permit/consent granted
I |BaboMC Mlija   j 1996_\ _____  2,000* _    1,060=    940 temporary building permit
2jVranjesewcDespot_ __ 11998j 460*     6-   „  460 _____  _____ _____
3 [Grujic D u s a n    [2001 i _   1,600 ____________   0: _   1,600 unfinished ______
4 jGazikalovic Nenad [20001_____ 5 7 6 ;______ ________ ______ 295:_____ 281;____ _______ ________
5 ;DimitrijewcBlagoje __! 20001   550    _ 0 i    550 unfinished ____
6 Djordjewc Vladan 12000 i  507   ~~ 393 ~_ 114..........
7 : Jankovic Madena 11999 i ___  970: __  __ __ 800=     170 temporary building permit
8 IJomnovic Joyan i 2000 : _   1 ,2 8 4 ___      834=  450 temporary building permit
9 Karic B o g o lju b   i 2000 i _ 6 5 0 1 __________  _____ 450: __ _ __ 200 temporary building permit
10 Karic Danica ;1997: 1,100 ~ ' "  0   1,100 .. .. . . .
II Karic Zoran ' =2000;  ~ ' ~~ 2,000 ____ _ '  J  ’ ' 0 ’ ' 2,000 ' _ '
12 Karic Sreten 11996 i _ __ Ji,120 _____ ______ 685: _____ 542 temporary building permit
13 jLucicZorica _ _i 1999 f   700 ___ _ 3 9 5 ;   _ 305 temporary building permit
14 !LjumoMcMilan_ 11997j___  __ _ 4,222! __ __  _0; __ _  4,222 unfinished^ _
15 jMaksimoucMileiiaka J 2000 s ______ __600:  _________  360;    240: _  _______
16 Markouc Slobodan |2000! __   ___550i____    _____ 0 :_____________550 unfinished^_______
17 Mijatonc Vojislav [ 1998 i"  993'_“___  585 408 GEMAKS H L ._ .Z Z ..
18JMilosevic Slobodan __ 120001__________ 735      479    256 unfinished _________ ______
19 [Narandzic Branka _  i 1997_i_________5 00!    341   159 temporary building permit
2 0 ;F ^ cS io b o to  1  J1998; 1  1,020  I _ _ ' „  L Z  870 _ '_!____ \
21Radosadjayic Sok(Jka 11 9 9 9 * 1 I I I M I Z I I I L I    0    706 GfMAKS ' ' ’
22Stan in irov icD raganj2000   414: _  ______________ 0 _ _ _ _ _  414 _  _  _
23 [Spasic T om islav il994=_______ 900     439    _ 461 temporary building permit
24 StojicRanko  2000     800   _ 0 800 unfinished
25 Tnojanmic Dragoslav * 1996 ______  1,000  _    0 ___ _ 1,000    „
26Hajdukovic Miroslav [19991   400;    0   _  400 unfinished _
27 iSarenac Slobodan 11999 780 553 237
Source: Law on one-time taxation of extra income and extra property acquired by using special 
privileges (2001)
Table 18: The list of extra profit tax payers-office buildings
11
Investor year object size  (sq m ) [building perm it granted for sq m  ;illeg a ly  built (sq m)
1 IBadzevic Slobodan 1 1999 394S 0; 394
2 IBadzevic Slobodan ! 1999 609 0 609
3 j Bosnjacki Dragoljub 1 1992 500 250 250
4 [Bircevic Slobodan i 1992 1,200 638: 562
5 iZivkovic Srba 1 1995 2,100! 700: 1,400
6 i Karic Jelena 12000 500; OS 500
7 IKrstovic Savo ! 1994 710: 355! 355
8 jNovakovicMirko j 1991 300; 180: 120
9 iPetrovic Branislav 1 1995 300 251 275
i o  Sp in k 12001 3,150 1,200 1,950
111 Stevanovic Nenad S1991 300; 180 120
12 iTrajkovic Nenad ! 1994 500: 133; 367
i TOTAL 1 10,563 3,661 i 6,902
Source: Law on one-time taxation of extra income and extra property acquired by using special 
privileges (2001)
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Many of the people from the list in Table 18 are famous businessman like Milija 
Babovic, the owner of Verano motors, Serbia’s biggest car import company, 
Madlena Jankovic from Zepter, Ljumovic Milan, owner of Eurotrend, Bosnjacki 
Dragoljub, furniture factory owner and the Karic family which owns banks, a mobile 
phone operator company and a TV station among many other companies. All 
individuals on the list used to be very close to the old Milosevic regime and some of 
them were members of ruling parties. For most of the people from the list it was not 
possible to track party membership because they were politically anonymous. 
However it can be assumed that they were connected to the top of the regime because 
in order to build objects of such size in such areas, it can be deduced that it was 
supported by very powerful people. It was also a very common practice of ex- 
officials and businessmen to sign ownership papers to their family members, cousins 
or friends. Furthermore these lists show that most of the business illegal objects were 
built under the rule of the SPS. In contrast, most of the listed residential objects were 
illegally built or extended in the period 1997 to 2000 when opposition parties were 
ruling Savski Venae. This, in addition to the lack of any institutional blockage, 
implicates all political parties in the illegal building.
7.5.1 Slobodan Milosevic
The most interesting case of illegal building, from the perspective of the elite driving 
the illegal building and changing the rules in order to fulfil their interests, is that of 
ex-Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic in Tolstojeva 33 Street.
Immediately after the eighth Congress of the Communist Party, when Milosevic took 
power in Serbia, he moved from his flat to a villa in Uzicka 33, Dedinje. However, 
the property he was indicted for in Tolstojeva 33 was a villa that he bought in 1991 
and which had a 350 sq m surface area at that time. In January 2002, the then 
governor of the Federal Bank of Yugoslavia presented evidence and material from 
Beobanka about the way Milosevic bought his villa in Tolstojeva 33. The price he
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paid for it was DM 2,500 or £ 780.00, which was the price of one square metre in 
New Belgrade’s Blocks51. The mortgage repayment period was 38.5 years, and 
during inflation the monthly mortgage was only one dinar (£0.27). However in July 
2000, Milosevic claimed a permit for an extension of his property for 5a on the 
neighbouring plot in Tolstojeva 31. Soon after making an agreement with Zorka 
Stojanovic, an enlargement of his house started. Although he had a permit for 
building issued by the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs on 
19/09/1996 (Danas, 3.11.2000) the intention was to enlarge the house by 1,100 sq m. 
However, due to his subsequent decision not to go ahead with the proposed indoor 
swimming pool with a dome roof, the total extension ended up at 900 sq m.
Picture 1: Milosevic’s villa in Tolstojeva 33
(Source: www.novosti.com)
Soon after this extension, Milosevic and his wife claimed an approval for the 
purchase of the plot next to their first property, in Uzicka 33, from the Republic 
Committee for Housing Issues and immediately received an approval from the 
Republic Minister for Finances at the time (and SPS member) Borislav Milacic 
(Radosavljevic, 2003). He made a purchase contract with the Republic of Serbia on 
22nd March 1999 and the price he paid for the plot was 150,359.60 dinars or 
£1,566.00. This amount was decreased by 30% because the Milosevic couple had 
been paying a housing contribution for 30 years. Furthermore, the rest was decreased 
by an additional 20% since they repaid their debt up front. The Milosevic couple then
51 New Belgrade, a local council that had the lowest flat prices among all central Belgrade’s councils
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moved to Uzicka 15, and soon after to villa Mir in Uzicka 1152, where Milosevic was 
later arrested. The expanded villa in Tolstojeva 33 was left to their son, Marko 
Milosevic. However, in December 2002, the court annulled the agreement for 
purchasing the location in Uzicka 34, but the Milosevic lawyer appealed. The only 
penalty they would have to pay was the extra profit tax at the time.
7.5.2 Karic Family
Another interesting case is that of the Karic family which was close to the Milosevic 
regime from the very beginning. The hypothesis that the elite always manage to be 
exempt from rules can be supported in this case. They were not penalised or forced 
to demolish their properties as many current officials promised during their pre­
election campaign, but through extra profit tax they managed to legalise everything.
‘Bogoljub Karic sang pop songs for President Tito, drank coffee with Slobodan 
Milosevic and rose to be the richest businessman in the Balkans’ (Wagstyl, 2002). 
The man who established Yugoslavia’s first significant private bank, its first private 
television station, its first private university and its first mobile phone operator has 
been cast as a symbol of the corruption of the Milosevic regime. He was also a link 
between Yugoslav and Russian businesses. Mr Karic was accused of tax evasion and 
improperly diverting funds from his mobile phone company. His bank’s management 
was accused of wrongfully authorising transfers to the Karic family companies in 
Cyprus, and of forgery (Wagstyl, 2002). They were also accused of getting access to 
hard currency savings that were taken from the bank’s clients53.
Among many other privileges the Karic brothers had the right to move into Dedinje. 
According to the Savski Venae Local Council, the Karic Family owns seven objects
52 Villa which was an official residence of Marshal Tito
53 In the early 1990s, Milosevic sequestered billions of Deutschmarks from citizens’ hard currency 
savings for the regime’s use. Most Yugoslavs were restricted to holding fast depreciating dinars.
201
in Dedinje. All these villas are very close to each other and are located in following 
streets:
■ Uzicka 17 - new object,
■ Uzicka 27 - new object,
■ Uzicka 35 - reconstruction and extension of existing object,
■ Tolstojeva 29 - reconstruction and extension of existing object,
■ Street Generala Struma la -  residential building,
■ Street Generala Struma 1- office building Jelena,
■ Street Generala Vasica 5 -  new object.
However, they are all illegally built with an estimated surface area of 3,842 sq m, 
and the value of their properties is DM 17 million (£5.5 million) (Stevanovic, 2001). 
Danica Karic did not have a permit for 1,100 sq m or Zoran Karic for the object of 
2,000m 2 surfaces (Table 17).
As the regime collapsed, Mr Karic was trying to develop connections with the anti- 
Milosevic opposition, but with some of them he failed. The central bank governor 
and the new government devised a special tax on ‘excess profits’. An estimated DM 
3.8 billion (£ 1.2 billion) in extra profits earned by those individuals, including Mr 
Karic, had to be paid back.
However, when asked for his motivation to build illegally, Bogoljub Karic justified it 
by the lack of time to acquire all the necessary documents since it could take three 
years to get them all. He also said that “he can not take all these villas to heaven, but 
he will leave them to the Serbian people, so they should not complain” (Karic in Ast, 
2000:30). Karic’s statements show the typical arrogance of the former regime as 
well as a belief that its members can be above the rules and that everything can be 
legalised no matter how illegal it is. This attitude is a reflection of the widespread 
societal acceptance of corruption as well as institutional weakness (Ast, 2000).
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Villas with no permits caused a lot of controversy in the media and among architects 
and designers, not only because of their illegality but also because of their 
architectural style, despite being very expensive. The main characteristics of these 
villas were the mixture of different architectural styles and a failure to fit into the 
existing built environment. Usually they had numerous triumphal arches, fountains, 
mosaics, ceilings painted with frescos and high surrounding walls. “Everything that 
belongs to the Karics is huge, but they still apparently feel crowded, as evidenced by 
new buildings increasing in size from previous villas, and their appropriation of parts 
of public and green spaces for their needs as well as surrounding pavements” (Ast, 
2000a; Ilic, 2001; Petovar, 2001).
Picture 2: Karic’s House surrounded by high walls
(Source: B92)
Picture 3: Karic’s house in Uzicka
(Source: B92)
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Mr Karic was a neighbour to Mr Milosevic in Tolstojeva Street, who actually 
intervened for him when an ex-major of Belgrade, Nebojsa Covic, wanted to 
demolish his house in 1995 (Ast, 2000). Although he did not have any papers or 
approvals, he ordered the demolition of the house that was under state protection and 
built a new one instead with the gold plated triumph gate (Picture 4). In building this 
gate they also broke regulations which, according to the Plan for Dedinje, allowed 
gates to have a maximum height of 0.9 m or, if transparent, 1.4 m. The walls they 
usually had around their properties were 2 m high and not transparent.
Picture 4: Karic’s Gate
(Source: B92)
Nevertheless, the threat of demolition that was used so much in pre-election 
campaigns is out of the question now. The Karic family applied for legalisation of 
their properties and they paid extra profit tax, although a few years ago, according to 
Stojanovic Chief Planner in TPI, they were not interested at all in legalisation, having 
acted above the law. They, as many other powerful citizens of Dedinje, never even 
came to ask for the conditions for legalisation (Interview 5, 2001). Furthermore, 
according to Vladan Mikovic, chief of communal inspection in Savski Venae 
Council, objects that were built for family living, as was the case with Karic’s 
objects, will not be demolished and they have a strong chance of being legalised, 
contrary to those buildings constructed for selling and profit-making which will
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probably be demolished (M.K., 2001). Therefore, seven permits are going to be 
issued for all of the seven illegal villas of the Karic family.
The first instalment of the extra profit tax of DM 8.2 million (£2.5 million) was paid 
on 19th November 2001 and the second and third, in January and March 2002 (B.J.,
2001). They legalised their villas, and are now more ‘clean’ in front of the law than 
many other small illegal builders and ordinary people who built some small objects 
of poor quality or extended their small houses but were not capable of paying the 
necessary fees for legalisation due to their extremely low incomes. With this example 
it appears that the elite managed to adapt and manipulate the new laws to their own 
benefit and without forfeiting their properties. Although they paid the extra profit tax, 
they still lived in their villas and they are still protected and guarded from ordinary 
people.
In September 2002, I went to Dedinje to take photos of Karic’s villas. The police, 
who were guarding the front of the villa, asked me for the official permit issued by 
the police. Since I did not have it, I was informed that the police would confiscate 
my camera and arrest me. My argument that I did not know that I needed a permit for 
that street and that I was undertaking academic research did not gain me access. 
After a long argument, I was allowed to leave with my camera, but without any 
photos. The question I did not receive an answer to was why it should be forbidden 
to photograph the villa.
7.5.3 Pink
The headquarters of Pink Television is another case where people close to 
Milosevic’s regime were using privileges, ignoring the law and making huge profits. 
Zeljko Mitrovic, who was a member of the JUL and the owner of television PINK, 
launched his career as a successful TV magnate as the owner of a small video shop.
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According to Vucinic, TV Pink used to be the most defamed and the most 
recognisable symbol of primitivism and trash that characterised the old regime. 
Established as a TV station that offered entertainment for the masses, it was part of 
the ruling Pink ideology whose main goal was to promote an alternative reality in 
which poverty, violence and the contravention of basic human rights and freedoms 
did not exist. TV Pink has always been included as part of the ideological and 
election apparatus of the old regime (Vucinic, 2002).
It turned out that the new government's settling of accounts with Pink, as was 
promised in the pre-election campaign, was very superficial. The biggest problem 
was the fact that their private property, which had obviously been illegally acquired, 
was not being called into question. Although Zeljko Mitrovic gained an urban permit 
for 1,200 sq m, TV Pink ended up having 3,500 sq m, which meant that 2,300 sq m 
were illegal. Mitrovic argued that the size of his building was in accordance with 
regulations and the excess sq m constituted the basement where the studios were 
located. However, the building will not be demolished. Following the advice of the 
local council to buy one of the surrounding plots, Mitrovic bought one and gained the 
right to apply for legalisation since he was fulfilling the ‘building coefficient’ of the 
plot.
Professor Cedomir Cupic, a member of the Anti-Corruption Agency founded by the 
Government of the Republic of Serbia in 2001, asked for the demolition of the Pink 
building. He said that “measures to be taken to institute the rule of law included, 
among other things, toppling of the TV Pink's building as it had been raised 
illegally”. In taking such a step the administration would prove its intention to 
establish a law-abiding state wherein no-one was above the law. “If the Pink building 
stays untouchable, I’ll know that I live in a state where justice has been used in 
different ways with different people. And the political and economic power which 
enables that is above the state and law!” (Cupic quoted in Pink Special, www.b92.net,
2002). He also said that his statement was addressed to state bodies rather than to the 
owners of the buildings in question.
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The response from Mitrovic consisted of the following press release: “Dear 
Professor: As I hold your person and endeavour in high esteem, I would like to draw 
your attention to several well-known facts that you have probably ignored 
unintentionally. It is common knowledge that TV Pink has legalised its building in 
the most costly way. Under the Law on Extra Property, we have paid 2.4 million 
DEM (~ £600,000) for having exceeded the prescribed size of the building, plus 
around 2 million DEM (~ £530,000) paid to the City Administration. So we have 
fulfilled all our obligations to the state. As far as I understood your statement, you 
are in a destructive mood when it comes to the TV Pink. So, there are only two 
solutions to this newly emerged situation...To save your honour and reputation, you 
will have to immediately topple the TV Pink building. Otherwise, people may see 
you as a coward...or, you will give up the idea, whereby making people suspect that 
I have bribed you..." (Mitrovic quoted in Pink Special, www.b92.net. 2001).
The most surprising aspect of this story was the silence of the Republic Government 
which did not support its own agency. The owner of TV Pink obviously felt secure 
enough under the new regime to criticise the Agency in such direct terms. His 
security is a result of his TV station’s importance in public life, with current 
politicians having been guests on his TV station, and the message was clear that the 
new government did not have anything against ‘populist’ television that might 
support them during election times. It has been realised that Pink might be as 
effective an instrument for propaganda for the new government as it was for the 
previous one (Vucinic, 2002).
For almost two years, the Serbian public was convinced that this process was 
finished and many were very disappointed by the government’s inactivity in solving 
the Pink issue. In April 2003, it was publicised that Pink had not actually been 
legalised, but it only had an urban consent, not a building permit. Due to the post­
election conflict that emerged between the two ruling parties in Serbia, the 
Democratic Party (DS) and the Democratic Party of Serbia (DSS), and the obvious 
media support of TV Pink to the DS, the DSS announced that Pink had not been 
legalised. Furthermore, they announced that a request for legalisation had never been 
submitted to the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs which can
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issue a building permit for office buildings. The DSS accused the DS and Nenad 
Bogdanovic, the president of the city’s executive board at the time, that they were 
trying to protect Pink and to create the legal conditions necessary for legalisation, by 
verifying the urban-technical conditions of the plot where the station was built. That 
means that they tried to shape the rules and technical conditions to suit the already 
existing object. The part of the Regulatory plan that allowed this was disallowed by 
the Constitutional Court in the meantime, rendering Pink legalisation 
unconstitutional (Stanimirovic, 2003). However, Pink did not apply for the required 
building permit. The step that the city government should have taken would have 
been to demolish the building, but everyone was aware that this would not happen. 
According to Goran Djurasinovic, the legal representative of Pink, they do not intend 
to apply since they are already in procedure and they paid extra profit tax (D.R., S.B.,
2003).
It is indicative of the continuing power of the elite that Mr Mitrovic managed to 
establish a new position in the new government and to find a way to escape justice. 
The elite started a new round of adaptive reconstruction and repositioning in the 
society, using the monopoly over resources accumulated during the 1990s. 
Mitrovic’s TV station has retained its status as the most popular broadcaster in the 
country. This new positioning of TV Pink was also enabled by the inefficiency of the 
juridical institutions, which failed to prevent, and later on to punish, those acts.
Picture 5: Pink TV
(Source: B92)
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7.6 Conclusions
According to Transparency International, political corruption is “abuse of the 
entrusted power by political leaders for private gain, with the objective of increasing 
the power or wealth. Political corruption does not necessarily involve money 
changing hands, but might take a form of ‘trading the influence’ or granting favours 
that poison politics and threaten democracy” (2004: 11).
The previous sections raise questions over the involvement of the elite and subelites 
in political corruption and illegal building in Dedinje area in 1990s. Understanding 
which party, individuals and coalitions controlled the resources and decision-making, 
and who had the power to change regulations in Dedinje, is key for the definition of 
the elite and subelites and for an analysis of the processes that were behind 
institutional changes and newly created rules. The parties whose members were 
identified as involved in illegal building in the area are the SPS and the coalition 
consisted of the SPO, the DS and the GSS which was in power in Savski Venae 
council. However, informal coalitions and networks among the SPS and those parties 
based on self interest were created in the Savski Venae council (Petovar, 2001). The 
informal political coalitions formed around illegal building were very strong and had 
the power to change and set new rules that would benefit them in spite of being in 
opposition to the rule of law. They consisted of different politicians from various 
parties as well as various businessman and developers who controlled everything 
from urban land allocation in the Agency to development, urban permits, building 
permits and the legalisation and demolishing process (Petovar, 2001; Die 2001). 
According to Petovar those political networks between the elite and subelites were 
stronger than the institutions of the system (Interview 18, 2001). They created their 
own rules that were followed by many, as well as new rules and routines that defined 
inappropriate actions and relations between individuals and situations.
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Political institutions produced new sets of rules that changed both the functional 
(logic of consequentially) as well as the perception role (logic of appropriateness) of 
the institutions related to building in this area. One of the first rules that was changed 
and adapted to suit the needs of elite was related to the change of ownership status of 
state-owned properties. The political elite, who inherited distribution channels for 
goods from the communist period, started changing rules and transferring state- 
owned properties into their hands. The existing formal rules on the ownership of 
properties were ignored, and properties were given to friends, family members or 
party colleagues. In some instances houses were rented as apartments in order for the 
elite to get the right to privatise and sell them.
Another example of changing the rules in Dedinje was the reconstruction mechanism 
when developers applied for permits for reconstruction, but usually built new objects 
exceeding up to ten times the size allowed in the permit. However, this mechanism 
was never blocked and none of those objects was demolished. One of the 
explanations given by informants for the huge number of issued permits of that type 
was that developers had corrupt connections with either local, city or republic 
authorities.
The change of the planning rules in the Regulatory Plan for Dedinje revealed the 
strength of informal networks. Both ruling and opposition parties took part in passing 
the Plan that incorporated new rules such as Act 43 which exempted the elite in 
Dedinje from legal consequences and enabled them to legalise their illegally built 
properties. The changed building coefficient had the same purpose end enabled 
objects, the size of which exceeded the size allowed in the building permit, to be 
legalised.
Furthermore, it has been revealed that in the highest political institution in the state, 
President Slobodan Milosevic was breaking the rules and obtained and extended his 
villa illegally. The most successful businessman in the country also illegally built or 
extended seven objects in Dedinje. The headquarters of Pink Television is another 
case where people close to Milosevic’s regime were using privileges, ignoring the 
law and making huge profits.
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The functional role of institutions changed and corruption became an embodied rule 
and routine in Serbia in the 1990s. The extent of the development and depth of 
corruption throughout the whole system became very visible, in particular in the area 
of housing. The change of the functional role of institutions was caused and shaped 
by the elite and by their needs. The rules and laws were ignored or changed and 
shaped to fit private aims, as was the case with Act 43 and the building coefficient in 
the Regulatory Plan. The elite and subelites created and reinforced institutional 
practiceswhich limited the scope of the political process to issues harmless to 
themselves.
This was additionally enabled by a lack of reaction from judicial and other 
institutions, which were again controlled by the same political parties. “You can use 
many laws to prove that some building is illegal from many aspects. The problem is 
that courts and judges are still old communist relics. The bureaucratic apparatus and 
administration has not been tackled, and they do not want to react. Ordinary citizens 
are helpless. 36% of the decisions of the High Court of Serbia have not been 
executed due to the inefficiency of implementation and resistance of some people 
who hold position and power in their hands” (Interview 17, 2001).
The best proof lies in the many attempts by the Association to appeal against illegal 
building, with no response from any court, either at the council level court or the 
Constitutional Court. Zdravkovic even argued that the new regime was deliberately 
postponing the re-establishment of the Constitutional Court in order to buy time to 
finish many suspicious activities started under the old regime, as well as to gain 
quasi-legal permits. However, in the summer of 2002, the Constitutional Court 
announced Act 43 from the RPD as unconstitutional and ordered its removal from 
the Plan.
The policy of charging extra profit tax in response to illegal building in Dedinje 
served to legalise many illegal builders, particularly as the source of money used for 
tax payment was not questioned. Additionally, Zdravkovic and Vesna Ilic claimed
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that the law on extra profit tax was passed only to enable less than 1% of population 
to launder their illegally earned money. “It is very strange, that in a country where 
for a short period of time the political and economic elite had earnings and profits 
bigger then anywhere in the world, while 99% of population struggled to survive, 
nobody is asking today of the money source of those rich people” (Interview 16, 
2001; Interview 17, 2001).
Consequently, due to new values and power relations embodied in the institutions by 
the elite, the perceptive role of institutions has changed as well. As argued by Offe, 
“good institutions are ‘good’ to the extent that they generate and cultivate good 
citizens or the ‘better selves’ of citizens, who at least get ‘used to’ and ‘feel at home’ 
in those institutions, develop a sense of loyalty, and come to adopt the cognitive 
expectations and moral intuitions from which the institutions themselves derive” 
(1996: 200). In contrast, in Serbia, citizens led by the example of the elite and 
subelites became disloyal to existing formal institutions and started accepting the 
new ones. The perceptive role of institutions was changed. Furthermore, the changed 
perceptive role and rising disloyality triggered even greater change in their functional 
role.
The logic of appropriateness and the logic of consequentiality were changed to the 
extent that in 2001, after the political change in Serbia, illegal builders and members 
of the former regime realised that they would not be accused or sentenced for their 
illegal operations, and decided to fight the proposals for demolition. They even 
organised a society for the protection of illegal builders called “Solidarity”. Bogoljub 
Karic was the organiser of that society, but due to the lack of participation by small 
illegal builders and poor people, his threat that all illegal builders would start a 
general strike in the country was unsuccessful (Zegarac, 2001).
In summary, in Serbia the elite took control over structural power and started 
changing and adapting rules according to their needs. This chapter assessed that 
process in the area of Dedinje. However, the following chapter will address how the
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rest of the society was affected by the change of institutions and rules, and what the 
response towards illegal building was.
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8 Chapter : Illegality for the rest
8.1 Introduction
The previous chapter dealt with the experience of the Serbian elite, but there are 
differences between illegal building by this elite group and the illegal building 
undertaken by the rest of society. The main differences are in terms of locations, 
sizes, the objects’ purposes and their architectural styles. However there are many 
similarities in the way illegal building was organised especially in the way informal 
links were established in order for the state institutions to be avoided and bypassed. 
This chapter focuses on Zemun, a socially and economically different council from 
the previous one, and examines the differences in patterns of illegality.
The political elite and the business elite close to them were able to build illegally as a 
consequence of their formal and informal positions. In cases where it was difficult to 
achieve their goals, they were capable of pressing for changes in the relevant 
institutions, as was shown in the case of Dedinje.54 Led by example from the elite, 
the non-elite55or mostly middle class citizens also started to build illegally, exploiting 
the weaknesses of the system that had been created by powerful groups. 
Consideration of the cause of social and political circumstances demonstrates a high 
degree of corruption. Illegal builders were hoping that they would be able to keep 
their houses without paying the penalties, as was the case with the elite, and they 
started building everywhere in the city. Political parties or coalitions that were 
governing local councils in Belgrade went with the corruption tide and started 
avoiding institutions and the law in the process of issuing building permits. In 
addition to the inherited political and economic bureaucratic administration and
54 For example, the changing of the ‘Regulatory Plan’ for Dedinje which was the topic of the previous 
chapter.
55 It has to be outlined that contrary to developing countries’ practices where illegal developments are 
associated with poverty, in Belgrade only 18% of poor settlements or slums were categorised as 
illegal (Petovar, 1998).
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complex regulations, the new rules created by the elite and subelites and the resulting 
corruption enabled local authorities to ignore plans and reshape the territories to their 
will.
The most striking example of this is the illegal settlement is Kaludjerica, which is 
considered to be the biggest illegal settlement in Europe (Interview 19, 2001). It 
developed in the mid 1970s as a result of the housing shortage in Belgrade, on land 
that was zoned to become a sport facility. Today, it is estimated that around 50,000 
households are in Kaludjerica (Interview 19, 2001), but there is no official data on 
how many properties have been legalised, or when houses were built.
However, the focus of this chapter will be the local council of Zemun, which has the 
biggest number of illegally built objects - 17,970 (Table 14, Chapter 5). This official 
estimate does not take into account those properties that have not been registered, 
and the actual number is therefore much higher (Gavrilovic and Curuvija, 2001). The 
aim of this chapter is to show how informal institutions and corruption were the most 
important factors in illegal building, and to prove that no matter which political party 
was involved, the principles and the mechanisms of illegal building, as well as the 
purpose of allowing it, were the same. The political goal was to buy social peace and 
the economic one was to earn huge profits, or as Boarov suggested with regard to 
political involvement in illegal works, “... the biggest wealth in Serbia was earned 
by the provision of ‘legal papers’” (Boarov, 2004:25). In the case of Zemun, 
especially interesting are the examples of ignorance of the law in the Businje area 
that was allocated for waste disposal by the General Plan for Belgrade. Land, 
although state owned, was parcelled out by the ruling Radical Party and sold for 
residential building. Another example of illegal building was a shopping centre built 
on an archaeological site protected by law. However these are not the only examples. 
The most endangered area was Zemun Quay, protected by UNESCO as cultural 
heritage. It was almost completely ruined by illegal objects built in the park that 
connects the quay with the city, and by eleven restaurant terraces that were illegally 
built on the quay. There was a danger of flooding in Zemun as a consequence of the 
additional pressure made on the quay by illegal objects (Interview 14, 2001).
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The City Hall building (Magistrat), the Square of Victory (Trg Pobede), the Stara 
Kapetanija building, as well as the KUD Branko Radicevic buildings, are only a few 
examples of conserved and protected buildings and areas that were heavily damaged 
during the reign of the nationalist Radical Party.
Though it was a widely accepted opinion that illegal building was undertaken by the 
non-elite for the purposes of securing tenure, it has to be emphasised that many flats 
were built for selling. Corruption was by necessity on a larger scale because the non­
elite did not have political connections, and thus could not rely on such connections 
in the way the elite did. However, the way the law and institutions were avoided 
reflected the behaviour of the elite.
In addition to Zemun, the analysis is extended and some of the examples of illegal 
building across the city are presented in the second part of the chapter. The aim is to 
illustrate the examples of illegal construction and to analyse briefly different 
mechanisms employed by the illegal builders. However, they will not be analysed 
specifically, since the builders were not willing to talk about the building. Finally, 
the last part of this chapter analyses the rapid increase in the number of kiosks in 
Belgrade during the late 1990s.
8.2 Zemun in the 1990s
The Zemun settlement originates from the 7th century BC. As a city it existed from 
the 9th century and was called Taurunum, a name given by the Ancient Romans 
while settling the area. Due to its rich cultural and architectural inheritance56, central 
Zemun has been protected by the Law for Protection of Cultural Goods. The Bureau
Zemun’s cultural heritage consists of 9 spatial, cultural and historical complexes, 21 archaeological 
sites, 278 cultural monuments, 33 traditional construction projects, 28 sacred architecture projects, 28 
projects related to famous persons or events and 20 public monuments and memorials 
(www.beograd.org.vu).
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for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the Republic of Serbia and the Bureau 
for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade57 are in charge of 
protecting central Zemun, GardoS and Zemun Quay. Those institutions undertook all 
types of spatial planning studies as well as designs for rehabilitation, reconstruction, 
restoration and conservation of cultural properties and other projects registered 
according to their spatial architectural, cultural and historical values. Making and 
implementing plans for these areas of Zemun that were not conserved is under the 
competency of the Town Planning Institute and Agency.
In 2000, Zemun had 181,692 citizens of which 34,521 were refugees (19%). 76.5 % 
of the 438 sq km area is agricultural (Kaljevic, 2000).
Table 19: Statistical picture of Zemun
Population 181,692
Area 438 sq km
Agricultural Area 76.5%
Number of employed 53,727
Refugees 34,521
Source: Kaljevic, 2000
In spite of its rich cultural and architectural wealth, and the protection it apparently 
received, Zemun was not bypassed by illegal building in the 1990s. It was seriously 
damaged by illegal building and there is a fear that some of the damage cannot be 
undone (Interview 3, 2001). “Today, after so many centuries, we have an opportunity 
to discover the glory of one old civilization and culture, but our modem conquerors 
of Zemun do everything to prevent that. In their stupidity, lack of education, and 
blindness from greed, they convert the city into the appendix of civilization, blocked 
by bazaars and blind streets instead of making it part of the world cultural heritage” 
(Hronika Kultumog Zivota za Zemun, 2000). The rapid increase of illegal
57 Their responsibility is to perform permanent terrain recognition, research and valuation of 
immovable architectural, sacred and profane, archaeological, ethnographical and historical buildings 
and areas.
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development is mostly associated with the rule of the Radical Party from 1996 to 
2000 (Interviews 1-5, 14-18, 2001; Petovar 2003).
In the 1990s, in addition to ethnic and ideological divisions and traditional 
metropolitan and provincial divisions, a new modem division between established 
urban populations and recent refugees emerged. Those divisions had been used by 
political forces to strengthen their own positions and to undermine the power of their 
opponents. “Such a manipulation of the existing fault-lines in a divided society acted 
as an alternative to charting a course of political and economic reform” (Thomas, 
1999: 6). This division was especially exploited by the Radical party when in power 
in Zemun, where it was promoting nationalistic politics which targeted refugees. 
Despite this, the party realised that it could not base its rule only on ‘nationalism’ but 
that voters had expectations in terms of quality of living standards.
In his role as mayor of Zemun, Seselj, while continuing to follow the SRS ultra- 
nationalistic programme, sought to project a ‘pragmatic’ image. The pages of 
Zemunske novine, the local newspapers, were full of articles describing his attempts 
to improve local public infrastructure. Spectators started regarding Seselj’s 
combination of social radicalism, energetic local government and ultra-nationalism 
as an increasingly dangerous force (Vasic, 1997). “Seselj retains his extreme 
nationalism but he does not empathise it, giving priority to the realities of society. 
While the Zajedno coalition is trying to its best to win over church, students, 
intellectuals, actors and lawyers, the Radical’s leader is talking to impoverished, the 
uneducated and semi-literate masses, particularly to workers, and is trying to win 
over farmers and refugees by using demagoguery that can sound ridiculous and even 
anachronistic to his political opponents, but it finds its mark where it counts, where 
power is won” (Nasa Borba, 1997:5). Although Radicals were giving an impression 
of successful local government, the reality was different.
“After local elections in 1996, Zemun became the \private ’ property o f 
the Radical party. Although the Radicals were arguing that Zemun is an 
economic miracle, most o f its residents and architects regarded Zemun as 
becoming an urbanistic massacre” (Interview 3, 2001).
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According to Majdin, since the local council’s budget was not inexhaustible, the 
same principle, already tested by the other local municipalities, was applied. Radicals 
started issuing permits for temporary objects and kiosks to everyone who was ready 
to pay. Lofts had been sold in order to be converted into flats, and at the end the 
Radicals were allocating or selling plots for individual building. During their rule, 
the Radicals sold around 200 lofts, more than 7,000 plots, and the number of permits 
for kiosks is unknown (2004). “Regarding the sold lofts, it has not been established 
whose property they use to be, because the contracts were not verified either in 
courts or tax revenue offices, and there is legal documentation missing. Money 
gained in this way was used by the Radicals to refurbish their party offices, to buy 
new cars and other things...” (Majdin, 2004:18). Djurucic also argued that Zemun 
was a strong centre of power, where everything was out of control including 
allocation of state-owned land, issuing of permits, and so on.
“Zemun was a very powerful political centre, and the Radicals were 
using their political power to do everything they wanted. Since the land 
was owned by the state it was very easy to manipulate it. However, the 
final result o f the actions from that centre o f political power is a 
catastrophically bad position for citizens o f Zemun today ” (Interview 1, 
2001).
According to the data collected by the new authorities, there were around 17,000 
illegally built residential and 4,000 illegal business-purpose objects. They all had in 
common permits for temporary prefabricated buildings or kiosks. On the ground, all 
these objects were 200 to 300 square meters, built from solid materials which made 
them difficult to demolish (Barovic, 2001). Although it was argued by local 
authorities that it was the most successful local council in Serbia, when the DOS took 
power in Zemun (October 2000), they found 16 dinars (£ 0.16) in the budget 
(Barovic, 2001), which left them without any resources for running the council 
(Kaljevic, 2000).
8.3 The extent of illegal building in Zemun
Illegal development in Zemun originated in the 1970s. It started developing with the 
growth of industrial complexes in New Belgrade and Zemun. Contrary to Dedinje,
219
where individual building was mostly banned by plans, it was allowed in Zemun. 
Factories were partially subsidising the development of individual houses by the 
allocation of plots, but since workers were not fully supported by mortgages and 
banks, most of them turned to illegal building. The government at the time did not 
react due to the lack of resources to provide housing and to keep social peace (see 
chapter 4). In the 1970s the number of individual houses was up to 20 times smaller 
than that of collective housing. In the 1980s that ratio changed, and collective 
housing was on average two to three times larger than individual housing. In the 
1990s the extent of building was noticeably small, followed by a new trend of more 
individual housing developments and a complete cessation of collective 
developments in 1992,1995, 1997 and 1999 (Table 20).
In 2002, Zemun had 191,938 citizens, which was an increase of 16,122 in 10 years. 
Despite the 34,521 registered refugees that came to Zemun (Kaljevic, 2000), the 
index change was only 9.2. This could be explained to a certain extent by the high 
immigration rate and mortality rate during wartime. However, in terms of housing, 
the number of dwellings increased by 9,640, and the index change was 17.3 (Table 
21). However, there is a suspicion that the increase was bigger but that many of the 
illegal builders refused to take part in the census because they were afraid to, due to 
the illegality of their properties (Petrovic, 2002).
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Table 20: Legal Housing Construction (1974-2000)
Year Individual Collective Total
1974 121 2,600 2,721
1975 31 68 99
1976 13 1,913 1,926
1977 162 1,053 1,215
1978 138 451 589
1979 398 1,624 2,022
1980 417 729 1,146
1981 263 1,140 1,403
1982 110 221 331
1983 186 692 878
1984 248 977 1,225
1985 457 843 1,300
1986 325 767 1,092
1987 181 326 507
1988 152 44 196
1989 163 277 440
1990 160 587 747
1991 134 139 273
1992 115 0 115
1993 95 123 218
1994 25 37 62
1995 2 0 2
1996 54 31 85
1997 24 0 24
1998 0 98 98
1999 8 0 8
2000 43 224 267
Total 4,025 14,964 18,989
Source: National Census 2001 (National Statistical Biro, 2003)
Table 21: Change in Population and Number of Dwellings in Zemun (1991-2001)
Population Dwellings
1991 2002 absolute index 1991 2002
absolute index
change 1991=100 change 1991=100
Zemun 175,816 191,938 16,122 109.2 55,855 65,495 9,640 117.3
Urban 156,941 168,495 11,554 107.4 50,074 58,239 8,165 116.3
Other 18,875 23,443 4,568 124.2 5,781 7,256 1,475 125.5
Source: National Census 2001 (National Statistical Biro, 2003)
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According to data from Table 20, the total increase in housing was 1,152 housing 
units in the period 1991 to 2000. According to the national census, there was an 
increase of 9,640 dwellings in the same period (Table 21). It should be emphasised 
that dwellings might comprise of more than one residential unit, which would 
increase the differences among those data. The differences can be explained by the 
fact that the census included illegal objects in the calculations. Moreover, according 
to data from the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs, there were 
17,970 illegal objects in Zemun in 2000, which constituted a 20.69% increase since 
1994.
Table 22: Illegal objects in Zemun (1994-2000)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 %
c h a n g e
Zemun 1 4 , 8 9 0 1 5 , 3 9 0 1 5 , 9 1 2 1 6 , 7 3 8 1 7 , 3 0 7 1 7 ,6 9 1 1 7 , 9 7 0 2 0 . 6 9
Source: Internal Data of Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs (2001);
The difference between the number of illegal and legal developments is represented 
in Figure 5, and it can be seen that the biggest increase occurred in 1997 and 1998, 
immediately after the Radicals took over power in Zemun.
Figure 5: Comparison of legal and illegal developments in Zemun (1995-2000)
«  6 0 0
□  i l l e g a l
total legal
2000
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If we compare the number of total legal (individual and collective) and illegal 
constructions (Figure 5), it can be concluded that illegal building was the major type 
of building in that period. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that the other types 
of illegal objects like kiosks and extensions were not included in these statistics, and 
that their number was even larger than that of whole objects. Furthermore, until 1988, 
there were around 30 illegal settlements in Belgrade (Saveljic, 1988). However, in 
the 1990s this number increased, and there were ten new illegal settlements in 
Zemun in this latter period.
8.3.1 ‘New Settlements*
From 1996 to 2000, the Radical authorities had sold 6,569 plots, upon which were 
built between 1,500 and 2,000 objects, comprising approximately 4.5 million square 
metres. The objects were built with temporary permits. 12,000 reconstructions of 
existing objects without any documentation were undertaken. According to the Local 
Community Association, Zemun, the revenue from sold plots was more than 230 
million dinars (approximately £23 million) (Kaljevic, 2000).
Furthermore, according to Raznatovic, vice president of Zemun council in the period 
2000 to 2004, in the 1990s there were ten newly created settlements in the council 
district, of which the most striking examples were Businje, Plavi Horizont and 
Grmovac. This was the result of the official politics of stimulating refugees to settle 
in the cities (especially Belgrade and Novi Sad) with the aim of increasing the 
electoral body and votes (Petovar, 2003). Furthermore, local authorities in Zemun 
divided the state-owned agricultural land and sold it for £5 to £10 per sq m, but 
without any infrastructure including water, electricity, roads and sewage (Petovar, 
2001).
“The Radical party was selling state-owned land to refugees and other 
interested parties. The General Plan for Belgrade allocated the area o f 
Businje for new waste deposition due to its marshy character. However, 
the Radical authorities plotted the area for the construction o f 1,200 
residential objects, and sold it. Due to the high underground waters,
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today when it rains, you need to use boats to access the houses” 
(Interview 14, 2001).
“Regarding Businje, and the refugees, the Radicals just brought civil 
technicians who parcelled out by ruler the land that was predicted for  
waste management. They have not planned sewage systems, water 
systems, or electricity. Today, those citizens live on the margins o f urban 
life, without ambulances or shopping facilities” (Interview 3, 2001).
Additionally, Businje is not the only newly built area that faces many problems due 
to its illegal nature. Raznatovic continues:
“Grmovac nowadays is in an even worse situation due to being five 
kilometres away from the electricity connection. Additionally the water 
system, since it was done by local residents, is poorly done and now 
cannot be connected to the city's infrastructure systems” (Interview 14, 
2001).
Prekajski argued that because of the Radical party it was not only Zemun that was 
the loser but the whole of Belgrade, especially in Altina which is the biggest illegal 
settlement in Zemun.
“The Agency and the City invested in that location and prepared 
infrastructure (water, electricity, heating) for the development o f the huge 
mass housing block, in which each building would be 4+1 floors tall.
Since the area was occupied by illegal builders who built ground floor 
houses that do not need such infrastructure, we lost the money 
irretrievably” (Interview 9, 2001).
The new city government tried to improve the life of citizens in illegal settlements 
but it was a slow and expensive process. “Altina is huge settlement and we will do 
our best to urbanize it, and first we’ll try to introduce public transport...in Becmen, 
another semi legal settlement which has around 20,000 citizens, the city government 
will build a water management system to provide them with drinking water this year, 
and a sewage system next year. Additionally we shall try to legalise all illegal 
connections on the water system” (Nenad Bogdanovic, executive president of the 
City Government, in K.V, 2001).
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Although the Radicals were arguing that the illegal housing they allowed was in 
order to provide housing for refuges, many informants rejected that justification. 
Raznatovic refutes the theory that everything was done in order to help to refugees, 
stating that there were around 6,000 people settled in those new settlements and that 
they were not all refugees. This figure is a fraction of the almost 35,000 refugees that 
came to Zemun, and this raises questions about the location of the remainder 
(Interview 14, 2001). According to Raznatovic, pure political and financial interests, 
coupled with a poor legal system, were behind illegal building and the cultural 
inheritance of Zemun was mined intentionally (Interview 14, 2001). Dabezic agrees 
about the intentional devastation of Zemun, stating that the main motivation was a 
demonstration of power (Interview 3, 2001). Additionally Jaksic argues that if a 
sociological analysis of the area, as well as an analysis of how many objects were 
kept and how many were sold, were undertaken, a completely different picture would 
be obtained from the one presented by the Radicals and it would prove that building 
was allowed primarily for the generation of high profits (Interview 2, 2001).
However, contrary to the other local councils, the Radicals tried to give an 
impression of legality in the process of the allocation of land.
“The mechanism was the following: Authorities would announce a 
competition either in Zemunske novine (local counciVs newspapers) or 
Velika Srbija (Radical Party’s newspaper) for building. The bids were 
secret, and the whole process was non transparent, but the illusion o f 
legality was created. However, the local council was not allowed to issue 
permits for business purposes building, which they were in fact doing, 
breaking the law at the same time” (Interview 14, 2001).
Dabezic describes the process of allocation of land in the same way arguing that the 
Radicals created an illusion of legality through announcing the allocation of land in 
local newspapers. Although they stated that land allocation was only for a temporary 
period of time, people were buying it believing that they would be able to legalise in 
future.
“Radicals legally protected themselves in that way, but they misled 
people to invest and buy land that was state-owned and prohibited for  
sale. In that way, the Radicals endangered human rights and destroyed 
the urban identity o f the area...citizens were ‘seduced’ by the idea that
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despite illegality they can built whatever they want...we were trying to 
stop that but our decisions ended up in drawers” (Interview 3, 2001).
Tilinger, a chief planner of the urban plan for Zemun, also agreed that the auctions 
organised by authorities were set up.
“The locations were very cheap, but still not accessible to everyone and it 
was known in advance who would get locations. Those locations were in 
most cases resold soon after the auction. When the plan was adopted, 
those involved were doing it even more openly since they knew that the 
plan was made and that all illegal objects would be legalised. 
Additionally, the prices went up, and the profits were higher” (Interview 
4, 2001).
As an example, Tilinger uses the case of a plot that the first buyers divided into three 
parts.
“On one part they built a house to live in, but they sold the other two and 
made a huge profit. Additionally, illegal houses were built on the sold 
parts too. However, everything was *approved’ by the local council since 
it issued them all with official house numbers, which was not allowed by 
law” (Interview 4, 2001).
But contrary to Dabezic and Raznatovic (2001), Tilinger thought that the major 
reason for the increase in illegal building was the increase in refugees, because they 
increased the demand for houses (2001). Tilinger rejected the idea that refugees 
should be blamed for the situation in Zemun, but rather that the blame rested with the 
authorities, both at local and city levels. According to her, the Zemun Local Council 
broke the law by selling the state-owned land. The Secretariat for Urban Planning in 
this case also bypassed the law for political reasons. Some citizens, who were 
ignorant of the legal status of land they bought, broke the law due to a lack of 
knowledge.
“They did not know what they got involved in, they believed that the local 
council as an institution was doing things legally. Some o f them have to 
pay back because o f that, especially builders who built on public spaces.
For example, on a location zoned for a school, there were built 
foundations for six houses. However, they have to be demolished now ” 
(Interview 4, 2001).
Moreover, Tilinger blamed city authorities for the chaotic way in which illegal 
building was undertaken. According to Tilinger the Secretariat for Urban Planning
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prescribed the Town Planning Institute to incorporate illegal objects in a plan, to 
legalise them. There were many objects that were built on directions that were 
planned for streets. However, Tilinger had to change the locations she planned to 
build streets on and to leave illegal objects where they were.
“Consequently we had to plan streets without logical directions for  
movement. They were not straightforward, but streets with strange 
shapes, just in order to go around illegally built houses. It would be much 
better if we (the Town Planning Institute) were involved from the very 
beginning in having an advisory role and helping people to build. Instead, 
authorities just brought engineers who just plotted an area that was sold 
by auction” (Interview 4, 2001).
But furthermore, she argues, it was not the Radical Party that was pressuring for this 
Since it was not their representative in the Commission created by the Secretariat for 
Urban Planning.
“It was more a cautious and political concession towards the Radical 
party by the Secretariat for Urban Planning” (Interview 4, 2001).
In contrast Zegarac, an Executive Director of the Town Planning Institute, thinks that 
the manner in which the Radicals plotted the area is a much better way than the 
chaotic illegal building in the rest of the city.
“Although the Radical party broke five to six laws, they showed more 
sense in the arrangement o f land than any other party in other city 
municipalities” (Interview 6, 2001).
Regarding the creation of a plan for Zemun, it was argued that it had a mostly 
political background.
“Contrary to the other local municipalities’ plans that were aiming to 
earn some profits cheaply, in Zemun the plan had a political background, 
and power and dictatorship were exercised” (Interview 4, 2001).
Additionally, it has to be emphasised that although the Radicals were in power in 
Zemun, they were not the only party responsible for illegal developments. As stated 
above by Tilinger (2001), city authorities were as responsible as Republic authorities 
(Dabezic, 2001). Dabezic argues that the situation in Zemun became even worse 
when the Radicals formed a coalition with the SPS on the Republic level.
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“Considering that Zemun is a culturally protected area, building permits 
are issued in the Ministry. Our (Bureau for the Protection o f Cultural 
Monuments o f the City o f Belgrade) decisions on interruption o f building 
in Zemun have not been implemented. Regarding the centre o f Zemun, 
there was coordination between local and republic authorities. The land 
was used in a most vulgar manner...without plans, without documents, 
with some fake approvals. Unfortunately, the damage made cannot be 
fixed now” (Interview 3, 2001).
With respect to the Radical Party, when the new authorities took power they asked 
the Ministry to check the legality of 7,000 building permits that the Radicals had 
issued. This was based on an investigation performed by new authorities who 
implied that most of the money citizens were paying for land tax was ending up in 
the Radicals’ hands. The land tax money was used for buying ‘necessary’ equipment 
and presents, and through that the transfers were ending up in the Radical Party. 
Most of the contracts are in the courts now (Gavrilovic and Curuvija, 2001).
A very controversial case of illegality is the case of the Magistrat building in Zemun 
which proved the involvement and informal networks of all authorities. Although it 
was not only a typical case of illegal building, it was also a case where the purpose of 
the building, determined by law, was changed. Additionally, in its backyard, a 
shopping centre was built on a protected archaeological site.
8.3.2 “Magistrat”
The Magistrat building is the oldest public administration building in Belgrade built 
in 1751. It is a protected cultural monument under the control of the Bureau for the 
Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade. However, when the 
Radicals took power in Zemun, they refurbished the building and changed its interior 
completely without an appropriate permit and they paid using the local council’s 
money.
In December 1998, the Radicals created a lease contract with public enterprise ZIPS 
which was in charge of the office space in Zemun, to rent the newly refurbished
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building of the Magistrat. The price was 1.52 dinars per square meter, which was 
around 1.5 pence per square metre (Majdin, 2004). The monthly rent for the 
Magistrat building (2,000 square metres) was therefore around £30 per month, which 
was cheaper than renting a kiosk in Zemun. The contract was made for a thirty year 
period, and the entire rent money, which amounted to 1,356,919.50 dinars (around 
£13.569) was paid in the first few months after the contract was signed. At the same 
time, the executive board of the Zemun local government, which allocated 5 offices 
in the basement of the ZIPS building (actually to the Radical Party’s newspaper 
‘Velika Srbija’) which was approved officially by the Republic Agency for Real 
Estate owned by the Republic of Serbia. Additionally the Executive Board of Zemun 
council allocated computers, furniture and telephones to ZIPS, the value of which 
was double thirty years’ rent for part of the Magistrat building. In effect, the 
Magistrat building was given to the Radical Party to use (Majdin, 2004).
The Radicals argued that when they came into power the building was ruined, and 
that they collected money and renovated it. After that they gave the building to ZIPS 
to use and they rented part of it. That contract also included two annexes, from which 
one gave part of the courtyard, originally a local handball playground and later a 
shopping centre (Krasic quoted in Majdin, 2004: 18). Krasic argued that the rent 
price was acceptable, since it was based on criteria that were given to other 
parliamentary parties to rent space, including a 5% discount (Majdin, 2004).
That was not the end of the manipulation with the Magistrat building. One year after 
the Magistrat was allocated to the Radical Party to use, there was a new annex built 
that separated the courtyard from the rent contract, and was allocated to businessmen, 
to build a shopping centre, who bid 3.5 million dinars for it (around £56,000). 
“According to bank statements, the whole sum was paid off three months before the 
contract was made” (Majdin, 2004:19).
“In an auction held in the local council, certain businessmen got the 
right to build the shopping centre on a plot that was protected as part o f 
a cultural monument-complex. First the construction was started, and 
then the application for approval was made to the Bureau fo r  the 
Protection o f Cultural Monuments o f the City o f Belgrade, which we 
refused to issue ” (Interview 3, 2001).
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Picture 6: Zemunikum Shopping Centre
According to the official decision based on the application made by Dejan Obradovic, 
the Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade refused 
to issue special approval and conservation conditions for the building of a shopping 
centre on Trg Pobede 3, in the courtyard of the Magistrat building. The explanation 
for the decision was the following: “This block represents part of the protected 
Zemun old central core as a cultural and architectural monument from the 18th 
century, that shows development of architecture from the 18th century 
on wards... Additionally, the Magistrat represents the clearest example of classicist 
architecture at the time and it is the work of the famous architect Jozef Felber and it 
is the oldest building of public administration in Belgrade. Moreover, any changes in 
this block would endanger neighbouring blocks which are also preserved as cultural 
and architectural monuments. Additionally, there is an assumption that under the 
courtyard there is an archaeological site of Antic Taurunum. Any building will ruin 
the site” (Decision no. 991186, 26.10.1999).
Additionally, the Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City of 
Belgrade issued a decision to stop further building after the investor had started 
development. That decision ordered the immediate cessation of any works, and to 
return the courtyard to its previous condition at his own expense, within five days. 
The investor was also obliged to inform the Bureau within three days after these 
conditions were fulfilled (Decision no. 991186, 26.10.1999). Regardless of the
230
investor’s right to appeal to a higher level, the decision had to be applied 
immediately.
The investor did appeal, explaining that he bought the courtyard at the official 
auction organised by the local council of Zemun, and that he was willing to modify 
the project in order to fit into the environment (Decision no. 5/302, 23.05.2000).
“No matter the fact that we (Bureau for the Protection o f Cultural 
Monuments o f the City o f Belgrade) rejected his application for  
conservation approval and that the Republic Bureau fo r  the Protection o f 
Cultural Monuments, which is a higher level o f competence, also refused 
his application (Decision no. 5/302, 23.05.2000) and supported us, the 
investor ignored all our decisions, kept building and finished the 
shopping centre ” (Interview 3, 2001).
Moreover, Dabezic continues, due to the lack of an entrance to the newly built 
shopping centre, builders demolished the wall that separated the neighbouring house 
built in the 18th century, which is also conserved and protected (Interview 3, 2001).
The size of the shopping centre is 2,700 sq m, and it is divided into 57 shops 
(Vlahovic, 2001). However, the Radicals issued a temporary permit for 1,792.20 sq 
m on 2nd October 2000, three days after they lost the elections and when they were in 
the midst of relinquishing power to the DOS. However, the rest of the 2000 sq m 
were not covered by any documents.
With regard to the new authorities, in July 2001 they asked for an interpretation by 
the Ministry for Construction of the contract made between Dejan Obradovic and the 
ex-council authorities. The unclear case of Zemunikum also divided local councillors 
who voted 6:5 to issue a temporary permit to part of the object without any 
documents (Vlahovic, 2001a). The Ministry and Minister Sumarac backed up this 
decision, but it was opposed by the president of the executive board of Zemun 
Jovancevic, who refused to sign it, arguing it was not within the local council’s 
competence. Despite this, the permit was issued but the councillors and building 
inspectors refused to give any comment in public (Vlahovic, 2001a). Deputy 
Minister Mr Radovanovic, who signed the permit, argued that although the law was
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broken initially, there were other laws including the law on spatial planning and the 
law on legalisation that had to be followed and therefore the permit was signed. “We 
just want the law to be followed” (Radovanovic quoted in Vlahovic, 2001a: 22). 
However, clearly contradicted the earlier rejection of the building permit issued 
previously by both the Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of the City 
of Belgrade and the Republic Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Monuments. 
Despite election campaigns that were based on anti-illegal building politics, the same 
illegal objects whose destruction was promised were now getting permits.
Raznatovic explained this by the fact that the investor paid the Agency for the cost of 
the infrastructure meaning that he got official approval for what he was doing 
(Interview 14, 2001). Radovanovic argued that the citizens who had bid for this 
location were not obliged to know the legal background, and could have assumed 
legitimately that everything was legal as the auction was organised by the local 
authorities. “Investors got the location, started to build and finished” (Radovanovic 
quoted in Vlahovic, 2001b). Furthermore, Radovanovic argued that the new 
authorities were not analysing the permit issued by the former authorities, and also 
expressed his surprise at the negative reactions of the Bureau for the Protection of 
Cultural Monuments of the City of Belgrade regarding the temporary permit they 
issued (Radovanovic quoted in Vlahovic, 2001b). He cited this as an example of how 
badly informed the new authorities were. He also maintained that there would no be 
advantage in demolishing the object. It would be very expensive to demolish the 
shopping centre, and local authorities could not afford demolition from their budget. 
He also emphasised that the shopping centre would employ many people. However, 
despite his points, the shopping centre was built illegally on an archaeological site 
and in the election campaign its demolition was promised. Contrary to 
Radovanovic’s claims, issuing the permit seemed undemocratic (Radovanovic 
quoted in Vlahovic, 2001b). This is particularly questionable given that the same 
protocol was not applied in the case of an object close to the shopping centre, which 
belonged to Zoran Marcetic, which was demolished. In this case both the Ministry 
and the new authorities in Zemun annulled the building permit he had for the object, 
and removed the object with the assistance of the police. This example clearly 
illustrates that while illegal building might have used the same informal links and
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culture of corruption, there is a definite institutional interest in maintaining some 
illegal decisions and prosecuting others. This suggests that some illegal builders 
enjoyed state protection, to the advantage of both parties.
Although Zemun was the council in which the ruling party exercised power and 
created new rules to benefit its own interests, illegal building spread across the whole 
of the city in all municipalities. The next section shows what kind of mechanisms 
were used by citizens to build illegally. The objects are obvious proof of a disrespect 
of laws, but since there was no institutional response towards them, they are still the 
mark of Belgrade. Although they were not built on archaeological or UNESCO 
protected sites, they have endangered the quality of the life of citizens in Belgrade. 
Some of them even put the lives of residents in danger.
8.4 The rest of the city
Picture 7 shows the most famous example of illegal building in central Belgrade. 
Instead of building up one floor more, investors built two houses on top of the 
building. Although there were many promises by the new authorities that the houses 
would be demolished, the only change was that the investors built walls to conceal 
the two houses.
233
Picture 6: Houses on the top of the building
One consequence of illegal building was that the quality of building was in many 
cases very poor. In one case in Karaburma (local council of Palilula), several new 
buildings collapsed (Radulovic and Klaric, 2003), putting the lives of residents in 
danger. In addition, 1,500 unsafe flats that were built (for examples see building in 
Pictures 7 and 8) and were not demolished by the new authorities because they did 
not have the resources to resettle the buyers. However they forced investors to knock 
down two newly built floors, in the hope that this reduction in weight would ease the 
pressure on the foundations (www.novosti.co.vu).
Picture 7: Karaburma I
Picture 8: Karaburma II
Source :www. novosti. co.yu
Other photos also show various irregularities. Picture 9 shows a very common 
situation whereby investors who had some permits or approvals which specified the 
number of floors and technical details of development hid one to two floors under the 
huge roofs. They were not paying any taxes on these flats, and the profit from selling 
was pure.
Picture 9: Flats hidden under the roofs
Picture 10 shows how by building too close to existing objects developers ignored 
urban plans and regulations. In many houses people were able to cross from their 
window to the window or balcony of the neighbouring house.
235
Picture 10: Proximity of the houses
Picture 11: New residential area without streets and arranged public space
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Picture 11 shows how most of the investors were interested only in finishing the 
objects and selling them. The provision of all necessary infrastructure and the 
arrangement of public spaces around the buildings were not their concern. This kind 
of development, in isolation from wider urban plans, was costly to the state and 
provided a low standard of living to residents.
Furthermore, in addition to the various illegal developments and extensions, another 
phenomenon occurred in Belgrade in the 1990s when its citizens started calling 
Belgrade ‘kioskland’. The reason for this was the enormous number of kiosks across 
the city. Unfortunately, none of the city’s institutions holds data on the total number 
of kiosks. Local municipalities are supposed to have evidence, but they do not 
(Curuvija, 1999).
8.5 Kioskland
The hyperinflation, which considerably curtailed local markets, and the imposition of 
economic sanctions badly affected the city economy. The scope of production and 
services decreased. Due to the ensuing massive unemployment and the collapse of 
the economy, most citizens realised that they had to turn to the black economy. One 
of the visible aspects of the black economy were the kiosks in which everything was 
sold, from food, cigarettes and flowers to clothes and pets. They were located 
everywhere. It became almost impossible to walk on pavements. Petovar describes a 
situation in which it was impossible for mothers to push prams with babies on 
usurped pavements, forcing them to go on the streets in order to pass by them, which 
was extremely dangerous (2003).
“..It is more and more difficult to walk on pavements. The number o f 
kiosks grows every day. It is really hard to find two o f the same or at least 
similar kiosks. They exists in various sizes, shapes, colours...the new 
class o f businessman owners compete to see who is going to find a new 
model as well as who is going to find the most inappropriate location. 
Kiosks are everywhere: close to crossroads, on the bus stops, on green
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spaces. It seems like every day there is a t least one new kiosk built in 
Belgrade, and I do not see the end. Sometimes I think that it w ill stop  
when there is no available space left, although I would not be surprised if  
they would keep building them on the top o f  the trees then...However, 
planners are pow erless and not asked fo r  any professional advice. It 
became more important to fin d  ‘the right person * ready to accept a ‘big  
envelope  ’  (bribe), and to issue a permit. It is chaos ” (Medic, 2000:1).
Zekovic calculated the costs and damage to Belgrade as a consequence of the huge 
number of kiosks. Kiosks and temporary objects covered 800,000 sq m of public 
space and 1.6% of the total available office space. Since the owners were not paying 
tax and the land rent they were paying was too low, she estimated that the city’s 
budget was around £33.3 million less than it should have been. Additionally, Zekovic 
estimated that the total value of the land occupied by those objects was between £12 
and £50 million, and consequently the total loss was around £100 million excluding 
the loss from property tax and communal tax for companies that did not pay 
(Zekovic, 1999).
Picture 12: Kiosk on pavement in central Belgrade in front of Town Planning Institute
Source: Curuvija, 1999
It was also common knowledge that if somebody wished to operate a kiosk they 
would require good connections with local councillors or the local council 
administration. This was confirmed by all interviewed informants (Interview 1 to 
Interview 22, 2001). Unofficially, it was also known that the ‘price’ for a kiosk 
location varied from location to location. It went up to £2,000 in central
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municipalities (Interview 21, 2001). The only difference of opinion noticed in the 
interviews was which political party should be blamed. Generally interviewees 
blamed the parties of which they were not members.
Regarding Zemun, where the number of kiosks was highest, the permits were issued 
as ‘temporary’ ones. “A mechanism was fully developed. It was based on a massive 
issuing of Decisions covered by Approvals. It is allowed by Law that the local 
council can issue building permits for temporary objects that are easily removable, at 
a maximum size of 30 sq m. Additionally, it has to be approved by the Secretariat for 
Traffic since the objects are mostly located on pavements and public spaces. 
However, nobody has that approval. They only have the false local council’s 
approvals. Those objects are much bigger than allowed by official parameters and 
they are usually 100 to 300 sq m size and steady on the ground” (Interview 14, 2001). 
Most of them in Zemun were actually solid objects, in which the ground floor was 
used as either a shop or a workshop, and the first floors were residential flats. And all 
of this was covered by legal or semi-legal approvals from local municipalities.
Picture 13: Demolition of numerous kiosks on pavements and central squares in 2002
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Picture 14: Kiosks on Slavija square
However, with the change of power in 2000, the new authorities fulfilled some of 
their promises and hundreds of kiosks were removed and demolished (Pictures 13 
and 14). Decisions on their removal were based on the lack of legal permissions for 
their location. It did cause a reaction among the owners and some sections of the 
public who argued that Belgrade’s already high unemployment would become even 
higher. However most of the citizens of Belgrade were pleased that they got their 
public spaces back.
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has analysed the mechanisms, political processes and changes of 
institutions behind illegal building in the local council of Zemun, and has specifically 
focused on the cases of the new settlements and on protected building and 
archaeological sites. The new settlements were the result of illegal development but 
organised by the ruling Radical party. Selling the state-owned land and issuing 
various permits in opposition to the law were visible manifestations of political
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power. Furthermore it represents an example of changing the formal rules. The most 
expert informants argued that there were two major underlying reasons for this: the 
financial and political benefits to the Radicals. However, although the Radicals were 
breaking the law, the City authorities run by opposition parties to the Radicals had 
the legal right to ask the Republic authorities to impose forced management over the 
Zemun council. This however never took place. The lack of institutional response 
from higher sources is an indicator of the strength of the informal political networks 
made around illegal building and their power to change and set new rules to benefit 
them.
The Radicals were changing the perceptive role, or logic of appropriateness, of 
institutions by establishing new standards, both normative and cognitive. This, in 
addition to the state of mind generated as a result of the behaviour of the elite (lack 
of respect for formal rules, the expectation that success must be result of patronage 
and corruption) resulted in an explosion of illegal building in Zemun. The cases of 
the Magistrat and Zemunikum represent the illegal uses of social position and power 
for personal/political profit or gain. Institutions designed to govern the 
interrelationships between the citizen and the state were used instead for party 
enrichment and the provision of benefits to the corrupt. Furthemore, the Radicals 
changed the rules not only for the party’s gain but also as an electoral strategy for 
buying votes.
Due to the changed roles, both functional and perceptive, of the institutions, illegal 
development was occurring to such an enormous extent that the DOS (opposition 
coalition at the time) based their 2000 election campaign in Zemun purely on 
agitation against illegal building. However, the DOS was aiming to stop a process 
which they knew required addressing fundamental causes which they were not 
prepared to investigate.
“Our election promise was that we would stop illegal building. However 
we had neither the courage nor the willingness to promise unrealistic 
things like that. We couldn't solve the problem o f existing illegal building 
because rationally it is impossible to be solved. According to our 
evidence, we were talking about thousands o f objects" (Interview 14,
2001).
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Aleksandar Raznatovic, vice president of Zemun at the time, said that it would 
probably take a year for the new authorities to investigate all the illegal operations of 
former authorities and that the major deals were already given to authorised courts to 
investigate them. Furthermore, Raznatovic added that it would not be difficult to 
prove irregularities since they existed in all spheres of the council’s functioning in an 
obvious and visible manner. “Abuse of power and breaking of the law were the main 
characteristics of this authority, starting from violation of cultural and historical 
monuments, to destroying the urban identity of the area, and making many residents 
suffer by the illegal sale of locations and by issuing hundreds of illegal permits for 
kiosks that were built without any plan. Wherever there was a free space, people 
built something” (Raznatovic quoted in Barovic, 2001:14). Radicals defended 
themselves by rejecting all accusations as being lies and calling on the current 
government to provide proof and bring charges against them (Dragan Todorovic, 
Radical Party quoted in Jevremovic, 2004).
Additionally, there are a few other problems that the current authorities are facing 
today. Many illegal builders argued that they were misled by ex-authorities and 
claimed their money back. According to the ex-director of Zemun Office Space 
Enterprise, the problem was not illegal builders who applied for legalisation in 
Zamun, but those who did not want to apply for legalisation. Furthermore, there were 
cases where buyers sued the local council, and one buyer even won his case. The 
verdict was that the local council had to pay back money to the buyer of the real 
estate with high interest rates. “The buyer did not care who is in power now, and now 
that the Radicals are gone he just wanted his money back.. .it is logical that the buyer 
was not suspicious about official institutions. Now we have to pay the bill the 
previous government made” (Simonovic quoted in Majdin, 2000:18). Although the 
corruption and informal networks were accepted as a rule imposed from the top in 
the 1990s, the change in politics brought a change of the rules, and respect of law 
was the new rule. However, it can be assumed that in those cases, the rule of law was 
accepted just so that the money could be claimed back. It is implausible that those 
who bought illegally properties and land were not aware of the circumstances.
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In addition to Zemun, the rest of the city, run by other parties, had a boom in 
illegality. The mechanisms used by illegal builders varied, including constructing 
new buildings instead of allowed extensions, adding floors under the roofs and 
funding kiosks everywhere in the city. The consensus to fight illegal building did not 
exist in any of the political authorities or parties. On the contrary, all of them were 
changing the institutions and applying the new rules created by the elite instead of 
blocking each other in illegality due to their financial or political benefits. The latent 
conflict between these people and citizens who were against illegal building was kept 
from emerging and the interests of the ruling elite and subelites were fulfilled.
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9 Chapter: Conclusions
This thesis started with the assumption that illegal building in the 1990s in Belgrade 
was a result of the function of the new rules established by the elite and subelites for 
gaining personal profits, but this does not explain how illegal building had spread 
among the non-elite. My thesis argues that illegal building was inherited from the 
communist period, and was in the 1990s enhanced by the failure of formal 
institutions and the hyperactivity of informal institutions. Inadequate institutions and 
regulations were also inherited from communism. Informal institutions became 
dominant and instead of blocking illegal processes in society, they actually enabled 
them. Corruption became a very strong ‘informal institution’ widely accepted by 
society.
This thesis examined the major drivers that enhanced illegal building on such a scale 
and in particular it explored the role of the elite, subelites and institutions in illegal 
building. It explained how the urban realm was both dependent upon and constrained 
by its economic and social context. It analysed how the political elite and subelites 
exercised independent power and hence explains their role in illegal building and 
usurpation.
This chapter is divided into four parts. The first part represents the institutions and 
the problems relating to housing developed during the communist period. Firstly, 
various roles of the centralised and self-management state explored in chapter 4 are 
summarised and synthesised. This includes the history of housing and illegal 
building since the communists came to power. It tries to convey the common 
characteristics of those aspects and to present the general pattern of political elite 
influence on the housing sector through institutions.
Secondly, the political and economic changes during the 1990s are discussed in 
relation to the reconstructive adaptation of the former elite and the emergence of the 
new elite and subelites as well as institutional changes. The institutions and the
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economic and political environment are mutually interdependent and affect each 
other, and therefore must be analysed together in order to provide a comprehensive 
explanation for given problems. The strengthening of informal links and the creation 
of informal institutions is analysed through frequent elections and parties’ coalitions 
formed around specific issues, and in particular illegal building. Furthermore, the 
particular organisations and the institutions related to building are assessed via the 
rules they either created or accepted from the state or another level of power and the 
degree of informality in which they were involved.
The third part discusses the implications of the research findings in Belgrade. The 
first point of discussion is the elite and subelites, both political and economic, and 
their relation to various institutions and illegal building. The cross analysis of case 
studies is detailed and major conclusions and findings are outlined.
The fourth part evaluates the position of the major illegal developments like 
Zemunikum shopping centre and Milosevic’s villa today, and assesses the 
institutional context of illegal building today, five years after the political changes. 
However, all those parts are combined for the assessment of the theories used and 
their practical meaning is evaluated.
The thesis concludes with an evaluation of, and some reflections on, the research 
presented and suggests possible ways forward for future research. There are two 
possible arenas for further investigation. One has a geographical perspective, and it is 
a comparative study of the cities across the country, paying particular attention to the 
role of the state versus local institutions and parties in forming the illegal sphere for 
building. The other has a wider geographical and historical perspective, and 
investigates illegal development in other Eastern European countries where the 
phenomenon exists.
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9.1 Institutional Inheritance
As Smith and Stenning suggested, transition is not a pure switch from communism to 
capitalism but rather the political and economic changes that have their own 
historical and institutional limits (Smith and Stenning, 2004). Following that line of 
thought, the inheritance of the communist institutional housing context was 
examined. The themes observed during the communist period and their impact and 
transformation in the transitional period are self-management, housing policies, 
housing financing and urban planning.
As chapter 4 demonstrates, due to the ‘consumption commodity logic’ and 
subsidising, the socialist housing system was neither efficient nor equitable. The 
constant housing shortages, overcrowding and long waiting lists were the main 
characteristics of housing systems across Eastern Europe. Moreover, priority in 
access to public rented housing was given to political and party officials, bureaucrats, 
military members and employees of the strategic industrial sectors rather than to 
workers and disadvantaged social groups (Szeldny, 1983). The state distribution of 
housing was led by two principles. The social principle was based on the needs of 
citizens for accommodation. The second one was determined by status and merit- 
based and this was the dominant one. In the socialist system, the political elite 
created housing policy and the possibility for the creation of bottom-up influence did 
not have any institutional support. The failure of the housing system led to the 
creation of alternative approaches, mainly used by people excluded from an official 
system of provision of flats. The result was an expansion of illegal building and the 
creation of informal settlements. The political elite mobilised out the problem of 
illegal building from the political agenda, keeping it from emerging. Consequently, 
illegal building started being informally ‘institutionalised’.
In the Former Yugoslavia, self-management reform did not lead to a distinctly more 
efficient form of housing provision than the overall Eastern European socialist 
model. “The self-managing housing communities ended up functioning as a hyper- 
protective institutional environment, which reduced both efficiency and the 
productivity of the socialist housing sector” (Mandic, 1992: 299). In the self­
246
management housing model, competition between building companies was avoided, 
and the state-owned developing companies had monopolistic positions, while the 
private sector was under strict control to prevent the development of free market 
elements. Private ownership was restricted to two housing units per family and to 
individual house construction and there was no possibility for private development to 
take place legally.
From the institutional point of view, although there was an attempt made through 
self-management, real democratic institutions were not developed. The housing 
allocation was, as in the other Eastern European countries, led by need and merit, 
criteria that will continue to dominate in the post-communist era. The dispersed 
decision-making resulted in long waiting lists and extensive bureaucratic rules that 
were waiting for approval from the top before being implemented.
Another institution developed during the socialist period was an institution of 
building permits. For the individual sector, the laws on building were very restrictive, 
and even if land was provided for individual building, the process of getting a 
building permit could last for years, if approved at all. This institution remained the 
same in the post-communist period and was the one around which many informal 
coalitions and rules were created.
Two main sources of funds used in the past to finance new housing construction 
were individual housing finances and collective housing funds created from wage 
deductions from the public sector and enterprise employees. Enterprises were solely 
responsible for housing funds and they could allocate housing funds or low interest 
loans for the purchase of apartments or the renovation or construction of new houses 
on enterprise grounded criteria, such as the number of years spent working in a 
company and household size. However, these criteria were not applied equally to 
everyone, and privileged managers were always on the top of the list, while non­
qualified workers could be on the list for years. The institution of informal privilege 
was another institution that has its origins from this period and it continued in the 
transitional period. In addition, the elite continued the practice from communism 
allowing them open access to the distribution of luxury goods and houses.
247
Finally the diversity of plans resulted in many inconsistencies in both the process of 
preparation and their implementation in practice. In addition, plans were complex 
and rigid. Moreover, public interest could be achieved only by the representatives of 
the state and that identification was the key legitimising base for planning and 
policy-making in the Former Yugoslavia. Urbanism was very open to interests which 
were coming exclusively from the state sector but which were very restrictive 
towards individual or private interests. Consequently, at the same time citizens were 
indirectly forced to use intermediation, family connections, bribing or giving a 
counter service of the local council or city servant in order to obtain a building 
permit or a permit for extension and renovation under the counter.
Although officially the entire society was based on the rigid structure of socialist 
formal organisations and rules, due to their selective implementation the society had 
realised that informal links were becoming the major weapon for the fulfilment of 
interests. On the other hand, the elite kept illegal building out of the agenda and kept 
the ‘housing’ problem latent. At the same time, the elite created an institutional 
framework favourable to their own interests and reinforced social and political values 
and institutional practices that, as suggested by Bachrach and Baratz (1970), limited 
the scope of the political process to issues innocuous to themselves. The institutional 
context for both informal rules and illegal building was grounded during socialism, 
but they developed and continued in the post-communist era.
9.2 Institutional Transition
The inheritance from the communist period discussed above progressed more during 
the post-communist period. The command economy of the country, affected by civil 
wars, international sanctions and irregular internal running, failed to restructure, and 
therefore deteriorated. The most successful state companies were run by the political 
elite who used them for personal profit. In order to survive, the majority of citizens 
turned towards the black economy and semi-formal forms of making a living. The 
political system, described as a political dictatorship, mobilised the black economy
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out from the political agenda for two reasons. First, the elite was involved in the 
black economy itself. Second, by not intervening, the political elite was buying both 
social peace and electoral votes. All of this was allowed through the functioning of 
informal institutions, of which corruption was the most powerful.
The change of institution of the public interest was followed by raising many new 
individual interests (non-existent or well hidden in the communist period). Political 
capitalism (Staniszikis, 1991) and demagogic populism (Greskovits, 1995) exercised 
by the ruling elite led to an economic collapse that created fertile ground for the 
escalation of corruption. The ruling elite had fused its institutions and power 
structures with those of the state. Civil society remained weak and under constant 
harassment by the ruling elite (Thomas, 1999). The ruling elite used such a political 
and economic setting to profit from every segment of Belgrade’s economy. One way 
of doing this was by selling the most valuable resource of the city - building land for 
building (legal or quasi-legal) from which the profits were enormous (Petovar, 1998).
With regard to political parties, it was revealed that most of them took part in 
informal coalitions with the ruling regime, and in this way helped in the creation of 
the national institutional context to be dominated by informal institutions. The 
frequent change of political positions by most of the parties created uncertainty and 
distrust among citizens. Furthermore, the frequent elections were characterised by 
many promises given by political parties that most often stayed only promises used 
for manipulation. The citizens lost the belief in political parties as institutions with 
the major function of being their representatives and of controlling each other in 
political arena. Instead, the frequent informal coalitions and changes of rules 
motivated citizens to behave in the same manner and to accept the informal 
institutions created by politicians.
The frequent elections were usually a cover for the ruling regime’s reign making the 
state appearing more democratic. Due to the control of the media and frequent 
changes of laws which ruling parties were shaping according to their needs, the 
ruling regime had a significant advantage and so was very keen on the use of
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elections as a defence from opposition parties and for buying social peace. However, 
one of the topics that was avoided in election campaigns was illegal building. A 
significant proportion of the electorate were illegal builders (if not directly then 
relatives and friends of illegal builders). Neither governing nor opposition parties 
wanted to lose votes from illegal builders. Although a small number of parties paid 
lip service to cracking down on illegal construction, they did little to oppose it in 
practice. Subsequently, illegal buildings were rapidly spreading across the city like 
an epidemic.
Furthermore, inefficient formal institutions inherited from communism responsible 
for building issues were replaced by informal institutions. “Procedures for the issuing 
of building permission and exercising development control have in general been 
nullified by corruption and lawlessness, despite the enactment of new formal controls 
by local governments run by democratic parties, who in some case were practicing 
even worse standards of planning and housing management” (Prodanovic, 2000: 
280). Public confidence in Belgrade has thus been severely shaken by the evident 
and visible attacks on the valuable public assets of the city through usurpation, illegal 
acquisition, and uncontrolled sales and chaotic development (Petovar, 2003). 
“Within the context of a prolonged war economy, confidence has been eroded in 
public morality and unlimited abuse of power exercised in the area of urban land 
policy where the key to ‘cheap profit’ is linked to minimal or non-existent 
responsibility exercised towards the previous legal owners of urban land and 
property” (Prodanovic, 2000: 280). The land that was nationalised during 
communism was acquired by developers associated with the centralised strongholds 
of power, through a chain of closely and informally connected privileged persons 
who did not respect any restrictions and obtained valuable assets at virtually no cost 
(Petovar, 2001; Petovar, 2003; Zdravkovic, 2001) This informal network, “even 
called by some officials ‘urbanistic mafia’, was effectively deciding on the allocation 
of urban land, naming architects and developers who constructed the infrastructure 
and buildings to their own specifications” (Prodanovic, 2000:280).
The enormous extent of corruption and the decision-making process carried out far 
from the public eye resulted in an increase in densities of development, the
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suppression of traffic and parking problems, construction in public spaces, and huge 
ecological damage. In the long term it also damaged the public interest, the sense of 
urbanity and urban identity and the overall visual city fabric.
9.3 Dedinje and Zemun
An analysis of two case studies sought to produce theoretical replication across them, 
whereby a theory was developed that explained the different results obtained from 
the case studies as being due to ‘predictably’ different circumstances or conditions 
under which they occurred (Yin, 1994). Yin suggests that one goal of the multiple 
case study approach is to “build a general explanation that fits each of the individual 
case studies, even though the cases will vary in their details” (Yin, 1994:112). 
Comparative analysis has been identified as invaluable in the testing and building of 
theory (Silverman, 2001). Issues and themes identified within Dedinje and Zemun 
were compared and contrasted in order to build explanations for illegal building and 
to identify the key drivers of this practice. In adopting a comparative approach to 
cross-analysis, these explanations are expressed in a range of ways by providing 
information, justifying actions or beliefs, giving reasons, supporting a claim or 
providing causal links (Draper, 1988). As Bryman has argued, through an in-depth 
exploration of the phenomenon in its setting, the qualitative case study researcher is 
in a better position to “view the linkages between events and activities and to explore 
people’s interpretations of the factors which produce such connections” (1988:102).
The Dedinje case study examined how powerful people and the Serbian political elite 
and subelites created a corrupt environment in the building sector by changing rules 
and institutions and adapting them to suit their own interests. The first rule that was 
changed was related to the change of ownership status for state-owned properties. 
The political elite used inherited distribution channels for goods and exclusive 
information access from the communist period. By creating new, unofficial rules 
applicable only to themselves and their close co-operators, they transferred the state- 
owned properties into their hands. The existing formal rules on the ownership of the 
properties were completely ignored and properties were given to friends, family or
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party colleagues (‘Dipos’ properties for example). In some cases rules were changed 
in a way they would justify the elite’s actions. For example, houses were rented as 
being flats in order to get the right to be privatised and sold. Some politicians tried to 
make their actions look legal by partially following the rules. For example, some 
exchanged their properties for properties located in Dedinje, but usually the size and 
value of the properties were far below the value of obtained assets.
Another mechanism used in Dedinje was the reconstruction mechanism, when 
developers applied for permits for reconstruction, but usually built new objects 
exceeding by up to ten times the size allowed in the permit. However, none of those 
objects was demolished. One of the explanations given by informants for the huge 
number of issued permits of that type was that developers had corrupt connections 
with either local, city or republic authorities. Even when local authorities wanted to 
react, they were unable to act fast due to the slow and complex inherited rules and 
procedures. Furthermore, even in the cases when they passed all procedures and got a 
decision to demolish, they would not implement it because demolishing could have 
annoyed their electoral body.
The change of the planning rules in the Regulatory Plan for Dedinje also revealed the 
strength of informal networks. Both ruling and opposition parties took part in passing 
the Plan that incorporated new rules such as Act 43 and that exempted the elite in 
Dedinje from legal consequences and enabled them to legalise their illegally built 
properties. The changed building coefficient had the same purpose end enabled 
objects, the size of which exceeded the allowed size in the building permit, to be 
legalised.
Furthermore, it has been revealed that in the highest political institution, the state, 
President Slobodan Milosevic was breaking the rules and obtained and extended his 
villa illegally. The most successive businessman in the country also illegally built or 
extended seven objects in Dedinje. The headquarters of Pink Television is another 
case where people close to Milosevic’s regime were using privileges, ignoring the 
law and making huge profits.
252
The Dedinje case study dealt with the experience of the Serbian elite, but the Zemun 
case study focused on the illegal building carried out by the non-elite. The main 
differences are in terms of locations, sizes, objects’ purposes and architectural styles, 
but there are many similarities in the way illegal building was organised especially in 
the way informal links were established in order for the state institutions to be 
bypassed. In addition, this council was chosen because it was led by a different 
political party than any other council in Belgrade and because it has the highest 
number of illegally built objects.
The first similarity found when Zemun was examined was that the land was allocated 
to friends, family and party members and supporters, as was the case with properties 
in Dedinje. Again, this was achieved through informal connections. Furthermore, the 
Radical Party that had an informal coalition at some level with the regime for a long 
time was powerful enough to break the law and to sell the state-owned land allocated 
by the plan for a waste disposal zone. The Radicals ‘allowed’ the illegal building of a 
shopping centre on an archaeological site protected by law as well as building on 
Zemun Quay, protected by UNESCO as cultural heritage. The term ‘allowed’ simply 
means that it was not prevented or blocked. In addition, the protected oldest public 
administration building was taken to be party headquarters.
The Radical Party used social divisions to strengthen their own positions and to 
undermine the power of their opponents. They especially targeted refugees from the 
former Yugoslav republics and they argued that they allowed illegal building in order 
to provide housing for refugees. In spite of their arguments, it was exposed that the 
Radicals used the same principle, already tested by other local governments, which 
included issuing of permits for temporary objects and kiosks to everyone who was 
ready to pay. Lofts had been sold in order to be converted into flats, and by the end 
the Radicals were allocating or selling plots for individual building.
In contrast to Dedinje, illegal building in Zemun was on a massive scale and difficult 
to monitor. In Dedinje, illegality was used by the elite to provide exclusive villas for 
their living, and since they controlled all institutions in the country, they could not
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have been stopped. The elite changed the rules in the field of property ownership 
regulation. This was also a message sent to the whole society that rules can be 
disrespected and replaced by new ones that conform more to private interests. 
However, in Zemun the elite used illegality not only to gain personal and party 
benefits, but also as an electoral tactic, a vote-buying strategy. The elite from 
Dedinje, who ran the Republic, did not stop the Radicals because first, its members 
were involved in illegal building themselves and second, it was also looking to avoid 
‘upsetting’ the electoral body. In addition the SPS, the JUL and the Radical Party 
coalition were ruling at all levels of power, from federal to local, and there was a 
silent informal coalition based on not intervening in this sphere of politics and 
mobilising it out from the political agenda.
The SPO, the DS and the GSS won Belgrade in the 1996/1997 elections. Since the 
coalition between them fell apart, the SPO ruled on its own. Although it was not in 
coalition with the Radicals, it never tried to block them in Zemun and stop illegal 
building. This indicates the strength of the informal political networks made around 
illegal building and their power to change and set new rules that will benefit them in 
spite of being in opposition to the rule of law. This so called ‘urbanistic mafia’ was 
an informal network that consisted of numerous politicians from various parties as 
well as of various businessman and developers who controlled everything from urban 
land allocation in the Agency to development, urban permits, building permits and 
the legalisation and demolishing process (Petovar, 2001; flic 2001).
9.4 Institutions Today
In spite of the removal of the Milosevic regime and the implementation of 
democratic changes from 5th October 2000, the problem of corruption has not 
disappeared. The new government has been engaged in the difficult process of 
defining new basic mles and institutions in order to govern the economy and society, 
but the process of transition has been slowed down due to the huge impact of 
corruption. Corruption is still ensuring the advantage of these new rules for narrow 
vested interests and is distorting economic and political development. Corruption
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also undermines the driving forces behind reforms. According to a World Bank 
analysis, the experience of anti-corruption programs and structural reforms to date 
has produced mixed results due to the blockage by powerful vested interests. One of 
the underlying reasons for this is the overemphasis on technocratic measures as well 
as a uniform approach that does not take into account the capacity of the state and the 
channels of transparency between the state and civil society (Kaufmann, 2000).
With regard to illegal building, the easiest solution would be that everything built 
illegally should be demolished. However, this is not feasible in either political, 
economic or social terms. Another easy solution would be that everything that is 
built illegally should be legalised. However this raises many other questions such as 
urban sustainability as well as the issue of equality. Why should some illegal builders 
be more privileged than others who paid all legal fees and provided documentation 
before starting building? The new government chose the second option and passed 
the new Law on Planning and Construction in 2001.58 According to this Law illegal 
building is treated as a criminal offence. An entrepreneur who is a contractor or 
responsible for illegal building will be imprisoned for one year, while the investor 
might face up to three years imprisonment if he/she invests in developments without 
legal documentation (Article 149, Law on Planning and Construction, 2001). 
Following this law that actually stopped illegal building, the government called for 
legalisation of illegal objects across Serbia. However the response was insignificant 
with many illegal builders arguing that they could not afford to pay legalisation fees. 
Moreover, when the new government came to power in 2004, they used legalisation 
as an election promise. The current Minister for Capital Investment in charge for 
building and construction indirectly abolished illegal building arguing that builders 
built to provide housing for themselves, and that they do not have to pay legalisation 
fees because they are too high. The solution to the problem has not yet been found by 
the new Minister. Moreover, illegal building has stopped being mentioned by 
politicians, as if it never occurred. For the illegal builders this means that they have 
been abolished and the message sent to the public is that informality paid off. 
Furthermore, the change in politics towards illegal builders brings instability and
58 Official Bulletin of Republic of Serbia 2001(43).
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encourages citizens to expect that if they build illegally in the future, they will be 
able to get away with it without consequence.
With regard to election promises on illegal building given before the DOS came to 
power, little has been done. Although many property frauds committed by ex­
officials were discovered, hardly any action has been taken by the new government 
to penalise them, even where instances are reported to the Federal Inspectorate. The 
fact that most of the officials of the former regime still live in properties that they 
have not acquired legally suggests that a degree of state protection remains. The 
Minister for Justice, Vladan Batic, and Prime Minister of Serbia, Zoran Zivkovic 
(period 2000-2004) blamed their ex-coalition partners in the Federal Parliament for 
this problem. The Housing and Administrative committees, which are in charge of 
solving problems with properties that were annexed and illegally gained, are 
organised on the principle of parity (half of the members are from Serbia and half are 
from Montenegro). Since many of the Montenegrin representatives and members 
gained their properties in this suspicious way, there was a lack of will to address this 
issue, and consequently the ex-officials from the SPS, the JUL and the SRS were 
amnestied (Zivkovic quoted in Vasic, 2003). They also stated that malversations 
stopped since the DOS came to power in 2000, and that the Commission decided to 
annul allocation decisions for 29 flats and to take away 10 irregularly allocated flats. 
Compared to 12,000 missing properties, this result is not very impressive. Judicial 
institutions have not started doing their job yet, and it is up to them to fix the 
situation.
Another problem that still cannot be resolved is the case of the Magistrat building. 
Regarding the shopping centre, it was opened in April 2002 with the appropriate 
ceremony attended by many celebrities and many influential businessmen. The 
Mayor of Belgrade at the time, Radmila Hrustanovic, attended the opening ceremony 
too (Vlahovic, 2002). However, nobody from the local authorities attended, neither 
the councillors who voted for the questionable permit nor those who did not. 
Zemunikum is now open, and investor Dejan Obradovic said that they have all the 
necessary documents and permits (Vlahovic, 2002). Additionally, this centre will be 
incorporated into the urbanistic plan, which will close the circle of necessary
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documents. It seems that double standards were applied again and the institution of 
informal connections was much stronger than the official laws.
Regarding the Radical Party which moved into the Magistrat building, the situation is 
as follows. On 17th March 2003, the 4th Municipality Court passed a verdict on 
annulations of the lease contract for Magistrat and gave the Radical Party fifteen 
days to leave. The verdict was based on the fact that the building is allocated for 
cultural manifestations or public administration, and because it is a historic site 
(Jakovljevic and Tanasic, 2004). However, the Radicals appealed to the Supreme 
Court. A year later, they are still in the building. Although there were four attempts 
by the local council to move them out, they were unsuccessful. The fourth attempt 
was on 30th March when fifty supporters of the Radical Party did not allow the Court 
executors to enter the building. Additionally, there were only four policemen 
accompanying the Court executors, in spite of the fact that the local council 
requested many more special police (Jakovljevic and Tanasic, 2004). The local 
council of Zemun sent an appeal to the Government of Serbia and the Interior 
Ministry to support and help them to implement decisions. The police refused to help, 
arguing that it was not within their jurisdiction (Jakovljevic and Tanasic, 2004). The 
President of the council, Vladan Janicijevic, argued that the police did not intervene 
deliberately due to their connections with the Radicals (News B92, 01.04.2004). This 
is further evidence of the institutional weakness of the juridical system. Even when 
decisions and verdicts are given, it is difficult to enforce them, especially when the 
police do not provide necessary support.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court restarted the case of the Zemun local council versus 
the Radical Party. The full content and explanation for this decision is not known yet, 
either to the public or to both sides in the process (Majdin, 2004). However, it again 
demonstrates institutional weakness and instability, where one institution denies the 
decision of the other no matter what the consequences, and creates an environment 
where people or parties see the opportunity to defraud the system knowing that they 
will be able to profit for a long period of time, because the institutions cannot or do 
not want to react. Desperate and unable to implement the law, the local council 
decided to appeal to the International Court of Justice in Strasbourg, claiming that
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the whole legal system is not working (Nedeljkovic in B92, 2004). The International 
Court of Justice in Strasbourg can ensure that if the state does not fulfil its decision it 
has to pay fines, and therefore councillors hope that it will force the Serbian 
Government to implement the decision.
With regard to Pink television, it can only be added that the building is still there and 
that Pink was the most watched and popular television station in Serbia in 2004. 
However, the biggest institutional surprise came from the Supreme Court which 
decided in March 2005 to return the questioned villa to Slobodan Milosevic, no 
matter that it was both obtained and extended in an illegal way. The decision was 
based on the argument that Milosevic cannot defend himself in court while he is 
being detained in the Hague (News B92, 25.02.2005).
It turned out that the new government's settling of accounts with Milosevic’s elite 
and so-called tycoons was very superficial. One might even call it a token operation 
as only a few people ended up being charged. Of those charged, the cases against 
them are moving slowly and the outcomes seem very uncertain. Due to the 
inefficiency of institutions and laws, many have managed to legalise their properties 
as, for example, Karic did with all seven villas in Dedinje. The biggest problem 
remains the fact that their private property, which has probably been illegally 
acquired, is not being called into question. No measures were taken to change this. 
Part of the new government structure and those who had acquired financial power 
during the previous regime have been working together (Ilic and Zdravkovic, 2001). 
Much evidence suggests that, besides the legally constituted authorities, there is a so- 
called para-structure uniting the grey zones of political, financial, and military power. 
This arrangement was established even while the old regime was still in office, and if 
there are no new transparent and accountable institutions with clearly defined laws 
and rules, they will be able to keep operating and gaining huge personal profits in the 
future.
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9.5 New Institutionalism - contribution to theory
This research aims to fill a significant gap that exists in urban studies in Eastern 
Europe, where the extent and implications of illegal development have been 
overlooked and underestimated. It also tries to contribute to a general new 
institutionalism theory by analysing the significance of informal links in relation to 
institutions.
At the theoretical level, there have not been any attempts to explain fully the 
influence of the aforementioned factors dominating the ideological, political and 
economic scene from the beginning of the post-communist period and their influence 
on the development of Belgrade. In the field of urban planning, which is still 
dominated by approaches from rational comprehensive theory59, the approaches of 
neoliberal economics have been used, with some fragments from institutional 
economics (Begovic, 1995). Some attempts have been undertaken to develop a more 
appropriate theoretical background for the transitional period, based on various 
theoretical sources (Vujosevic, 1996; Vujosevic and Spasic, 1996), but those 
approaches conceptually conform to the theories which had already been made 
during the communist period (Vujosevic, 2000). Therefore, a more comprehensive 
and overall analysis of illegal development in Belgrade was more than necessary.
This thesis intends to contribute to the research of the delicate issue of illegal 
building, and combines several levels of theory in order to establish a theoretical 
ground for future research on similar issues as each of these theories have strengths 
and weaknesses as explanatory tools. Hunter’s elitism helps in defining pyramids of 
power and does help to explain the behaviour of the elite. Pluralism provides some 
help in the analysis of coalition building during elections, and explains how this 
relates to the rest of the society. Neo-elitism helps in the analysis of mobilisation of 
bias and the creation of a political agenda. Communist and post-communist housing 
theories are used as a partial explanation for the initial development of illegal
59 Lindblom, C (1959), ‘The science of muddling through’.
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building in the early 1970s. However, new institutionalism puts all these theories into 
the appropriate framework to be applied to understanding a corrupt society.
Following the work of March and Olsen (1984), this research takes into account the 
social, economic and political behaviour and analyses them in relation to institutions 
in terms of rules and routines that consequently emerged. In particular, this research 
focuses on informal conventions as well as formal rules and structures, and on the 
ways in which institutions embodied values and power relationships. The empirical 
chapters of this thesis comprehensively argue that informal institutions should be 
taken seriously. Conceptualising informal networks is an important element of urban 
political analysis, especially in post-communist societies. Corruption is often a 
dominant institution imposed by informal networks. Corrupt rules become a logic of 
appropriateness. The examination of illegal building confirmed that informal 
networks played a vital part in process. The space for corruption in the building area 
and the creation of interest-based coalitions was far-reaching and the profits 
enormous. The elite and subelites and the informal networks they created around 
illegal building were stronger than the institutions of the system. They created their 
own rules that were followed by many as well as new rules and routines that defined 
inappropriate actions and relations between individuals and institutions. Those rules 
were imposed on institutions and institutions furthermore deflected them to the rest 
of society which, living under abnormal political and economic conditions, accepted 
them with ease. Their bottom up impact on the institutions resulted in even greater 
corruption.
Factors that directed the construction of a dominant political coalition within a given 
set of structural constraints and opportunities, and around which political parties 
were creating new rules and norms as well as informal coalitions, were profit making 
and buying of the electoral body. Corruption became an embodied informal 
institution in Serbia in the 1990s, widely accepted by all spheres of society. 
Therefore this research supports the notion that the elite, the informal networks they 
created with the subelites and consequently the rules that they produced, are central 
to the understanding of the development of illegal building in Belgrade in the 1990s.
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However, although new institutionalism helps in conceptualising the power relations 
among actors by theoretically analysing informal networks, it does not give a 
methodological approach for a practical examination of informal networks. A 
problem for conducting this research was setting the adequate research methodology 
bearing in mind the sensitivity of the subject investigated and lack of available 
information. Furthermore, the most informal networks are secretive. It means that 
getting information out of them is very difficult. This difficulty is further exacerbated 
when coalitions and networks are based around illegal issues, as was the case in 
Belgrade.
However, one of the key strengths of the research lies in its attempt to develop a 
theory relating to urban politics, and to use this framework to guide the study of 
illegal building. However, the nature of the theoretical framework limits the breadth 
and depth of understanding drawn from specific fields which have traditionally 
carried out research into the political arena. In this sense, the research is limited in its 
ability adequately to address the range of questions which may be brought to bear by 
scholars working within these fields. However, there are two possible arenas for 
further investigation. The first has a geographical perspective, and constitutes a 
comparative study of the cities across the country, paying particular attention to the 
role of the state versus local institutions and parties in forming the illegal sphere for 
building.
The second has a wider geographical and historical perspective, and investigates 
illegal development in other Eastern European countries where the phenomenon 
exists. For example, the very popular coastline of Croatia subject to illegal building. 
Macedonia, a former Yugoslav Republic, faces the same problems across the 
country. Bosnia and Herzegovina are also characterised by illegal building. The most 
extreme example however is Tirana, capital of Albania, which experienced a boom 
in illegal development. The general characteristics of all these areas are their 
communist past and their corruptive present condition. Although there is no apparent 
academic research, the problem of illegality has been evident in many ex-Soviet 
Union countries. Greece and Southern Italy also have problems with illegal building. 
Furthermore, new institutionalism does not necessary have to be used for illegal
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building only, but can be applied to many other issues around which informal 
networks have been formed. New institutionalism has the potential to explain many 
political decisions and their consequences that have not been previously fully 
explained.
In summary, in spite of all the methodological shortages such as lack of reliable and 
complete data and lack of any single theory that would give a comprehensive 
theoretical explanation, this thesis is the first of its kind in my opinion that has 
examined illegal building from a political point of view in a post-communist society. 
The delicate issue of illegality was investigated as deep as possible due to the 
problems of lack of data and information, the refusal of illegal builders to participate 
in the survey and the existing fear among expert informants to talk openly about the 
issue, as explained in the methodological chapter. Still the research carried out gives 
valuable insights into the power relationships, different interests and informal 
networks in Serbia in the 1990s. The mechanisms of the change of rules and the logic 
of appropriateness in institutions are analysed in the post-communist societies. Most 
importantly, it explains how the new rules resulted in the failure of the institutions to 
prevent and later on block the rise of corruption and illegality in the society. 
Therefore, this research can offer valuable starting points for urban analysis, and in 
particular the illegal elements of it, in many of the post-communist societies that 
have similar political and economic backgrounds to Serbia.
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10 Appendix 1:Transparency International CPI index (1999)
Rank Country 2000 CPI score Surveys used St. deviation
i Finland 10 8 0.6
2 Denmark 9.8 9 0.8
3 New Zealand 9.4 8 0.8
3 Sweden 9.4 9 0.7
5 Canada 9.2 9 0.7
6 Iceland 9.1 7 1.1
6 Norway 9.1 8 0.7
6 Singapore 9.1 11 1
9 Netherlands 8.9 9 0.6
10 United Kingdom 8.7 9 0.6
80 Uganda 2.3 4 0.6
81 Mozambique 2.2 3 0.2
82 Kenya 2.1 4 0.3
82 Russian Federation 2.1 10 1.1
84 Cameroon 2 4 0.6
85 Angola 1.7 3 0.2
85 Indonesia 1.7 11 0.8
87 Azerbaijan 1.5 4 0.9
87 Ukraine 1.5 7 0.7
89 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1.3 3 0.9
90 Nigeria 1.2 4 0.6
The Transparency International Corruption Index for 2000 was published on October 
26th 1999. CPI scores relate to perceptions of the depth of corruption as seen by 
business people, risk analysts, and the general public and ranges between 10 (highly 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
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11 Appendix 2: Interview and List of Intrviewed Informants
Interview
1. What do you consider to be the causes of illegal building in Belgrade?
2. What is the scope of illegal building? Do you have statistical evidence on it?
3. For how long have you been facing the problem of illegal building in your 
work?
4. When did illegal building become most intensive?
5. What cases did you have while doing Regulatory and Urban plans?
6. Which areas are attacked the most?
7. Are there any official decisions that have facilitated illegal building?
8. Is there any hidden mechanism behind the illegal building?
9. If so, how would you describe it?
10. Are there any specific institutions / organisations directly responsible for 
illegal building?
11. Are there any persons, according to you, directly responsible for illegal 
building?
12. On what scale have different centres of power (local/political/economic) had 
any influence on Illegal building?
13. Who do you find most responsible for illegal building - the local, city or 
central government?
14. In your opinion is there any corruption involved in the process of obtaining a 
building permit?
15. How would you define the term ‘Urbanistic mafia’, introduced by the ex­
mayor, Nebojsa Covic, in 1995?
264
List of informants:
1. Ljubisav Djuricic, (20/07/2001), Director, City Assembly of Belgrade, The 
Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs;
2. Tanja Jaksic, (09/08/2001), Architect, current member of the City planning 
commission, previously employed in the Bureau for the Protection of Cultural 
Monuments of the City of Belgrade;
3. Ana Dabezic, Architect, Bureau for the Protection of Cultural Monuments of 
the City of Belgrade;
4. Aleksandra Tilinger (18/07/2001), Planner, Town Planning Institute; the 
leader of the team that made an urban plan for Zemun (Case study 2);
5. Jelena Stojanovic (18/07/2001), Senior Planner, Town Planning Institute;
6. Zoran Zegarac,(28/09/2000), Executive Director from 1996, Town Planning 
Institute;
7. Ljiljana Belos, Senior Planner, Town Planning Institute; the leader of team 
that created a regulatory plan for Dedinje in 1995; (Case study 1);
8. Ljubica Zivotic (26/09/2001), Director of the sector for building land, the 
Agency for City Building Land and Development of Belgrade;
9. Slobodanka Prekajski (24/09/2001), The manager of the Marketing sector, 
Agency for City Building Land and Development of Belgrade;
10. Dr Spasoje Krunic (21/09/2001), Ex-President of the City Executive Board 
(1996-2000), Architect, member of Serbian Renewal Movement;
11. Dr Zoran Nikezic (24/09/2001), Ex-Director of the Secretariat for Urban 
Planning (1996-2000), Architect, member of Serbian Renewal Movement;
12. Aleksandar Cotric (30/08/2001), member of the executive board of the city of 
Belgrade (1996-2000), member of the Serbian Renewal Movement;
13. Miodrag Jaksic, (30/08/2001), Architect, member of the Serbian Renewal 
Movement;
14. Sasa Raznatovic (14/08/2001), Vice President of the Zemun local council 
(2000-2004), member of the Democratic Party;
15. Nikola Saveski, (22/08/2001), Vice President of the Savski Venae local 
council (2000-2004);
16. Predrag Zdravkovic (04/09/2001), President of the Association for Protection 
of the Environment of Senjak, Dedinje and Topcider Hill;
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17. Vesna flic, (23/08/2000), Association for Protection of the Environment of 
Senjak, Dedinje and Topcider Hill;
18. Ksenija Petovar (25/09/2001), Professor of urban sociology, Faculty of 
Architecture and Faculty for Geography, University of Belgrade; Local 
Councilor in Savski Venae council;
19. Branko Bojovic, Architect, Institute for Urbanism and Architecture in Serbia;
20. Anonymous interview 1 (02/09/2001)- ex-member of the city government, an 
ex-vice director of the Agency for City Building Land and Development of 
Belgrade;
21. Anonymous interview 2 (27/08/2001)- ex-member of the Stari Grad local 
government;
22. Anonymous interviews with investor A in Dedinje (20/08/2001);
23. Anonymous interviews with investor B in Dedinje (20/08/2001);
24. Anonymous interviews with investor C in Dedinje (01/09/2001);
25. Anonymous interviews with investor D in Dedinje (08/09/2001);
26. Anonymous interviews with investor E in Dedinje (26/09/2001).
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12 Appendix 3: Electoral patterns in Serbia in 1990s
Election turnouts and electoral patterns in Serbia, 1992-2000
0 p'92 rep'92 fed'92 rep ^ lo c ^ fed'96 rep-97 p-97 rep'00
TOTAL 6949150 6777102 6755800 6920571 7158146 7138309 7202498 7225860 5680720
VOTED 4747165 4723711 4694969 4300440 4291797 4306883 4133641 3671053 3321796
ACCOUNTED 4622341 4437904 4435215 4125609 3902735 4069336 3967657 3555234 3243584
SPS 56.3% 28.8% 31.5% 36.7% 30.7% 59.3% 13.20%
SPS-JUL-ND 42.9% 34.3%
SRS 22.6% 21.8% 13.8% 10.7% 17.7% 28.1% 37.5% 8.60%
SPO 19.2% 3.50%
DEPOS 16.9% 17.2% 16.6%
DSS 5.1% 1.5%
TOGETHER 23.7% 22.5%
DS 4.2% 6.0% 11.6%
DS-RDS 1.5% 2.2% 0.0%
DS-RDS-GS 1.2%
DOS 64.70%
SSS 2.7% 0.1%
Coalition Vojvodina 0.4% 1.3% 2.7%
DA-SSS-PPS 1.5%
DZVM 3.0% 2.3% 2.6% 0.7%
SVM 0.7% 1.9% 1.2%
LzaS-dr S.Uglj. 1.3% 1.4% 1.2%
DRS Mus. 0.1%
KP za DD-DPA 0.7%
DK PreSevo-Bujanovac 0.3%
SSJ-RAZNATOVIC 0.4% 5.60%
GG-Milan Panic 33.8%
OTHERS 7.3% 13.8% 12.3% 8.9% 21.1% 6.7% 7.5% 3.40%
Source: www.cesid.org.yu
P- Presidential elections 
Rep- Republic elections 
Fed- Federal elections 
Loc- Local elections
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13 Appendix 4: Change in Population and Number of Dwelling (1991-2002)
A comparison of indices of population change (101.7) and dwellings change (115.6) implies that the 
housing shortage was reduced. But, according to the report by the Town Planning Institute, it was 
estimated that there was a shortage of 70,000 housing units in Belgrade (2001). Petrovic suggests that 
the structural shortage that exists in Belgrade cannot be analysed though a simple comparison of 
numbers of households and population numbers. Although 140,662 refugees came into Belgrade, at 
least 100,000 young people left, mostly from family houses, which did not result in the relief of 
housing stock, because parents remained. The increase in the number of dwellings can only associated 
with illegal building bearing in mind data that show an average decrease in legal housing by 83%.
Table 23: Change in Population and Number of Dwellings (1991-2002)
Population Dwellings
1991 2002 Absolutechange
Index
1991=100
1991 2002 Absolutechange
Index
1991=10
Republic of 
Serbia 7548978 7479437 -69541 99.1 2735313 2981156 245843 109
Urban 4126728 4218096 91368 102.2 1445149 1609219 164070 111.4
Other 3422250 3261341 -160909 95.3 1290164 1371937 81773 106.3
City of 
Belgrade 1548275 1574050 25775 101.7 545804 631197 85393 115.6
Urban 1275158 1280639 5481 100.4 435593 500381 64788 114.9
Suburban 273117 293411 20294 107.4 110211 130816 20605 118.7
Urban Municipalities
Cukarica 149913 168356 18443 112.3 51001 63947 12946 125.4
Palilula 149899 155575 5676 103.8 51132 58524 7392 114.5
Rakovica 96128 98935 2807 102.9 29759 34200 4441 114.9
Savski Venae 45835 42483 -3352 92.7 17589 19156 1567 108.9
Stari Grad 68297 55541 -12756 81.3 26774 28336 1562 105.8
Vozdovac 155922 151746 -4176 97.3 54394 63061 8667 115.9
Vracar 67199 57934 -9265 86.2 27938 29024 1086 103.9
Zvezdara 135334 132352 -2982 97.8 47280 53004 5724 112.1
Zemun 175816 191938 16122 109.2 55855 65495 9640 117.3
Suburban Municipalities
Barajevo 20795 24436 3641 117.5 13354 15140 1786 113.4
Grocka 65516 75376 9860 115 24566 35769 11203 145.6
Lazarevac 57770 58474 704 101.2 21047 22299 1252 105.9
Mladenovac 54393 52394 -1999 96.3 19181 19701 520 102.7
Obrenovac 67420 70974 3554 105.3 25410 29897 4487 117.7
Sopot 19933 20356 423 102.1 12195 13599 1404 111.5
Source: The First Results o f 2002 Census, Federal Statistics Office (2001
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14 Appendix 5: Full explanation of necessary procedure, and institutions 
included in the process of Building Permit Acquirement
The procedure for acquiring planning consent, building, and use permits for housing is defined by the 
Law on City Planning (Official Bulletin of the Republic of Serbia No. 44/95,16/97,46/98), and by the 
Law on Civil Construction (Official Bulletin of the Republic of Serbia No. 44/95) which are 
supplemented by other laws defining the matter of civil construction in the specific segments (water 
management, environmental protection, health-care, road maintenance, etc.). This is the basic 
instruction for obtaining a building permit, found on the official website of the Agency for City 
Building Land and Development of Belgrade P.E. in 2000.
I Information about location
The first necessary step for the investor or developer in the process of obtaining a building permit is 
to get information about the availability of locations for development or how he/she can invest in the 
reconstruction of an existing object. This information can be obtained from lawyers, architecture 
bureaus, in the local municipalities or from appropriate city institutions (Agency). When the required 
information is obtained, the interested investor or developer needs to go to the City Secretariat for 
Urban Planning or to the appropriate local council, where he/she can get further instructions on 
obtaining a building permit. Building of any object is only possible on the location that is anticipated 
for the building by an appropriate planning document or by die local council.
For information about building feasibility on a given location, an interested investor or developer has 
to make a written application to the Secretariat for Urban Planning. For interventions on a smaller 
scale like annexes, adaptations, reconstructions, building of smaller objects which can be connected to 
the existing communal and infrastructure systems without interventions, and the change of land use, 
an interested investor, developer or private builder has to apply to the Secretariat for Urban Planning 
in the Local Council. For the adaptation, reconstruction and building of large objects, the investor 
should go directly to the Secretariat for Urban Planning. The Secretariat for Urban Planning is obliged 
to respond to the investor within eight days of the date the demand is submitted.
II Preparation and approval of the planning project
The planning project defines the planning conditions for construction. Where there is no planning 
project for the specific site, it must be created. This procedure can last from 6 to 12 months. The 
Investor must submit: the proof of land (site) ownership (right of land use), a surveyor's opinion of the 
site and the technical description of the planned investment. In addition, the investor must also submit 
the status report from the utility and other companies maintaining the infrastructure of the site, which 
then become part of the planning project.
1. Initial project.
Investors, developers or private builders, in the process of applying, need to make an initial building 
project. It consists of documents that give details about:
■ The purpose of building;
■ The main facts about the object (general facts about object such as location, the
stages of the planned building, connections with encirclement, etc);
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■ The conditions given in the related planning documentation and facts from the 
previous technical conditions;
■ The legal basis for building, necessary preliminary works on the location, research 
for the corresponding phases of producing technical documentation, coordination 
and cooperation among participants in creating the technical conditions;
■ The structure of the process of producing technical documentation and the structure 
of technical documentation;
■ The deadlines for completion of the building (partial and final);
■ The special conditions for the proceedings of the technical control.
The responding documents have to provide information about the title of the official planning 
document, which consist of the planned intervention on that location, the title and the issue of the 
official bulletin where the document is published, and the short description of all planned 
interventions on that location such as demolishing and removing existing objects, the purpose of the 
planned object, the gross built area, the area under the object, the number of planned floors, parking 
space and information about that and about neighbouring plots that could be affected by building.^If 
the planned project fits into all these regulations, the investor can proceed further with the process of 
getting a permit.
2. Verification of legal and ownership status of the object
The legal and ownership documents that the investor has to provide are the following:
■ A legal document about the ownership status of the plot and the object (certificate 
from the land ownership court books or a legal verdict which replaces the former 
contract or ownership);
■ The accomplished right61 to use the land or object which means that the investor 
owns:
■ The legal decision about inheriting the rights on the land which the former owner 
had;
■ A decision made by the appropriate institution about giving the land for building for 
use on open competitions, a direct agreement in the cases predicted by Law. State 
owned land for building is given for use to the city or to the municipalities 
dependent on the open competition. All auctions and open competitions are 
organised and led by the Agency for City Building Land and Development of 
Belgrade P.E. Immediately after the open competition, the executive board of the 
city or the council, depending on who won the land, makes the official decision 
about giving the land. A certificate for this is produced by the Secretariat for 
property rights and construction affairs or by local municipalities.
■ A certificate from the Land Books which states the right for land use;
The right for adaptation or reverting common space or its part into living space or offices:
■ An act on the change of use of a given space which is passed before 12.7.1995;
■ An agreement about the right to build on flat roofs and the transformation of 
common rooms into flats or offices;
■ A decision made by the legal authorities competent for that building or a written 
agreement of 51% of users or owners of the flats, which is made before 4.11.1995.
60 Act on planning and organisation of the space and settlements in Serbia, Act 47, Official bulletin of the 
Republic of Serbia, 1995 (44)
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1. Geodetic documentation
Geodetic documentation may be acquired in the Republic Geodetic Institution in the Centre for the 
cadastre of real estates of Belgrade and it consists of:
■ The geodetic foundation necessary for getting urban-technical conditions;
■ A copy of the plan of the cadastre with the inscribed decimetre network on it;
■ A topographic plan;
■ The copy of the plan of the infrastructure and underground installations;
■ The protocol of regulation;
■ A report about cadastre plots which make up the building plot.
ED Urban permit (urban-technical conditions)
This phase follows the approval of the planning project by the local authorities. The planning permit is 
issued by the local authority when the investor submits: the proof of site ownership (right of land use), 
the copy of the site plan, the planning project, and the status report from the utility and other 
companies maintaining the environment and infrastructure of the site. This phase should be completed 
within three months.
The urban permit determinates the location for building and the urban and technical conditions under 
which it is going to be built (Paragraph 42, Act on planning and arranging of the space and settlements 
in Republic of Serbia, 1995); Book of regulations about issuing of urban permit and urban consent;
With the application form, the investor/developer/builder has to enclose the proof of site ownership 
(right of land use), a copy of the site plan, urban-technical conditions, the conditions necessary for the 
connection of infrastructure and any special conditions. With all the necessary documents, the investor 
should apply to the City Secretariat for Urban Planning, or the local council or to the Ministry for 
Urbanism and Building of the Republic of Serbia. The Ministry for Urbanism and Building of the 
Republic of Serbia is authorised for issuing building permit for all objects defined in paragraph 24, 
Act on building of objects, (44) 1995.
Investors submit all documents to the City Secretariat for Urban Planning, which checks their validity, 
and their coordination with planning documentation. If everything is correct and in accordance with 
the law and plans, they forward the documents to the Town Planning Institute, which is in charge of 
defining urban-technical conditions.
In order to start with defining urban-technical conditions, the Town Planning Institute has to receive 
geodetic documentation that has been verified by the Geodetic Institute of the Republic of Serbia, as 
well as a program for building and an initial project from the investor at the same time that it receives 
a demand from the City Secretariat for Urban Planning. On the basis of this information, the planning 
document and the conditions obtained from the Communal Utility companies and other organisations, 
the Town Planning Institute produces urban-technical conditions. Urban-technical conditions 
determine the basic spatial and technical conditions for building and development and the 
implementation of the planning document for that area.
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■ Urban-technical conditions for building the object are: purpose, number of floors, 
urban-technical standards and normative, horizontal and vertical regulation of the 
object, position, architectural shape and style, accesses to object, other objects 
allowed on the site, etc;
■ Urban-technical conditions for site arrangement are: demolishing, re-parcelling out 
of lots, levelling of the terrain, pedestrian areas, parking spaces, green space 
arrangement, fence around the building, etc;
■ Urban-technical conditions for connection to the infrastructure networks: water, 
sewage, hot water system, electro energetic system, gas, telephone, television, main 
road connection, garbage collection, etc
■ Special urban-technical conditions are related to: protection of cultural objects, 
protection of authorisation rights, waterpower conditions, health and hygienic 
conditions, conditions for undisturbed movement of disabled people, security and 
protection conditions, etc.
When finished, urban-technical conditions are sent to the City Secretariat for Urban Planning, which 
proceeds with the production of an urban permit.
IV Preparation of the major project
The planning project, i.e. the planning permit, defines the conditions for the creation of the technical 
project. The investor negotiates the costs and time schedule with a construction company. Parallel 
with urban technical conditions, which are an integral part of the urban permit, and conditions to draw 
up the plan for the object that the investor obtains from public communal services, the investor starts 
with producing a major technical project. A major project consists of working out details from the 
initial project, on a precisely set location. It includes:
■ Additional analysis;
■ Working out of technical characteristics;
■ Stability and security calculation and building physics calculations;
■ Foundation project;
■ Technical and organisational building solutions;
■ Working out of details for connection to communal and other infrastructure and 
green space arrangement;
■ Protection of neighbourhood objects;
■ Prevention of negative impact on the environment;
■ Costs of building;
■ Geodetic-technical documentation necessary for building.
In addition to the above documents, a proof of registration of the Project company and control of 
licence of architects involved in the process of projecting and planning is also required.
In the case of building onto existing objects, additional analysis has to be done:
■ That object will not endanger the stability or safety of the existing object;
■ That built extension will not worsen the existing usage of the object;
■ That the finished object fulfils the stability and safety living conditions in that object.
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In the case of the transformation of common space (e.g. room for drying laundry) into living space or 
offices it has to be checked that all technical conditions are fulfilled and it will not affect the stability 
of the object as well as that the usage of the rest of the object will not worsen.
Technical documentation that relates to small scale intervention or reconstruction consists of a sketch 
of the basic and characteristic cross sections, the appearance of the object and a description of all the 
works to be undertaken.
The next step is collecting consent from all public communal services and other organisations from 
which previous documents and permits were obtained. All of this, together with the urban permit, is 
submitted by the investor to the City Secretariat for Urban Planning in order to get urban consent, 
which confirms that all technical documentation is in accordance with the Urban Permit. After getting 
urban consent, the Agency determines the costs the investor has to pay for the arrangement and use of 
the urban building land with a deadline for payment. The investor also needs to submit proof for (of?) 
tax payments. At that time, a revision commission makes a report about the validity of the technical 
cocumentation and does the final check of the architects’ licences.
After receiving the application for a building permit, the Secretariat for Property Rights and 
Construction Affairs or an adequate local council inspects it together with all documents and it 
verifies their validity and accuracy. If the documentation is incomplete, the Secretariat for Property 
Rights and Construction Affairs instructs the investor to provide the missing documents. It also gives 
the deadline and the notification of additional costs and tax that have to be paid. If the investor misses 
a given deadline, the Secretariat for Property Rights and Construction Affairs is allowed to reject the 
application, issue a building permit (permanent or temporary) or it may be involved in the trial if the 
investor decides to complain in court.
V Obtaining the building permit
To obtain the building permit, the investor must submit the technical project and approvals of the 
technical project from different institutions (technical control of the project, the protection of the work 
environmental, sanitary, veterinary, water works, fire prevention, power company, etc.), depending on 
the type of project. The investor must also submit the urban permit, pay the fees for land planning and 
the reclassification of land use if the land was agricultural. The building permit could be acquired 
within a period of 3 to 6 months, depending on the time needed for different approvals.
VI Construction Phase
The investor hires a construction company of his/her choice. The building period depends on the size 
and technical characteristics of the premises to be built, as well as on the construction company’s 
capacities. It should be stated that the investor and the construction company must strictly follow the 
proposition from the building permit.
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VII Obtaining the usability permit
Once construction is finished, the investor needs to obtain the use permit. The local authorities must 
carry out an inspection to ensure that the construction was implemented according to the approved 
technical project and building permit. Also, the investor must register the property with the land 
register. The procedure lasts up to 3 months
As can be seen, the period necessary for obtaining the building permit in Belgrade is between 2 and 
three years, which explains why citizens decided to skip the whole process and to start corrupting civil 
servants in order to get a permit.
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The legal basis for getting all the accounted documentation is huge The most crucial laws are the 
following:
1. Act on City Planning (Official Bulletin of the Republic of Serbia No. 44/95,16/97,46/98),
2. Act on Building of objects Official Bulletin of the Republic of Serbia (44/95; 24/96; 16/97).
3. Act on Building Land, Official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia 1995 (44) and 1997 (16);
4. Act on expropriation, Official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia 1992 (83), 1993 (67), 1994
(47) and 1996 (12);
5. Act on state measuring, land register and records about rights for use of the estates, Official 
bulletin of the Republic of Serbia 1992 (83), 1993 (67), 1994 (47), 1996 (12);
6. Act on the basis of legally-ownership relationships, Official bulletin of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia 1980 (6) and, Official bulletin of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
1996 (36);
7. Act on building onto objects and transformation of common rooms into flats, Official bulletin 
of the Socialist Republic of Serbia 1988 (24);
8. Act on stop of relevance of Act on building onto objects and transformation of common 
rooms into flats, Official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia 1994 (46);
9. Act on planning and arranging of the space and settlements in the Republic of Serbia (1995);
10. Act on the funds owned by the Republic of Serbia, Official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia
1995 (53), 1996 (3), 1996 (54), 1997 (32);
11. Act on nationalisation of the buildings for rent and land for building, Official bulletin of the 
Federal Peoples’ Republic of Yugoslavia, 1958 (52), 1959 (3);
12. Act on turnover of properties, Official bulletin of the Socialist Republic of Serbia 1981 (43), 
1987 (27), 1989 (6), 1989 (40);
13. Act on special conditions for turnover of properties, Official bulletin of the Socialist 
Republic of Serbia 1989 (30), 1989 (42);
14. Act on the restrictions on turnover of properties, Official bulletin of the Republic of Serbia 
1989 (30); 1989 (42), 1991 (22);
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